Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York City

SERVICE CIVIL ASSOCIATION GUARDIANS al. et THE OF NEW YORK OF CITY COMMISSION et al. July Argued 1982—Decided No. 81-431. November Christopher Crowley argued petitioners. the cause for Kimerling. With him on the briefs was Kenneth argued respondents. Leonard Koerner the cause for With him on the Schwarz, brief was Frederick A. 0. Jr.* urging

*Briefs of amici curiae were filed Arthur N. reversal Eisen- berg al.; and E. Richard Larson the American Civil Liberties Union et Martinez, Bailer, and Vilma Roger S. Morris J. L. Waldman for Legal the Asian American Defense and Education Fund et al. Williams, Douglas McDowell, Robert E. Bagby R. and Thomas filed Equal Employment Advisory brief for the urg- Council as amicus curiae ing affirmance. of the Court and judgment announced White IV, and V of which Jus- I, III, Parts

delivered an opinion, joined. Rehnquist tice the pri- before the Court whether

The threshold issue intent discriminatory need to prove this case vate plaintiffs of the Civil Act Rights a violation of VI to establish seq.,1 et §2000d U. S. C. amended, as 1964, 78 Stat. regulations promulgated implementing and administrative other Justices, sepa- I as do four conclude, thereunder. erred in of Appeals requiring rate opinions, I However, intent.2 conclude discriminatory proof on should be affirmed other be- grounds, below judgment com- discriminatory animus, in the proof absence cause, relief should not be awarded Title VI pensatory shown, intent is discriminatory declaratory unless plaintiffs; relief should be the available pri- and limited injunctive violations. There four being remedies for Title VI vate affirm the of the Court of judgment Justices who would other is affirmed. accordingly Appeals, judgment I. Atkins Michael H. Sussman filed a brief for the NAACP Thomas and curiae. as amicus Act, 2000d, provides: 42 U. S. C. Section 601 Stat. shall, ground race, color, person in the on the or na- “No United States in, of, origin, participation from denied the tional be excluded benefits subjected any program activity receiving or be to discrimination under Federal financial assistance.” Appeals The five of us reach the conclusion that the Court of erred joined by different routes. Stevens, Brennan Justice Justice that, although proof requires reasons Title VI itself Blackmun, Justice intent, discriminatory regulations incorporating administrative disparate-impact Post, standard are valid. at 642-645. Mar Justice that, itself, disparate-impact proof shall would hold under Title VI dis Post, necessary. agree all that I crimination is at 623. discriminatory animus is not an essential element of

Marshall valid, regulations I are even violation of VI. also believe that the itself, assuming, arguendo, VI, proscribe does not that Title II, disparate-impact discrimination. Part infra.

This class action involves a challenge by black and Hispanic police officers, petitioners here,3 several written exami- nations administered New York City between 1968 and 1970 that were used to make entry-level appointments to the city’s Police Department (Department) through October 1974.4 The District Court found that the challenged examinations had a on the discriminatory impact scores and pass-rates of blacks and and were not Hispanics job-related. These find- were ings not disturbed the Court of Appeals.

Each member of the plaintiff class seeking relief from dis- crimination achieved a score on passing one of the challenged examinations and was hired as a police officer. Since ap- were pointments made order of test scores, however, examinations caused the class members to be hired later than whites, situated similarly which lessened the petitioners’ se- niority and related benefits. when the Accordingly, Depart- ment laid off officers June on police a “last-hired, basis, first-fired” those officers who had achieved the low- est scores on the examinations were laid off first, and the black plaintiff Hispanic officers were disproportionately affected by layoffs.

On 30, 1976, April petitioners filed the suit5 present against Department and other New York City officials 3 representatives The class The are Guardians Association of the New City Department, Inc., Hispanic Society York Police The of the New York City Department, Inc., Perez, Police Oswaldo Felix E. Santos. 4 alleged Department’s Petitioners also that minimum height the 7"5' re quirement against Hispanics. disposition discriminated The of this issue in the lower courts not now us. before 5 petitioners’ judicial Department’s This was second attack on the use of the 1972, examinations. Petitioners first filed suit in the District but denied preliminary injunction Court their motion for a restraining the mak ing appointments eligibility generated from the ranked lists the chal lenged examinations, eligibility on the the basis lists would soon be 586 respondents here. Petitioners’ amended the entities, layoffs alleged

complaint violated their the 1975 June Rights rights Civil Act and VII the under Titles VI § seq., § seq., 42 et and 2000eet under 42 1964, U. S. C. 2000d § and federal under various other state 1983, C. U. S. complaint allegation primary was that but The laws.6 challenged impact discriminatory examinations for the petitioners upon hired would have been earlier minorities, seniority to sufficient have accumulated and therefore would layoffs. withstand the pe- although hearing, that, Court held

After a the District respondents prove had acted had failed to titioners discriminatory vio- intent, the use of the examinations disparate impact the tests had a VII, because lated proved respondents upon to be minorities and were not granted petitioners’ job-related.7 mo- The court therefore restraining Department injunction preliminary for a tion firing recalling any police seniority until lists officers from seniority they petitioners would were reordered accord discriminatory practices. respondents’ 431 had but for have 1977). (SDNY light holding Supp. of its under P. 526 Assn. v. affirmed. Guardians fully Appeals The exhausted. Court (CA2 1973). Comm’n, Civil Service F. 2d Petitioners unsuccess- filing present suit. See fully sought to revive the earlier case before (CA2 1980). 232, F. 2d § Among was a under 42 U. S. which District these claim C. discriminatory in rejected petitioners prove twice because failed to necessary tent, § 1981 which the court found to be a element of a cause (SDNY 1273, 1276, 1977); n. 4 Supp. Supp. 466 F. action. F. (SDNY 1979). 2d, Appeals 633 F. at 263-268. Court of affirmed. certiorari, they petition for but raised this 1981 issue in their Petitioners Building abandoned it after our decision last Term General Contractors Assn., Pennsylvania, (1982), Inc. the issue 458 U. S. 375 resolved adversely Reply to them. See Brief for Petitioners n. Co., Griggs Power Duke correctly 7 The District Court relied on its Title VII progeny, and its as framework for analysis. disparate-impact Supp., 431 F. at 538-539. unnecessary VII,

Title the District Court deemed it to decide petitioners’ merits claims under Title Id., VI. n. 2. 530, respondents’ appeal,

On the Second Circuit vacated the District Court’s decision and remanded the case for reconsid- light holding our in eration Teamsters v. States, United (1977), U. S. 324 which we ruled that a bona fide seniority system merely perpetuates the effects of 703(h) pre-Title protected by VII discrimination is of that §2000e-2(h). statute, U. S. C. 562 F. 2d 38 On remand, the District Court found that Teamsters ren- had previous holding dered its granted untenable to the that it extent respect occurring prior relief with to discrimination appli- to March 24, 1972,the date on which Title became VII municipalities. §2(1), cable to 92-261, See Pub. L. 86 Stat. 103. This meant that, VII, under Title class members hired prior any to the effective date were not entitled relief, remaining that the members class were entitled to seniority back awards that did not take into account time (SDNY periods prior Supp. to that date. 466 F. 1979). appli-

The court then turned to Title VI, which has been municipalities cable since if its enactment in see provide periods prior would relief for the time to March considering (1975), 1972. After v. Ash, Cort 422 U. 66S. opinions University Regents and the various California (1978), v. Bakke, the District Court concluded implied private right that an of action exists under Title VI. Supp., citing 466 F. at 1281-1285. Then, Lau Nichols, interpreta- S.U. VI administrative regulations adopted by agencies, tive several federal proof discriminatory enough court reasoned that effect is thereby to establish a violation of Title action, VI rejecting respondents’ only proof contention that of discrimi- natory Supp., intent F. could suffice. 466 Fi- at 1285-1287. nally, turning question to the relief, court held that the under Title VII should be available same remedies available some unless would conflict with VI, they purpose under case, seniority, to “In the instant back peculiar Title VI. in Franks v. Bowman Trans- remedy as Title VII approved portation Co., (1976), necessary . . . as just U. S. 747 Id., Title VI.” at 1287. to make discriminatees ‘whole’under class relief was entire granted pursu- Accordingly, order, In a the court set forth a ant to Title subsequent VI. the determination of constructive senior- plan detailed for individual member of the class would be ity to which each entitled, monetary nonmonetary and the and corresponding would be derived therefrom. The court entitlements meet petitioners ordered and consult with respondents also of future examinations. App. on the and use preparation A99-A107. Circuit, once to the Second appealed again

Respondents under Title as to which affirmed the relief VII but reversed (1980). All members Title VI. 633 F. 2d 232 three of Title VI relief could not be panel agreed award sustained, divided on the rationale for this con- panel but held that the trial court erred con- judges by clusion. Two discriminatory that Title VI does not cluding require proof in Lau intent. believed that this Court’s decision They supra, Nichols, which held that proof discriminatory violation, could suffice to Title VI had been establish impact overruled implicitly judgment supporting opinions supra. Bakke, id., J.); 633 F. at at 2d, (Kelleher, J.). (Coffrin, third declined to Judge Meskill, member panel, dis- reach the whether Title VI question requires proof Instead, intent. he concluded that the criminatory “compen- in the sought by plaintiffs remedies awarded to satory under Title case at bar are available litigants Id., history, in the legislative Judge VI.” at 255. Nothing Title VI intended observed, Meskill indicated that was from the a pro- individuals excluded benefits compensate view a compen- federal his gram assistance, receiving satory private remedy cross-purposes would work with the expressly provided administrative enforcement mechanism §602 of Title VI, U. S. C. §2000d-l, and with the objectives of the federal assistance statutes. 633 F. 2d, 255-262.8 petitions rehearing

After the Second Circuit denied for granted plain- from sides, both 633 F. 2d 232 we petition tiffs’ certiorari, 1140,9 which claimed solely proof discriminatory error on the basis that of intent is required not to establish a Title VI violation.

