Roman Catholic Archdiocese v. Sebelius
987 F. Supp. 2d 232
E.D.N.Y2013Background
- Six New York-area Catholic organizations (Archdiocese, Diocese, two high schools, ArchCare, CHSLI) challenge the ACA contraceptive "Coverage Mandate" and HHS/DoL/DoT regulations that require contraceptive coverage without cost-sharing. Nonprofit religious organizations may be "exempt" (religious employers) or, if not exempt, may use an "accommodation" that requires a self-certification to their insurer/TPA, which then must provide coverage.
- The Diocese and Archdiocese qualify as "religious employers" and are exempt; the other plaintiffs qualify as "eligible organizations" and would have to sign the self-certification or provide coverage, which they say violates their religious beliefs against facilitating contraception/abortifacients.
- Plaintiffs sued under RFRA, the APA, and the First Amendment (Free Exercise, Establishment, Free Speech). The Government cross-moved for summary judgment after promulgating final rules implementing the accommodation.
- The Government late-asserted that the plaintiffs’ plans are ERISA "church plans," which may limit DoL enforcement against TPAs; plaintiffs argue they nonetheless face coercion because the rules force them to choose actions (self-certify or provide coverage) that violate their religion.
- The district court found Article III standing, held that non-exempt (non-Diocesan) plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial burden under RFRA from the self-certification and related requirements, and granted their summary judgment on RFRA; it denied RFRA relief to the exempt Diocesan plaintiffs and entered judgment for the Government on their non-RFRA claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing | Plaintiffs have standing because the Mandate forces them to choose between violating their religion or facing fines; spiritual complicity suffices | Defendants: no standing because regulations rely on ERISA enforcement of TPAs and plaintiffs’ plans are church plans, so TPAs won’t be compelled | Standing found: plaintiffs sufficiently allege injury-in-fact (spiritual complicity); suit may proceed |
| Substantial burden under RFRA | The self-certification and compelled arrangements force plaintiffs to facilitate contraceptive coverage, violating sincere religious beliefs; any compulsion ("just a form") is substantial | Government: the accommodation avoids burden — self-certification is administrative/de minimis and does not force plaintiffs to contract, pay, or refer | Non-Diocesan plaintiffs: self-certification and coercive choice impose a substantial burden; Diocesan plaintiffs: no substantial burden because they are exempt |
| Compelling interest / least restrictive means | Plaintiffs: government has not shown a compelling interest in applying Mandate to them specifically and less restrictive alternatives exist (direct provision, subsidies, third-party arrangements) | Government: promoting public health and equal access to contraception; uniform enforcement is necessary; exemptions are limited/justified | Government fails strict scrutiny as to non-exempt plaintiffs: interests not shown compelling as applied and Mandate is not least restrictive means; non-exempt plaintiffs prevail on RFRA |
| Injunctive relief | Plaintiffs seek injunction to stop enforcement against them | Government: public interest in access and uniform enforcement outweighs harm | Permanent injunction granted for non-exempt plaintiffs (irreparable harm, balance of equities & public interest favor plaintiffs); Diocesan non-RFRA claims denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (compulsion to act against religious belief triggers strict scrutiny)
- Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (courts must accept the sincerity and centrality of asserted religious beliefs)
- Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (RFRA requires tailored, claimant-specific compelling interest showing)
- United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (compulsory tax/participation can substantially burden religion when it requires forbidden acts)
- Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (laws that exempt many but burden some implicate strict scrutiny)
- Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (RFRA analysis treating substantial pressure/compulsion as substantial burden)
- Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013) (similar RFRA holding regarding Mandate; examination of accommodation)
- Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (RFRA analysis of contraceptive mandate)
- Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1996) (substantial pressure to violate religious belief constitutes substantial burden)
- Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (no substantial burden where plaintiff had no role in third-party conduct challenged)