Ronald Cauthern v. Roland Colson
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22944
| 6th Cir. | 2013Background
- Ronnie Cauthern was convicted of the 1987 murders and rape of Patrick and Rosemary Smith; physical evidence and witness statements tied him to the crimes.
- After an initial direct appeal and remand, Cauthern was resentenced in 1995 (venue changed). The jury returned death for Rosemary’s murder and life for Patrick’s.
- Cauthern pursued state post-conviction relief (evidentiary hearings) and then a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the district court denied relief but granted a COA on one issue and this Court expanded the COA.
- This Sixth Circuit panel reviewed five principal claims on AEDPA standards: prosecutorial misconduct in rebuttal, ineffective assistance of counsel at resentencing (failure to investigate/present mitigation and other errors), Brady suppression claims, exclusion of mitigation (Eddings claim), and vagueness of Tennessee’s HAC aggravator.
- The panel affirmed the district court on Eddings, Brady, and HAC claims, but reversed and granted a conditional writ on prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective-assistance claims, ordering resentencing within 180 days or vacatur of the death sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prosecutorial misconduct (rebuttal invoking "evil one," Dahmer, Susan Smith, biblical rhetoric) | The rebuttal was inflammatory, appealed to juror passion, and so infected sentencing that due process was violated | The remarks, though improper, were invited by defense argument, the trial court instructed jury, and overwhelming evidence made prejudice unlikely | Reversed: state court unreasonably applied Darden; misconduct was so pervasive and egregious that confidence in death sentence was undermined (habeas relief granted) |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel (failure to investigate/present mitigating witnesses, other investigative failures) | Trial/resentencing counsel failed to investigate and present significant mitigation (step-siblings’ abuse testimony, experts, investigation of co-defendant), causing Strickland prejudice | State courts found limited investigation explanations and no reasonable probability of a different outcome; some proposed evidence would be marginal or inadmissible | Reversed as to certain claims (notably failure to investigate/present step-siblings): state adjudication unreasonably applied Strickland; prejudice established for mitigation failure; conditional writ granted |
| Brady suppression (police report re: witness Andrew, payment to Andrew, vandalism of Andrew’s car) | State withheld impeachment/Brady material that could have undermined witness Andrew’s credibility and affected guilt/penalty | State courts conceded suppression but found evidence not material — no reasonable probability of different result given other evidence | Affirmed: AEDPA deference upheld; withheld items not material enough to undermine confidence in outcome |
| Exclusion of son’s letter (Eddings/mitigation exclusion) | Trial court excluded a short letter from petitioner’s son; exclusion prevented consideration of relevant mitigation and should require resentencing | State argues exclusion was harmless because same mitigating facts (son, photo, jury instruction) were before jury; harmless-error review is appropriate | Affirmed: state court reasonably applied harmless-error review; exclusion not structural error requiring automatic resentencing |
| Vagueness of HAC aggravator (use of post‑1989 statutory language at resentencing) | Wrong statutory wording used; HAC is vague and error tainted sentencing | State used limiting instructions and there was ample evidence of torture/serious physical abuse, rendering the wording error harmless | Affirmed: error was harmless under Chapman; limiting instruction + overwhelming evidence of torture cured any vagueness problem |
Key Cases Cited
- Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (due-process standard for prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution’s duty to disclose favorable, material evidence)
- Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (sentencer must consider all relevant mitigating evidence)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (AEDPA review; state-court unreasonable application standard)
- Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (exclusion of relevant mitigating evidence can require resentencing)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless-error standard for constitutional errors)