HH r-H squarely The supra, mheld Lau v. Nichols, that only programs Title VI forbids the use of federal funds not in intentionally grounds that discriminate on racial but also impact disparate those endeavors that have a on racial mi- Appeals recognized norities. The Court of this but was of respondents, University as view, are of California Regents supra, v. Bakke, had confined the reach of Title VI programs operated intentionally to those that are in an dis- criminatory disagree manner. For two I reasons, with this reading of Bakke.

A recognize I including First, that in Bakke five Justices, myself, declared that Title on VI its own bottom reaches no panel The majority disagreed Judge views, with reading Meskill’s our decisions in Bakke and Cannon University Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 of (1979), allowing as private right of irrespective action under Title VI compensatory Also, effect of the sought granted. relief fearing that part noncompensatory relief might the District Court’s order not VII, available to the agree entire class under Title the court not could Judge with Meskill’s conclusion that his unnecessary rationale made it requires decide whether Title proof discriminatory VI intent. 2d, F. at 274. 9Respondents petition certiorari, also filed a they in which seek re view of Appeals’ the Court of plaintiff determination class is enti tled to relief under Title VII. City Civil Service Comm’n New Assn., York v. Guardians No. 81-432. light suggests Constitution,10 that, further than which Washington Title VI does Davis, 426 U. S. proscribe racial discrimina- unintentional not of its own force Appeals thought were these declarations tion. The Court of holding contains its own Lau’s VI inconsistent disparate-impact prohibition racial discrimination. in- Title VI forbids Bakke, however, was whether

issue in the form affirmative action tentional discrimination though remedy past discrimination, even such intended Holding permitted Constitution. affirmative action action if the Con- not bar such affirmative that Title VI does plainly of whether does not is not determinative stitution proscribes in addition to Title VI unintentional discrimination that the Constitution forbids. the intentional discrimination aVI, It is construe Title statute intended to sensible to forbidding protect those intentional, racial as minorities, permitted by benign, that are but racial classifications nonbenign yet proscribing burdensome, as the Constitution, contrary of a kind not Constitution. discriminations language opinions Although the in the Bakke has some of holdings sweep, in Bakke and Lau are en- a broader telling tirely in the consistent. Absent some more indication being opinions I overruled, that Lau would not Bakke was so hold.11 Regents Bakke, University at 10 See U. of California BRennan, White, MARSHALL, (Powell, J.); id., (opinion of at JJ.).

Blackmun, unequivocally Justice Stevens correctly states that “when the Court respected in statute, its should future rejects reading one action If a after it has been authorita litigation. ... statute to be amended per tively Court, always be by construed this that task should almost Post, However, Justice Stevens ap by Congress.” at 641. formed holding square pears ignore disregarding his own admonition Nichols, present Lau directly issue. case that addressed Lau, requires “unequivocally rejected]” notion that Title VI we modify discriminatory chosen not to proof of intent. Since has B wrong concluding Even if I am in that Bakke did not over- my many colleagues Lau, rule so as believe, there is holding disproportionate-impact another reason subject regime. discrimination is to the Title VI In Lau, the affirming holding was unanimous that the school practice district there involved was forbidden Title VI to against unintentional as well as intentional discrimination racial minorities. Five Justices were the view Title impact VI itself forbade Lau, discrimination. atS., joined by 566-569. Justice Stewart, Chief Justice and concurred the result. The Blackmun, concurrence stated that it was not at all VI, clear standing prohibit alone, would unintentional discrimination, implementing regulations, explic- but that the Title VI which itly impact forbade discrimination, were valid not because purposes inconsistent with the Id., Title VI. at 569-571.12 overruling holding if Even Bakke must be taken as Lau’s disparate impact, that the statute itself does reach none opinions arguably compel five Justices whose this permit regu- result considered whether the statute would clearly lations that reached such discrimination. no And Justice Bakke took issue with view of the three con- curring in Lau, Justices who concluded that even if Title proscribe VI itself did not unintentional racial discrimina- Lau, Title VI “authoritatively after was espe- construed” we should be cially adopt slow to a new construction of the statute at this late date. VI, §2000d-l, empowers Section of Title Stat. C. agencies providing “rules, federal financial regulations, assistance to issue general applicability orders of which shall be consistent achieve objectives ment of the authorizing the statute the financial assistance . explained . . .” Justice Stewart regulations the therefore should be “ ‘ upheld valid, they “reasonably as because were purposes related to the Nichols, enabling legislation.’”” of the Lau v. (opinion 414 U. at 571 result) Service, (quoting Mourning v. Family Publications concurring in Inc., 356, (1973), 411 U. S. quoting Thorpe Housing in Author turn v. ity City Durham, (1969)). 393 U. S. 280-281 of agencies promul- permitted federal tion, it nevertheless upshot gate regulations such effect. The of Jus- valid with enforcing charged opinion that those with was tice Stewart’s enforce the statute discretion to Title VI had sufficient forbidding discrimination. as well as intentional unintentional contrary. Nothing in Bakke to the that was said question this leaves the whether course, Of The Chief Blackmun were cor Stewart, Justice Justice, they reading I in statute. am convincedthat rect their the ambiguous; language the The Title VI on its face is were. surely inherently subject so. It is “discrimination” is word proscription given construction the antidiscrimination the Griggs Duke Power Co., of Title VII permitting, requiring, if not to the extent of least disparate-impact regulations As reach discrimination. agency given pointed out, federal en Justice Stewart the authority consistently construed Title VI forcement had (opinion concurring supra, in that manner. at 570 Lau, result). passage VI, the Moreover, soon after the helped legisla Department Justice, which had draft agencies preparation regulations tion, assisted seven incorporating disparate-impact of discriminat standard early regulations interpretations ion.13 These were agencies charged its and we enforcement, statute with reject inconsistency them should absent clear with or structure of the or with the unmistakable statute, face legislative Corp. history. Zenith Radio mandate (1978). nothing I States, United discern legislative history nothing VI, in the of Title has been presented by respondents, odds that is at adminis statutory fur Title, trative construction of the terms. consistently thermore, has been administered this manner notes, Reg. Marshall Fed. As Justice post, shortly regulations promulgated, after these initial were agencies adopted every department federal Title VI Cabinet and about 40 prohibiting regulations disparate-impact discrimination. by Congress.14

for almost two decades without interference circumstances, Under these it must be concluded Title disparate-impact VI reaches unintentional, discrimination as well as deliberate racial discrimination.

