2020 IL App (2d) 190215
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background
- Sandra Rojas, an LPN employed by the Winnebago County Health Department since 1996, was cross-trained in 2015 after the Department consolidated eight clinics into one combined clinic.
- Rojas notified management that her Catholic beliefs prevented her from providing birth control, dispensing Plan B, or referring patients for abortions.
- Public health administrator Dr. Martell told Rojas the Department could not accommodate her remaining in the clinic, offered temporary accommodation and two alternative positions (part-time food inspector or LPN at the county nursing home), and gave a short decision window; Rojas resigned effective July 31, 2015.
- Rojas sued under the Health Care Right of Conscience Act and the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act; the trial court denied summary judgment to both sides but certified four legal questions under Ill. S. Ct. R. 308 about burdens of proof, transfers, and whether Title VII-style ‘reasonable accommodation’ defenses apply.
- The appellate court reviewed those certified questions de novo and answered all four in the negative, remanding the cause to the trial court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Must an employee prove an adverse employment action under the Right of Conscience Act? | Rojas: statute protects against discrimination for conscience-based refusals; no Title VII adverse-action requirement should be imported. | Defendants: Right of Conscience Act should be read like Title VII; plaintiff must show an adverse employment action (McDonnell Douglas framework). | No — the court declined to import Title VII’s adverse-employment-action requirement into the Right of Conscience Act. |
| 2) Does transferring an employee to a job without the objected-to duty necessarily violate the Right of Conscience Act? | Rojas: a transfer motivated by her conscience objection is necessarily discriminatory. | Defendants: a transfer can be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory way to address conflicting duties. | No — a transfer is not ipso facto a statutory violation; context and motivation matter. |
| 3) Is Title VII-style ‘reasonable accommodation’ a defense to a Right of Conscience Act claim? | Rojas: absence of such an explicit defense in the statute means no Title VII-style defense applies. | Defendants: employer should be able to rely on reasonable accommodation/undue hardship defenses analogous to Title VII. | No — the Right of Conscience Act contains no reasonable-accommodation/undue-hardship defense and the court will not read one into the statute. |
| 4) Is Title VII-style ‘reasonable accommodation’ a defense to a Religious Freedom Act claim? | Rojas: Religious Freedom Act requires the government to meet the Sherbert/Yoder compelling-interest and least-restrictive-means test; no reasonable-accommodation shortcut exists. | Defendants: in government-employment cases, showing a reasonable accommodation should defeat a substantial-burden claim before compelling-interest analysis. | No — the Religious Freedom Act’s text imposes the compelling-interest/least-restrictive-means test; the court will not import a separate Title VII-style accommodation defense. |
Key Cases Cited
- Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognized constitutional right to choose abortion)
- Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (recognized conscience protections in health-care contexts)
- CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277 (2011) (interpreting ordinary meaning of “discriminate”)
- Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (Title VI interpretation discussion)
- Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (equal-protection/affirmative-action analysis under Title VI)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden-shifting framework for employment discrimination)
- Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (undue-hardship standard for religious accommodation)
- Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (neutral law of general applicability limits free-exercise claims)
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (discussing free-exercise and compelling-interest frameworks)
- Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2000) (refusing to import adverse-action requirement where statute is not limited to employment)
- Morr–Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich, 231 Ill. 2d 474 (2008) (Illinois Supreme Court addressing Right of Conscience Act and pharmacists' claims)
- Vandersand v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (C.D. Ill. 2007) (analyzed Right of Conscience Act separately from Title VII in a pharmacist-refusal case)