275 F. Supp. 3d 898
N.D. Ill.2017Background
- Edwin and Magalia Rojas sued X Motorsport and Villa Park defendants for alleged unlawful detention at a dealership (claims include emotional distress). The case is related to a prior TILA suit by Edwin.
- During depositions of nonparty Onesimo Rojas and plaintiff Magalia Rojas, opposing counsel (Horwitz for Plaintiffs/Onesimo and Lewis for X Motorsport) engaged in repeated interruptions, instructions not to answer, and profane exchanges.
- Horwitz repeatedly instructed deponents not to answer questions (relevance/privacy objections), coached a witness during breaks, interrupted examination, and told the interpreter not to interpret at times.
- Lewis interrupted and twice told Horwitz to “shut up” (once as “shut [your] big fucking mouth”) and made a sarcastic remark about Lorazepam; she apologized later.
- Cross-motions for sanctions were filed: X Motorsport sought Rule 30(d)(2) sanctions against Horwitz; Plaintiffs sought sanctions under the court’s inherent authority against Lewis.
- The court concluded Horwitz’s conduct violated Rule 30(c)(2) and warranted censure; Lewis’s conduct warranted an admonishment under the court’s inherent authority.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel may instruct a deponent not to answer during deposition | Horwitz (plaintiff) argued many questions were harassing/irrelevant and justified instructions to protect privacy and avoid psychiatric probing | Lewis (defendant) contended questions (e.g., about shoulder, meds, events) were reasonably related to claimed emotional distress and permissible | Court: Instructing a deponent not to answer is allowed only to preserve a privilege, enforce a court limitation, or to present a Rule 30(d)(3) motion; Horwitz’s repeated instructions violated Rule 30(c)(2) and were improper |
| Whether deposition coaching and post-break questioning that changes testimony is permissible | Plaintiffs argued some follow-up was needed to clarify anxiety and memory | Defendants argued such conduct was coaching and shifted testimony improperly | Court: Horwitz’s coaching during breaks and prompting likely caused altered testimony; this conduct was improper and contributed to sanctionable behavior |
| Whether counsel’s unprofessional, profane interjections warrant sanctions | Plaintiffs sought sanctions against Lewis for telling opposing counsel to “shut up” and for the Lorazepam remark; argued misconduct damaged decorum | X Motorsport argued Lewis was provoked by Horwitz’s greater misconduct and that her comments were less serious | Court: Lewis’s profanity and sarcastic Lorazepam remark were improper; she was admonished (less severe) given provocation and apology |
| Appropriate remedial measure (sanctions) | Plaintiffs sought admonishment/sanctions for Lewis under inherent authority | X Motorsport sought monetary sanctions under Rule 30(d)(2) against Horwitz | Court: Horwitz was censured for conduct unbecoming the bar; no monetary award to X Motorsport because Lewis also crossed the line; Lewis received an admonishment under the court’s inherent authority |
Key Cases Cited
- Redwood v. Dobson, 476 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2007) (instructing a witness not to answer based on alleged harassment is improper; counsel must seek protective order rather than silence witness)
- Ramirez v. T & H Lemont, Inc., 845 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2016) (courts have inherent authority to manage proceedings and sanction misconduct)
- Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2012) (inherent power to sanction for willful abuse of process or bad-faith litigation conduct)
- Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (inherent powers are potent and must be exercised with restraint; available to sanction bad-faith litigation conduct)
- Johnson v. Cherry, 422 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2005) (inherent-authority sanctions appropriate for vexatious or oppressive attorney conduct)