I—I I—I Although Appeals construing erred Title necessarily judgment VI, it does not follow its should be ground respond- reversed. an affirmance, As alternative judgment private ents defend the on the basis that there nois right peti- of action available under Title VI that will afford they agree tioners relief that seek.15 I that the relief petitioners denied under Title VII is unavailable to them VI, under Title at least where no intentional discrimination proved, has been as here. case

A private I deal first with the matter of a cause of action non-English-speaking under Title In Lau v. Nichols, VI. sought against Chinese students relief the San Francisco claiming they taught Eng- District, School be should language, proceed lish that instruction should Chinese, or way provided equal that some other should be to afford them opportunity. reversing educational This Court, the Court of Appeals, gave pri- relief under Title VI. The existence of a vate cause action however, under that Title, was not disputed in that case. years University Four later, the Court decided Cali- Regents Bakke, v. which also involved a suit

fornia details, post, 14 Justice Marshall how has rebuffed disparate-impact regulations, efforts overturn the Title VI and how Congress, agencies interpreting full awareness how the were VI, VI, has later on indicating ap modeled statutes 601 of Title thus University proval of the administrative definition. Cf. Bob Jones United States, (1983); Haig Agee, 461 U. S. (agency interpretation of a statute confirmed ratified con inaction). gressional Respondents 8-9; Arg. See Brief for Tr. Oral 21-22. against au- seeking state educational Title VI under relief that a decide, assumed, but did thorities. Four Justices A fifth Jus- private Title VI.16 available under action was private could cause of action that no tice of the view was remaining implied Justices The four the Title.17 under private available.18 action was that a concluded Chicago, University in later, Cannon Still specified (1979), applying in factors Cort the Court, 677 parties private could held that 66 Ash, U. S. prohibitions IX Educa- Title of the to enforce the sue § against seq., et C. 1681 U. S. tion Amendments program any gender-based educational discrimination major part analysis supported A funds. federal VI, from Title that Con- IX had been derived was that Title private gress were available under remedies understood to be intended similar remedies and that VI, Title Further- S., IX. 441 U. at 694-703. under Title available thrust of the Cannon Court’s the unmistakable more, was congressional opinion correct as to the view was that the availability private Id., Title set actions to enforce VI. pri- dissent, were of view Justices, 710-716. Two and itself were not available remedies under Title VI vate Justices, IX. Those how- true under Title that the same was § to enforce that 42 C. 1983was available ever, asserted U. S. alleged proscriptions IX and Title where VI being discriminatory practices carried on under were dissenting, J., Id., color of state law. (White, J.). eight joined by Justices Thus at least Blackmun, IX and Title could be the view that Title VI Cannon were of J.); id., (Brennan, 16 Bakke, (Powell, at 328 at 281-284 JJ.). Marshall, Blackmun, J.). 17 Id., Justice, however, of the view (White, was at 379 This action, a cause discriminatory constitutes state alleged conduct where 1983 is available. of action under U. S. C. Burger, J., (Stevens, J., 18 Id., 419-421, 420, joined C. n. 28 JJ.). Rehnquist, Stewart against agency enforced a ceiving action a state or local re- respondent Department.19 federal funds, such as the (1980). See also Maine v. Thiboutot, U. S.

B Petitioners, are however, not entitled ato “make whole” remedy respondents’ Title VI violations. Whether a liti- gant analytically prior has a cause action “is distinct and question any, litigant may what if relief, be entitled (1979). to receive.” Davis v. Passman, U. S. legal rights The usual rule that where have been invaded any and a cause of action is available, a federal court use remedy available to afford full relief. Bell v. Hood, 327 general yields rule nevertheless necessary carry Congress where out the intent of or to frustrating purposes avoid of the statute involved. example, Mortgage For in Transamerica Advisors, Inc. v. private Lewis, 444 U. S. the Court found that a right implied of action limited relief be could under §80b-l the Investment Advisers Act 15 U. S. C. seq., prohibits practices et which certain in connection with advisory investment contracts. Section 215 of the Act performance declared that contracts whose formation or would void, violate the Act were Court concluded that legal customary intended “that the incidents of including availability voidness would follow, of a suit for injunction against operation rescission or for an continued S., the contract.” at 19. But the Court refused to monetary recovery private alleging allow relief a suit vi- stating contrary Act, that, olations the absence of a provides legislative expressly par- intent, “where statute disagreed holding private right with the Court’s that a One implied itself, expressing Title IX a view action could be under without as privately § 1983. 441 U. to whether Title IX could be enforced via (Powell, J., dissenting). reading chary remedy must be a court remedies, or ticular Ibid. into it.” others remedies are not “make whole” indicated that have also

We seeking private ordinarily appropriate relief for actions pursuant by Congress passed to its of statutes violations place Spending on the “power conditions Clause under the Hospi- grant Pennhurst State School funds.” of federal (1981). This is because Halderman, tal v. typical Spending receipt Clause funds under of federal the legislation grantee or other matter: the State is a consensual accepting weighs the funds before and burdens the benefits comply their agreeing attached to with the conditions appropri- Typically, receipt. advanced, the funds are before grantee’s plan, whether the will determine ate federal official grant satisfy program proposal, the conditions will grantee will have and the funds, of federal or other extension obligations in a later be. When its will in mind what money brought by the federal for whose benefit those suit contrary to the determined, used it is to be was intended position, the fluids are attached to that the conditions State’s recipient being complied would that the with, money receipt than assume of federal terminate its rather unanticipated burdens. announced more than once has

Thus, Spending fashioning stat- Clause for violations remedies recognize by recipients must the courts funds, of federal utes assuming recipient the ad- “alternative choices has that the complying a has announced with what court ditional costs” using necessary federal law or of “not to federal to conform entirely. program withdrawing the federal from funds” and (1970). Although Wyman, 420-421 Rosado v. enjoin may identify its continuance and the violation a court perform prospectively recipients to funds of federal or order money, receipt re- the of federal to the incident their duties terminating withdrawing option and hence cipient the has injunction. prospective force of the Hospital supra, Pennhurst State School and Halderman, approach: spend- reiterated the Rosado Remedies to enforce ing power respect privilege recipient statutes must receipt of federal funds to withdraw terminate its of fed- money obligations eral rather than assume the further necessary compliance. duties that a court has declared are at 29-30, 30, n. id., dis- 23; J., (White, senting part). [Spending The Court noted “in no Clause] required provide money . . case . have we a State to plaintiffs, required” to much less a State to assume more obligations. Id., burdensome at 29.

HH > Since the cause action under Title isVI one implied by judiciary expressly rather than created Congress, respect foregoing we should considerations applicable Spending defining Clause cases and take care the limits of this cause of action and the remedies available proof thereunder. it Because was found that there was no by respondents, put of intentional discrimination I aside for present purposes involving private plaintiff those situations a program who is entitled the benefits of a federal but who intentionally against by has been discriminated the adminis- program. In trators cases where intentional dis- question shown, crimination has been there can no as be recipient’s obligation program what the under the was no recipient question obligation. was aware of situations, such it be that the victim of the intentional compensatory be discrimination should entitled a award, prospective well as to relief the event the State contin- as program.20 with the ues liability It is not uncommon in law for the extent of defendant’s knowledge culpability. Thus,

turn on the extent his has been said that, law, contracting principles party under of contract cannot held unless, extraordinary special harm due to circumstances at the liable for Appeals in be, the Court of this case However finding the District Court’s that there was no did not disturb grounds. The discrim- discrimination on racial intentional dispropor- unintentional and resulted from the ination was entry-level impact tests on racial minorities. tionate immediately is not situations, this and similar obvious grantee’s obligations program what the under the federal surely grantee were and it is not obvious that the was aware administering program in violation of the stat- that it was proof discriminatory regulations. cases, In such ute or grantee impact If can bear the does not end the matter. proving necessity” practices burden of some “business discriminatory impact, complete that have it has a affirma- Griggs violation. v. Duke Power tive defense to claims of typical at 431. In the case where deliberate Co., S.,U. grounds recipient shown, on racial is not discrimination charges illegal will have at least colorable defenses disparate-impact and it often will be the case discrimination, judgment, grantee prior to will not have known or that, compelling have had reason to know that it had been violat- congres- ing clear Hence, the federal standards. absent guidance contrary, pri- sional intent or to the the relief declaratory injunctive vate actions should be limited to statutory ordering compliance relief future with the declared regulatory obligations. in the form of Additional relief and money past violations

or otherwise based on unintentional should be withheld. foregoing in this case. considerations control decision spending-power legislation:

I note first that Title VI is made, the circum- the contract was he knew or had reason know time extraordinary injury probable as to have the such “so stances that made degree probability.” judging as to the of this opportunity of for himself id., 1006-1019; §§ Corbin, § also 11W. Jae- A. See Contracts (3d 1968). law, usually 1344A ed. And tort ger, Williston on Contracts rights intentionally recklessly violated another’s only persons who have Wade, (1983); Smith punitive damages. are liable for 1971). (4th Prosser, Torts 9-10 ed. W. Law of regulatory “It is not a measure, but an exercise of the unquestioned power of the Federal to ‘fix Government the terms on which Federal funds shall be disbursed.’ Oklahoma v. Civil Commission, Service recipient required accept No is Federal voluntarily, If aid. he does so he must it on take Cong. conditions which is on it offered.” 110 Rec. 6546 (1964)(Sen. Humphrey). (memorandum Celler) by (validity Rep. id., at

Accord, power Congress of Title on VI “rests to fix the terms available”); on which Federal id., funds will be made at 6562 (Sen. (Sen. Pastore). Kuchel); at 7063 id., Title VI rests on principle “taxpayers’ money, which is collected with- spent discrimination, out shall be without discrimination.” (Sen. Ribicoff). Id., at 7064 Accord, id., 7054-7055, 7062 (Sen. (Sen. (memo- Pastore); Javits); id., at 7102 id., at 6566 Republican randum the Members the House Committee Judiciary). “[v]ery simple. on the Stop The mandate of Title isVI money; get the discrimination, continue the discrim- get money.” (Rep. Lindsay). ination, not Id., do at 1542 “ imposes obligations simply op- Title VI no but ‘extends an potential recipients accept reject. tion’” that are free to (memorandum Celler) by Rep. (quoting Id., at 1527 Massa- (1923)). legisla- Mellon, chusetts v. 262 U. S. This history clearly tive shows intended Title VI to typical spending-power provision. abe “contractual” Spending legislation, pre Since Title is VI it Clause private litigants seeking compliance sumed that to enforce its terms are to no more entitled than the limited rem edy plaintiffs deemed available to the in Pennhurst. The point quiry complete, is not at this however, because, like all statutory presumption rules construction, the Pennhurst “yield persuasive contrary legislative must ... evidence of intent.” Transamerica, S.,U. at 20. inAs Trans- legislative history america, however, the relevant of Title VI reveals that “what evidence of intent case, exists this cir- though may weighs against implica- be, cumstantial right monetary private in a of a of action for a award tion proof of intentional this,” ibid., case such as at least absent discrimination. explicitly any allow for form of a VI does go

right of action. This fact did not unnoticed Senators unsuccessfully proposed Keating an Ribicoff, who adding provision expressly allowing amendment to Title VI a proper proceeding for the institution of “a civilaction or other permanent preventive including application an for a relief, temporary injunction, restraining or other . . . order, order, Cong. person aggrieved.” Rec. 15375 Keating explained proposal, if that, Senator under this some spe VI, one violated Title funds couldbe denied or “a suit for performance requirement cific of the nondiscrimination could brought... by the victim of at Id., be the discrimination.” language proposed 15376. The relevant of the amendment 204(a) § Rights was identical to that of Act of Civil §2000a-3(a), provision creating pri S. C. a 1964, U. right

vate of action to enforce Title II of the Act, which deals public in with discrimination accommodations. Suits under 204(a) only. “private plaintiff brings are in form When a an damages. action under that he cannot recover If Title, he injunction, obtains an he does so not for himself alone but attorney ‘private general/ vindicating policy also as a that Congress highest priority.” considered of the Newman v. Park Enterprises, 390 U. Piggie S. (1968). Senator Keating thought elementary required fairness VI-proscribed victims of Title discrimination be accorded private right “proposed same in of action as allowed the edu public Rights] [Civil cation and accommodationstitles of the bill.”21 Keating-Ribicoff proposal

The VI, was not included Title important point present purposes but the for even the is that 21Hearings on 1731 and S. 1750 before the Senate Committee on (1963) (Sen. Judiciary, Sess., Cong., Keating). 88th 1st private

most ardent advocates enforcement of Title VI contemplated private plaintiffs would be awarded “preventive they relief.” Like the drafters of Title II, did private plaintiffs monetary not intend to allow to recover Although expressed Keating awards. intent of Senators compen- is Ribicoff alone not determinative whether a satory remedy may obtained in action to enforce piece is VI, “it one more of evidence that did beyond cause, anything not intend to authorize a of action for equitable Mortgage limited relief.” Transamerica Advisors, supra, Surely, Inc. Lewis, 22. it did not intend to do so where intentional discrimination is not shown. remaining congressional

The indications intent are also they circumstantial, but all militate favor the conclu- only prospective ordering compliance sion that relief with the grant appropriate private remedy terms of the aas “greatest possi- Title VI violations cases such as this. The emphasis” given objective” ble was to the fact that the “real of Title VI was “the elimination of discrimination the use receipt Cong. Federal funds.” 110 Rec. 6544 (Sen. (Sen. Pastore). Humphrey). id., also remedy regarded of termination of assistance was as “a only last to be if all resort, used else fails,” because “cutoffs important objectives of Federal funds would defeat of Fed- legislation, gains eliminating eral without commensurate in segregation.” racial or Id., discrimination at 6544, 6546 (Sen. Humphrey).22 respected, Congress

To ensure that this intent would be in- § explicit provision requires an cluded in 602 of Title VI that any that administrative enforcement action be “consistent objectives authorizing with achievement of the of the statute in the financial assistance connection with the action which §2000d-l. Although taken.” S. C. an award of dam- ages remedy not would be as drastic a as a cutoff of funds, g., id., e. also, Cong. Celler); 22 See 110 (Rep. Rec. 1520 at 7068 id., at 7065 (Sen. (Sen. Ribicoff). Pastore); 602 liability large monetary possibility for unintended dis- of nondiscriminating potential might dissuade

crimination well thereby programs, recipients participating in federal from objectives funding hindering 633 statutes. See of the J.). (opinion Meskill, 261-262 of F. 2d, any way history summary, legislative that in is no there only injunc- presumption that limited rebuts Pennhurst remedy granted a for unintended be as tive relief should spending power. passed pursuant violations statutes intent not to allow little there is evinces an What evidence compensatory any greater relief, I relief.23 conclude 23 agreement appropriate it is not generally are The lower courts damages v. monetary for Title VI violations. See Lieberman to award (CA7 1981)(Title case), IX de University Chicago, 660 F. 1185 cert. 2d Dis nied, (1982); Independent Needville Drayden 456 U. S. 937 v. School (CA5 1981); HUD, 5, F. 10-11 trict, 129, Supp. F. 2d Nabke v. 520 (WD Assn. v. Trails 1981); Apartments, Mich. Tenants Indian Concerned (ND 1980); 522, Dept. Supp. F. 526-527 Ill. Rendon v. Utah State (Utah 1978). Security Service, Supp. 454 F. Employment Job Dorsen, (1980); § 317 Antieau, Rights Federal Civil Acts N. also C. Bender, Neuborne, Law, Rights B. & Political and Civil P. (4th 1979). Missouri, ed. But cf. Miener v. 673 F. 2d United States 608 (CA8 1982) 969, damages may (holding 977-979 be recovered under “closely § Act of which was considered to Rehabilitation (Neb.) VI); City Omaha, Supp. analogous” to Title Gilliam v. 388 F. (CA8 1975); (dicta), remedies, aff’d without mention of 524 F. 2d (CD 1978) Ana, Quiroz City (dicta); 18 FEP Cases 1138 Cal. Santa Georgetown College, Supp. Flanagan v. President & Directors 417 F. 1976) (DC (dicta). post, argues, that even if Title VI authorizes Stevens only remedy, peti- limited full a relief is available in this case because the “sought 1983,” § § “provides relief under 42 and 1983 a tioners U. S. C. remedy.” Damages usually ac- damages indeed are available a 1983 tion, plaintiff alleges deprivation such is the case when the but Thus, rights by Spending statute. secured Clause Pennhurst State Halderman, Hospital School and the Court that, § plaintiffs if the were to relief 1983for indicated even entitled under Spending legislation, the alleged defendants’ violations of certain Clause required provide money plaintiffs.” defendants would not be “to to [the] past other relief based on violations of the conditions at- pri- tached to the use of federal funds, is not as available a remedy involving vate for Title VI violations not intentional discrimination.24

V If the relief unavailable under Title VII and ordered under is the kind VI of relief that should be withheld enforc- ing Spending a statute, Clause the Court should affirm the judgment Appeals Only without more. if all declaratory prospective or some this relief the kind is or properly relief that enforcement of Title VI contem- plates Appeals should the Court be reversed in or whole part. To resolve I matter, this now consider the items of re- contends, erroneously post, Marshall my view recipients “would allow to violate the conditions of their contracts until a court enjoins identifies the violation and either its continuance or orders recipient begin the performing to receipt its duties incident to the of fed- money.” so, eral This is always not because the Federal Government can any recipient comply sue who to grant agree- fails with the terms ment repay and force the to misspent violator Bell v. funds. See New (1983) Jersey, (White, J., concurring). But it is an entirely subject different matter recipient open-ended liability to to private plaintiffs. third-party beneficiary Justice Marshall’s analogy, 632-633, post, appealing, ignores possibility is but he salutary remedy felt compensatory have deterrent of a effect outweighed by possibility was remedy po- that such a would dissuade recipients participating important tential from programs. federal Of course, every persons not contract that benefits third accords enforceable rights persons; question Corbin, in such is of intent. A. Con- (Second) tracts Section 313 of the Restatement of Contracts party government agency states that a who contracts with an do public generally subject or render a is act service to the to contractual liability public consequential damages resulting to a member of performance perform. only exceptions from to this failure rule provide involve situations where the terms of the contract for such liabil- ity, entity governmental subject liability or where the would to the injured public. exceptions appli- member of the Ibid. Neither these present cable context. any if element to determine Court the District

lief ordered remedy. injunctive permissible is a dispos-

Although cases are Amendment Eleventh only prospective holding relief is available here, in itive remedy officials, the law state of federal violations 651, 667 ob- Jordan, in Edelman v. permissible imper- and between that the difference served many be that between in instances “will not missible relief patent day night.” as the Eleventh It as here seems monetary include a the relief cannot context that Amendment wrongs, past is in the form of even if the award for award damages. “equitable id., 665- instead of restitution” “totally prospective need not be with- relief However, 667. injunctive [defendant’s] relief is revenues”; out effect on permissible if defendants, it means that the order even shape decree, of the court’s will their conduct to the mandate money they spend if more had been left free to have to “than pursue previous 667-668. Id., their course of conduct.” key question present purposes is whether the decree The payment grants requires “not relief, of funds or other as necessary consequence compliance in the future with a federal-question determination, but as a form of substantive compensation” flowing or relief on other based from viola- prior at a time tions when defendant “was under no court- imposed obligation to conform to a different Id., standard.” at 668. present granted District Court case a number

relatively discrete items of relief. each First, class member seniority, right was awarded constructive which included the (1) monetary [the members] to: “all entitlements which class they appointed would have received had been on their con- seniority including backpay structive date,” and back medical and insurance benefits; all other entitlements relative seniority, including salary, to the award of constructive bene- pension rights. respondents fits, Also, were directed to give sergeant’s examination to those class members whose

constructive would have seniority entitled them to take last such examination. Finally, an effort to insure that future hiring practices would be nondiscriminatory, respond- ents were ordered to consult with on the petitioners prepara- of tion and use future police officer examinations for the next two and years, provide to with race petitioners and eth- information nicity the scores of the regarding next scheduled examination. App. A99-A107.25

theOn one it is hand, obvious that the of award backpay and back benefits constitutes relief based upon past conduct no it longer permissible; therefore should not stand. On the it hand, other is without doubt the portion order to consultation insure that requiring future examinations will not have discriminatory effects constitutes permissible injunc- relief tive aimed at respondents’ future conforming conduct to the declared law.

This leaves the award of constructive seniority pur- of future poses entitlements: the to the right take special sergeant’s examination ordered the by District Court and to an right salary increase and to the benefits level warranted the constructive an Because such seniority. award affects only the future conduct of a defendant, argu- could be as ably categorized relief. permissible prospective I conclude, however, that an seniority, award of constructive for any whatsoever, must be purpose impermissible deemed retroactive relief. Transportation

In Franks v. Bowman Co., 424 U. we identified of seniority two types —“bene- fit” these, and status.” The “which de- “competitive first termines size of pension rights, length vacations, insurance coverage like, is unemployment benefits, and analo- . . . like gous Benefit-type seniority, backpay. backpay, serves to work complete equity penalizing wrongdoer the same time that it tends to make whole economically §2000e-5(k) permitted by As U. S. C. U. S. C. App. A107. attorney’s petitioners. District Court also awarded fees to wronged.” at 786-787 Id., one who was J.). A (Powell, seniority general “reduces the of retroactive the award bar to employer he required at such time as anof restitution discriminatory perpe upon actions account for his called (opinion n. 27 Id., the law.” trated violation Court). benefit-type seniority in this constructive Since restitutionary obviously in nature, it remedial case is rights compensation” were vio those whose is “a form respondents “under no court- were a time when lated at ” imposed obligation Edel a different standard. conformto It is therefore not an at 668. Jordan, man remedy alleged appropriate Title VI violations here. for the seniority, although pro- “competitive status” An award of compen- spective form, constitutes a form nevertheless past now violative on conduct deemed sation or relief based respect such an be said to Act. In no can award be of the necessary consequence,” ibid., future Title VI com- “a employer. pliance also the It therefore must be consid- remedy. inappropriate I also note that ered an Title VI seniority employee’s pref- competitive-type an “determines rights advantages expense erential to various economic at the employees. normally of .other These include the order of layoff employees, job trip assignments, and recall and and promotion.” supra, Franks, at 787 consideration (Pow- J.). Although seniority an award constructive of this ell, any wrong- does nature not result increased costs the employer, “directly doing implicate[s] rights expec- and perfectly employees,” tations of innocent at only compensation past wrong. and it can be viewed as for a Accordingly, “competi- I conclude that neither “benefit” nor seniority may pri- tive status” constructive as a obtained remedy violations, vate for Title VI in the least absence of proof of intentional discrimination. foregoing, apparent

In view of the it is to me proper granted by Title VI relief the District Court is the directing respondents order to take actions and make dis- hiring practices closures intended to insure that future will be nondiscriminatory However, and valid. this relief is under the wholly sustainable District Court’s and findings claim, conclusions with Title respect petitioners’ VII all will it.26 fully members the class benefit from There is thus no need to disturb judgment Appeals.

I—I > for the reasons I conclusion, above, am con- expressed vinced discriminatory intent is not an essential element a Title violation, VI but that a private should plaintiff recover only relief for a injunctive, noncompensatory defend- ant’s unintentional violations of Title VI. Such relief should not include an award of constructive on seniority. Albeit dif- ferent grounds, below is judgment

Affirmed,.27 with whom joins, Powell, Justice The Chief Justice and with whom as Part joins II, con- Rehnquist in the curring judgment.

With I reluctance, write The separately. many opinions filed this lines case draw that are required by, VII, type granted unconditionally. 26 Under this of relief can be VI, given option complying Under Title the defendants should be terminating in the participation program. V, federal See Parts IV supra. 27Despite opinions, the numerous views of least five Justices on dissenters, Brennan, two issues are identifiable. Justices Mar shall, Blackmun, Stevens, join majority and to form for up me a holding validity regulations the of incorporating disparate-impact the 2, A supra. majority, however, standard. See n. different not would compensatory allow relief in proof discriminatory the absence of of intent. Rehnquist Justice and I reach directly. this conclusion See Parts III IV, supra; (Rehnquist, and at post, J., concurring judgment). Powell, joined by Justice, post, 608-610, Justice Chief at be private lieves that no granted relief should ever be under Title under VI any O’Connor, post, circumstances. Justice at would that all hold discriminatory relief should be denied proved. unless intent is It follows from compensatory the views of these three latter Justices that no relief discriminatory should be awarded if not animus is shown. incompatible prior our with, indeed in some instances seem today opinions will rather decisions. further confuse Our guide.1 than

I Chicago, University In 441 Cannon of dissenting), would have held Con- I (Powell, J., right gress implied private of under Title intended no action same IX of Education Amendments of 1972. For the the may petitioners general reasons, I also hold that would Rights under of the Act of this action Title VI Civil maintain 1964. frequently

Congress, all too own, for reasons its elects of private right-of-action question. The remain silent on the required particular, proof as to the Court divided standard of rights involving Title Members prove of in cases VI. Seven violations proof of agree requires that a violation of the statute itself (Rehnquist, J., infra, 610-611; post, discriminatory intent. See at at 612 (O’Connor, J., concurring judgment); post, and n. 1 concurring J., judgment); (Stevens, joined by Bren post, dissenting, at 641-642 JJ.) Blackmun, (“Today, proof purpose nan is a neces and invidious claim”). sary Only component of a valid Title VI White Justices may by proof that a of Title VI Marshall believe violation be established discriminatory effect, only non- recognize White would ante, compensatory, prospective for such a relief violation. See Blackmun, however, Brennan, Stevens, be 602-604. Justices adopted regulations pursuant lieve a violation of the to Title VI may by proof discriminatory impact. post, be at 645 established J., dissenting). (Stevens,

Thus, discriminatory majority proof ef- Court would hold only enforce liability brought fect suffices to establish when the suit is regulations rather than itself. And seem that the statute it would 1983; pursuant § regulations may be enforced in a suit C. to U. S. anyone invoking implied limited right of action under Title VI would be discriminatory-intent prove of Title required standard violations Thus, against recipi- apparent governmental VI. that a suit result is governed ents of federal funds —who sued under 1983—will be liability against recipients fed- a different standard of a suit than difficulty explaining eral would have this in terms of the funds. One result legislative history VI.

result is as to frequently uncertainty litigation available the courts remedies, an answer without leaving provide clear We have legislative guidance. recognized repeatedly that a action whether of be re- private right implied e. a determination of g., quires See, intent. congressional Transit Jackson Authority Transit v. Union, 15, 20-23 (1982); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 560, U. S. of We to the look, course, history, legislative and in to what other remedies particular have been provided. Advisors, See Transamerica Mortgage Lewis, Inc. (1979) (“it is S. an canon elemental of con- statutory struction that where a statute a provides expressly particular remedy or a court be remedies, must others chary reading it”). into VI is legislative history with refer- replete

ences Act’s central purpose ensuring that tax- payers’ ante, money See spent nondiscriminatorily. J.). (opinion In accord this purpose, White, Congress for the most expressly provided perhaps effective all remedies a federal statute: off funding cutting In addition, funds.2 a created constructed ad- carefully argues Justice Marshall relief must be available because the statutory remedy of cutoff “impractical” a fund is and “too Draconian to be widely Post, (dissenting opinion). post, used.” at 626-627 n. 7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). my view, reasoning departure such a evinces from principle legislative guide implying right intent a judiciary of action. The affirmatively is not free to decide remedies expressly adopted Congress “impractical” are so or “Draconian” that judicially necessary. created remedies are Ross See Touche & Co. (1979)(“The Redington, 442 U. question S. ultimate is one of con gressional intent, improve not one of whether it can this thinks that law”). upon statutory Rather, scheme that enacted into Con gress’ express adoption remedy of one one be viewed as —and —should congressional choice obeyed. University that should be See Cannon v. (“Where Chicago, 677, 749 (Powell, J., dissenting) a statu tory expressly provides enforcing scheme for an alternative mechanism created, rights I especially permit and duties would be reluctant ever to federal court to volunteer its purposes”). services for enforcement withholding of procedure that such to ensure ministrative light only appropriate. these In where ordered funds is authorize intended to I not believe factors, do through inadvertence. some private to do so but failed suits Regents University 438 U. S. Bakke, v. also of California (“[T]here J.) express (1978)(opinion is no White, it would private VI, Title provision to enforce actions attending carefully Congress, quite so if after incredible in- private Act, in other Titles of actions matter of private silently to enforce cause of action a to create tended VI”)-3 solely judgment this below on I affirm Title would issue.

>—I H—I ground for affirmance. alternative however, an is, There Appeals agreed that and the Court the District Court Both any discrimination. petitioners intentional failed to show had opinions relying Appeals, held Bakke, on the The Court showing an made to establish that must be that such —one prerequisite protection equal to a successful claim—is a post, agree 639-642, I claim. with VI Stevens, reading Appeals of our correct its was that the Court opinions in Bakke. leg- “[i]n

My the clear view of in Bakke was that conclusion proscribe those held to Title VI must be intent, islative Equal Protection violate the racial classifications that would Jus- at 287. Fifth Amendment.” or the Clause of Title VI asserting violations 3 I hold that actions also would of an Congress’ § creation brought under 42 U. S. C. 1983. not be sug remedying strongly procedure for violations express administrative privately either rights be enforced gests that it did not intend that Title VI Sewerage County Middlesex § under the statute itself or under 1983. See Assn., (1981); 1, Authority National Sea Clammers 463 U. S. (1980) (Powell, J., Thiboutot, 1, 22, dissent cf. Maine n. 11 (an pro liability governing statute ing) exception to 1983 is “where terms”). remedy its vides an exclusive for violations of and Blackmun under- White, Marshall, tices Brennan, thorough analysis history legislative took of the in reach- ing They the same conclusion. See id., 328-340. con- cluded “that Title VTs definition of racial discrimination is absolutely coextensive the Constitution’s.” Id., at 352. necessarily requires rejection prior This construction decision in Lau v. Nichols, U. S. 563 that dis- criminatory impact liability suffices to establish under Title my Appeals fully view, VI.4 therefore was justified holding petitioners failed to establish their Title VI claims.5 judgment.

For I reasons, these concur the Court’s any analysis legislative Lau Court did not undertake history of VI, essentially of Title its reaching supporting conclusion without reason ing. I no may have occasion here to consider whether the result Lau despite rejection premise. stand of its assumed by O’Connor, 612-615, For the post, reasons stated Justice at I re ject argument Justice Stevens’ novel an agency that administrative is adopt any regulation may free to purposes be said to further the of enabling agencies an statute. Administrative do not have —and should not lawmaking power. have —such

Justices White explicit and Marshall would avoid the reasoning of by deferring prior Bakke ato administrative construction Title of VI. See ante, J.); (opinion White, post, (Marshall, of J., at 617-623 I dissenting). question do not the view that the Court should a “sustain] interpretation reasonable administrative if even we would have reached a question initially different judicial proceeding.” result had arisen in a Post, J., (Marshall, at 621 dissenting). I precedent But know of no asserting whatever for that this interpretation deference to administrative proper already contrary— this Court has issued definitive —and after Moreover, construction its own. Bakke Justices White Mar- “[njowhere agreed shall any suggestion is there that Title VI was funding any intended to terminate federal reason other than consider- origin ation of recipient race national institution a manner incorporated inconsistent with the standards in the Constitution.” (opinion Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, at 332 JJ.). If any “nowhere” is there evidence that intended the Title standard, VI standard to from clearly differ the constitutional agency an interpretation contrary to the is entitled to no deference. in the judgment. Rehnquist, concurring

Justice opin- join IV, and of Justice White’s I, III, I in Parts V opinion. I join II in Part ion and Justice Powell’s judgment Appeals. affirm the therefore would in the O’Connor, concurring judgment. Justice given I in Part dissent For reasons agree post, I the limita- 636-639, cannot Stevens, place scope opinion on the would tions that Justice White’s litigants suing equitable under relief available I address two dissent, like the would Therefore, Title VI.1 (1) proof purposeful questions: discrimina- further whether necessary if claim, Title VI is a element of valid tion regulations incorporating im- an administrative so, whether statutory upheld agency’s pact as within standard authority. My question to the first leads affirmative answer imposing impact regulations an standard me to conclude that judgment I affirm the basis, On that would are valid. below. any construing Title VI the benefit of

Were without we might prior interpretation conclude Court, from this one well designed purpose to redress more than statute was Regents University ful discrimination. Cf. of California (1978) (opinion Bakke, J.). 265, 412-418 438 U. S. Stevens, majority however, a of the Court concluded other Bakke, (opin (opinion at 328 J.); id., at 287 Id., wise. Powell, JJ.). ion of Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, post, 641-642, Like Justice I feel constrained Stevens, by interpretation that of the statute. stare decisis follow part company dissent, however, I with Justice Stevens’ regulations incorporat administrative when concludes that ing may notwithstanding upheld the an “effects” standard the I that the decision below should be affirmed on Because conclude discrimination, I ground petitioners prove failed to that have intentional question no the whether there is a cause have occasion address damages of action Title VI for relief. under proscription only.

statute’s of intentional discrimination post, regulations having at 642-645. Administrative the force only they statutory if law be set aside exceed the au thority agency arbitrary, capricious, of the or are an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not accordance with law. Batter ton v. 432 U. Francis, S. Stevens’ argues regulations agency incorporating dissent that an “ef “furthering] fects” a standard reflect reasonable method of purposes the of Title VI.” Post, at 644. five If, as Mem purpose bers of Court in Bakke, concluded of Title VI proscribe only purposeful program is to in a discrimination receiving federal financial assistance, it difficult to fathom uphold regulations how the Court could administrative proscribe recipient having would conduct a dis criminatory regulations simply Such do not “further” effect. they purpose go beyond purpose. of Title VI; well City The Court’s decision Rome United States, 446 persuade contrary. does not me to the challenge constitutionality there to the was of a federal stat- imposed ute that stricter standard nondiscrimination provision required pursuant than that the constitutional Specifically, which the statute was enacted. held §2 enabling authority that, under the of the Fifteenth Congress may banning voting Amendment, enact a statute §1 practices having discriminatory effect, even if prohibits only Amendment intentional discrimination vot- ing. Congress’ power Id., at 178. The Court reasoned § 2 of under the Amendment is “no its less broad than author- ity Necessary Proper under Id., Clause.” at 175. long appropriate Therefore, as as the statute was an means of enforcing prohibition, the Fifteenth Amendment’s the stat- ute was valid. authority granted

The breadth of under provision enabling equiva- of the Fifteenth Amendment is not lent the to amount of an discretion that administrative agency possesses implementing provisions of a federal 614 is itself a creature of An administrative agency

statute.2 stated that an agency’s leg- the Court has Although statute. if are re- they “reasonably will be upheld islative regulations Mourning statute, of the enabling lated” to the purposes Service, Inc., 411 369 Publications 356, (1973), U. S. Family upon by a 1900 decision this Court for the relies 2 Justice Stevens conformity statutory regulation’s to au proposition that “an administrative by conformity thority measured the same standard as a statute’s [is] to be Post, (citing Comingore, authority.” at 644 Boske v. to constitutional 470). Boske, however, statutory 469, distinguishable that the U. S. general authority regulation at issue there conferred the adminis for the carry power adopt to rules to out the functions of the office. 177 trative S., respect statute, to this same the Court observed 467. With power only. subsequent case that it conferred “administrative . . . legislation [C]ertainly guise regulation under the cannot be exercised.” (1913). 14, George, George the Court dis United States U. S. approved regulation by Department the Interior which had the effect of statute, emphasizing enlarging the the fundamental “distinction between Id., legislative and administrative function.” at 22. Moreover, articulating applicable cases since Boske the limitations to agency rulemaking power scope agency indicate in- discretion is suggest. language example, deed narrower than the of Boske would For (1976), Hochfelder, in Ernst Ernst v. & U. S. Court declined interpretation Exchange endorse an Securities and Commission Rule 10b-5, proscribing negligent § 17 CFR 240.10b-5 as mere conduct. The Court observed: importantly, adopted pursuant authority granted “More Rule 10b-5 was 10(b). § rulemaking power granted under to an ad- Commission agency charged

ministrative with the administration of a federal statute is ‘ Rather, power power adopt regulations not the to make law. it is “the carry Congress expressed into effect the will of as the statute.”’ States, 68, (1965), quoting Dixon v. Manhattan Gen- United Commissioner, Thus, Equipment eral Co. v. 297 U. S. power granted . . . cannot exceed the [the Rule] Commission Con- 10(b).” S., gress under 425 U. at 212-214. Commissioner, Equipment See also Manhattan General Co. v. 297 U. (1936) (“A regulation [carry which does not into effect the will of expressed by statute], operates as but to create a rule out of harmony statute, nullity”). with the is a mere Cf. FCC v. American Co., Broadcasting (agency illegal by cannot make statute). regulation legal what is under the expand considerably power

we would the discretion and agencies interpret “reasonably permit were towe related” to agencies proscribe Congress conduct that did not intend to prohibit. “Reasonably simply to” mean related cannot “in- upholding consistent with.” Yet that be the would effect of regulations administrative at issue this case as five if, expressed in Bakke, Justices concluded ofwill recipients prohibited only pur- is that federal funds are from posefully discriminating grounds on the of race, color, or origin programs. national in the administration funded acknowledge I Nichols, that in Lau S. 563 U. approved liability the Court under Title VI for conduct hav- ing only discriminatory impact. I Nevertheless, believe that Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Black- accurately Bakke, observed MUN interpretation Bakke’s of “Title Vi’s definition of racial absolutely [to be] discrimination coextensive with the Con- stitution’s” casts serious on the doubt correctness my logicalimplications Lau decision. In view, the of that in- terpretation require Accordingly, that Lau be overruled. I regulations would conclude that the Title VI at issue here validly liability. peti- cannot serve as basis for Because prove tioners have failed to intentional I discrimination, judgment Appeals. would affirm the of the Court of Justice Marshall, dissenting. granted

We certiorari this case consider whether proof discriminatory required intent to establish viola- Rights tion of Title of the VI Civil Act of S. U. C. seq. agree 2000det For I below, the reasons outlined proof discriminatory Justice White animus should required. Unlike I however, believe White, compensatory relief be awarded to Title plaintiffs proof discriminatory VI the absence of animus. judgment I would therefore reverse the Appeals. petition presented question certiorari is upon proof plaintiff obtain can relief

whether a VI requirement non-job-related employment a dis- has that a prove minority applicants, criminatory also on or must effect discriminatory i. issue has di- intent. Pet. for Cert. This Appeals.1 To resolve it we must decide vided the of Courts Nichols, in 414 563 whether decision Lau v. U. S. our discriminatory proof impact of is sufficient which that held light in of must be of VI, establish a violation Title overruled subsequently expressed in five Univer- the sity Justices views Regents 438 265 Bakke, v. U. S. of California Nichols, In this held the San Francisco Lau v. Court sup- failing provide system school had violated Title VI plemental language children ances- instruction to of Chinese try speak plaintiffs English. in The Lau did not who did not charge system in- show the officials of the school had ancestry. against tended students of to discriminate Chinese (1980)(opinion 448, Fullilove v. 479 Klutznick, JJ.). joined by Be- J., of C. Burger, Powell, White provide supplemental cause instruction had the failure discriminatory impact, this nevertheless Court concluded system Looking de- that the school partmental regulations had violated VI. guidance, emphasized discriminatory programs bars that have a Title VI design though purposeful present.” no 414 even is “effect (emphasis original). S., at 568 1 Pickard, (CA5 1981) (intent Castaneda Compare 989, v. F. 2d 1000 University Chicago, (CA7 Cannon v. standard); 1104, F. 2d of Education, 1981) (CA2 1980) Lora v. Board (same); 248, 628 F. 2d of Center, Inc., (CA3 v. Medical with NAACP (same), 1322, F. 2d 1981) (en banc) (impact standard); City Board Education School Dist. of Califano, (CA2 1978) 576, (same), grounds v. 584 F. 2d on other aff’d Education, City Harris, sub nom. Board New York v. 444 U. S. 130 Organization, Guadalupe Tempe Elementary Inc. Dist. School (1979); (CA9 1978) (same). No. F. 2d and n. 6 University Regents supra, Bakke, five of California recipient prohibit

Justices concluded that Title VI does not taking of federal aid from race into account an affirmative- program designed vestiges past action to eradicate the special program discrimination. Since the admissions chal lenged deliberately in Bakke used racial criteria, that case require proof did not consideration whether of discrimina tory necessary intent is to establish a violation Title VI. only question posed was whether a conceded resort to permissible eliminating race was aas means of the effects of past reaching discrimination. However, the conclusion pro that the consideration of race in an affirmative-action gram part does not violate Title we relied in our VI, on proscription view that Title Vi’s of racial discrimination co Equal extensive with that of the Protection Clause. 438 (opinion J.); (opinion S.,U. at 287 at 328 id., Powell, JJ.). and Be Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Equal prohibit cause the Protection Clause has been to held Washington discrimination, intentional Davis, v. expressed 229, U. S. 238-248 the view we in Bakke question holding proof calls in into the v. Lau Nichols that discriminatory impact is sufficient to establish a violation of Title VI.2 required presented by

If we were the decide issue this persuasive interpreta- in the case absence of a administrative I statute, tion the would in hold, accordance with the view expressed requires proof in Bakke, that Title VI of discrimi- natory though holding intent, even this would entail over- ruling against v. Lau Nichols. But case comes us background regulations of administrative uni- that have formly consistently interpreted prohibit the statute to inconsistency We have not resolved between the in two decisions Education, g., e. any Board subsequent See, our cases. New York Harris, (“There City supra, at 149 thus is no need here be concerned with issue whether VI Rights of the Civil Act of standard”). incorporates the constitutional discriminatory impact that can- programs have nondiscriminatory grounds. justified As Justice on not decisis is the doctrine of stare observed, once Frankfurter imprisonment v. Interna- United States “an of reason.” not Boxing Inc., York, New tional Club of expressed opinion). (dissenting view The broad necessary case, in that not to the decision was Bakke, which longstanding this of whether foreclose consideration does not interpretation is a reasonable of the statute administrative by this Court. should be followed one which Shortly a Presidential VI, the enactment of Title after regulations produced Title VI enforcement task force model recipients specifying of federal funds use “criteria have the sub or methods administration which effect 80.3(b)(2) jecting 45 CFR individuals discrimination.” added).3 (1964)(emphasis Department, whichhad language participated heavily helped VI,4 of Title draft the agencies regulations.5 preparing de Seven federal promul partments carrying out the mandate of Title VI soon regulations applied disparate-impact gated “effects” (1964). Reg. contempo 29 Fed. As a test. See charged of a statute those with set raneous construction ting regulations motion, substantial the law these deserve meaning respect determining of Title Zenith VI. (1978); Corp. v. Power States, 443, 450 Radio 437U. S. United Development Reactor Electricians, Co. U. S. (1961);Norwegian Nitrogen States, v. United Products Co. See also Zuber v. Allen, (1969) (interpretation by 192 of a statute adminis U. S. participated drafting weight”). trators who carries “most judgment agency has an administrative exercised its When 3 (1968). Comment, L. 36 Geo. Wash. Rev. 846-846 4 Rights: Hearings No. 5 of House Civil before Subcommittee Com- (1963) Sess., Judiciary, Cong., (testimony of mittee on the 88th 1st Kennedy). Attorney General Comment, Rev., L.

5 See 36 Geo. Wash. 845-846. with an issue that is not resolved respect clearly of it is man- language statutorily the statute purposes enforce, dated to this Court will accord due consideration to in Bakke the views agency. Indeed, itself, opinion of four Justices which I stressed that agency coauthored authorizing and some cases affirma- regulations requiring tive-action were “entitled to considerable defer- programs6 ence Title 438 construing VI.” (Brennan, JJ.). White, Marshall, Blackmun, Following the initial of promulgation regulations adopting an impact standard, Cabinet and about 40 every Department federal agencies standards adopted interpreting VI bar programs discriminatory impact.7 with a statute has been so construed uniformly consistently for agencies responsible its enforcement for two dec- nearly ades. Our cases make that a clear and consist- longstanding ent administrative of a statute is interpretation entitled Co., NLRB v. Bell special weight. Aerospace Insurance (1974); Metropolitan Trafficante Life 100.3(b)(6) (1982) g., e. See, § (Dept, Education); 34 CFR of 24 CFR 1.4(b)(6) (1982) § (Dept. Housing Development); of and Urban 45 CFR 80.3(b)(6) (1982) § (Dept. Services); of Health and Human 28 CFR (1982) 42.104(b)(6) 31.3(b)(6) (1982) § (Dept. Justice); of (Dept. § 29 CFR of Labor). However, regulations prepared these were not contemporaneously and, alone, of enactment Title VI weighty that reason are less “impact” regulations. than the 7Regulations of the Departments Dept. Cabinet are as Agri follows. of 15.3(b)(2) culture, § 8.4(b)(2) (1982); Dept. Commerce, § CFR of 15 CFR 300.4(b)(2) (1982); Dept, Defense, § of (1982); Dept. Education, CFR of 100.3(b)(2) (1982); (d) § Dept. CFR Energy, 1040.13(c), §§ of 10 CFR (1982); Dept. (3) Services, 80.3(b)(2), Health and Human §§ 45 CFR (1982); Dept. of Housing (3) Development, 1.4(2)(i), §§ and Urban 24 CFR (1982); Dept. Interior, (3) §§ 17.3(b)(2), (1982); 43 CFR Dept. of Justice, (3) §§42.104(b)(2), (1982); 28 CFR Dept. Labor, 29 CFR (3) 31.3(b)(2), (1982); §§ State, 141.3(b)(2) Dept. § (1982); 22 CFR Dept. Transportation, §§ 21.5(b)(2), (1982); Dept. CFR Treasury, 51.52(b)(4) (1982). CFR listing For a agencies the federal with such standards, see CFR Index 620 (1972); Bergh, 210 352 205, 409 U. S. United States

Co., 40, U. S. interpretation significant that this administrative

It is also by Congress, despite its never been altered Title VI has interpretation. 1966, of the House awareness pro- proposal Representatives alter Title VI to defeated proposal discrimination, intentional and never hibit Elementary emerged In the from committee the Senate.8 Secondary Congress di- Education Amendments of guidelines and under Title criteria established VI rected segregation ap- dealing jure and de school de facto country regardless plied uniformly origin of the across segregation. §2, L. 84 91-230, cause of such Pub. Stat. § passage Act,

42 S. C. 2000d-6. Since 1964 Congress has enacted 10 additional on also statutes modeled § none of define discrimination to re- VI, 601 of which proof Although quire must of intent.9 caution be exercised 8 (1966) (House vote). Cong. 112 18715 The identical amend See Rec. Representative Whitener, was introduced Senator Ervin and both ment Act. have strong critics the 1964 The amendment would conditioned violation have defined “dis fund termination on a constitutional and would require showing crimination” Title VI to of “affirmative intent to under Id., sponsors that one purpose exclude.” 18701. Both stated negate proposals application purely “to mechanistic and their was Id., in the determination of discrimination.” at 10061 statistical criteria (Sen. Whitener). id., Ervin); (Rep. Proponents at 18701 of the measure guidelines had 1964 criticized the administrative been issued under the Landrum). g., id., Act. E. (Rep. Opponents at 18703 of the measure ibid. VI,” complete repealer that it constitute “a of title asserted would Id., Rodino), (Rep. gut title VI the 1964 and that “would law.” Kastenmeier). (Rep. 18705 (Title 1681(a) § 20 U. S. IX of the C. Education Amendments (Rehabilitation 1972); 1973); § § 1242 29 U. S. Act of C. 794 S. C. (Revenue 3766(c)(1) (Crime § Act); 42 U. Act of Sharing S. C. Control 1973); Community Development § Act of (Housing U. S. C. 5672(b) (Juvenile 1976); 1974); § Justice Act of 42 U. C. C. S. (Public Act); § § (Age Employ Discrimination U. S. C. 6709 Works 6870(a) Act); (Energy § Re ment U. C. Conservation Resources S. (Railroad Regu 1976); Act of U. C. Revitalization and newal Act). latory its Title VI Reform directed attention dealing recog- congressional

when with we have inaction, appropriate significance nized that isit to attribute to such interpretation inaction where an administrative “involves public controversy,” issues of considerable United States v. (1979), 442 544, 554 Rutherford, U. has not any misinterpretation objectives acted to correct itsof de- spite continuing subject its concern matter, -with ibid. contemporaneous

A consistent construction a stat charged ute those its enforcement with with combined congressional acquiescence presumption a “creates favor of interpretation, give the administrative which we should great weight, ruling even we doubted the correctness if Department. Tillinghast, . . " Costanzo v. 287 U. S. added). (emphasis construing 341, 345 Thus, stat repeatedly utes, this has a sustained reasonable ad interpretation ministrative if even would we have reached question initially a different result had the arisen judicial proceeding. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Cam paign (1981); 454 Committee, 27, U. S. 39 Red Lion Broad casting (1969); v. Co. FCC, 395 U. S. 381 367, Udall v. (1965);Unemployment Compensa Tallman, 1, 16 Aragon, (1946); tion v. Comm’n 329 143, U. S. 153 United (1871). States v. 12 Alexander, 177, Wall.

While not the reasonable construction the statute, the uniform administrative construction of Title VI is “far from Carp. unreasonable.” Zenith Radio States, United Rights S., at 451. The Civil Act was aimed at “erad- icating significant areas of discrimination on nation- Rep. Cong., wide basis.” H. R. 914, No. 88th Sess., 1st “[mjost glaring” problem was “the discrimina- against Negroes throughout tion which exists our Nation.” Ibid. past Given remedy that Title VI was meant to de- regulations in enacting the Employment Public Works Act of which provides for “through agency provisions enforcement and rules similar to already established, those respect to racial and other discrimination under title VI Rights of the Civil Act 1964.” U. S. C. 6709. against minorities, crimination (Powell, J.); at 328 id., Black- (Brennan, White, Marshall, JJ.), of effectu- an “effects” test is a reasonable means mun, ating goal. City States, v. United Rome this (1980)(ban changes having on a dis- electoral U. S. criminatory appropriate enforcing impact an method discrimination). against prohibition In addition, intentional interpreted agencies the statute when the first Washington years Davis, 426 U. S. before easily equal protection have could been viewed as standard discriminatory g., impact. See, e. Arnold v. North of one (1964) curiam); (per 376 Anderson v. Carolina, U. S. 773 (1964).10 given for Moreover, 399 the need Martin, objective applicable standard to thou- an and administrable grants far VI, under Title the “effects” test is sands of federal practical a than test that focuses on the motive of the more recipient, very typically is difficult determine.11

which history fully legislative VI confirms that Con- Title gress delegate to the Executive Branch substan- intended to interpreting meaning leeway of discrimination tial in Abernathy, Title VI. Title VI and Constitu- under Regulatory Defining “Discrimination,” 70 tion: A Model (1981). L. The word “discrimination” was Geo. J. in authorized Instead, nowhere defined Title VI.12 10 Lightfoot, (1960); Perry, See also Gomillion v. U. The Dis 364 S. 339 Discrimination, L. proportionate Impact Theory of Racial 125 U. Pa. Rev. (“Considerable Washington (1977) uncertainty prior to in 544 existed regard principal element of a constitutional claim of racial to whether discriminatory simply discriminatory purpose ef discrimination was fect”). Washington Davis course, made clear that Of even discriminatory impact may highly probative of evidence of discrimina intent, tory 426 at 242. U. Arlington Metropolitan Housing Corp. Village Development 11 See (CA7 1977) Heights, VIII), (discussing 558 F. 2d Title cert. denied, (Sen. (1964) id., Ervin); (Rep. Cong. 12 See 110 Rec. 5612 at 1619 (Sen. id., id., id., Abernethy); Talmadge); (Rep. Dowdy); at 1632 (Sen. Johnston). departments agencies adopt regulations

executive and principle with the antidiscrimination 601 of the Act “as general Rights: Hearings criterion to follow.” Civil on H. R. Judiciary, 7152 before the House Committee on the 88th Cong., (testimony Attorney 1st Sess., 2740 General Kennedy). Congress willingly “[gjreat powers” conceded defining to the Executive Branch in the reach of the stat- (statement Rep. Id., ute. at 1520 Celler, Chairman of the Committee).13 Judiciary significance House Indeed, the statutory administrative role scheme under- Congress required scored the fact that President approve regulations.14 all Title VI contemporaneous the face a reasonable and adminis- consistently trative construction that has been adhered to for nearly years, originally permitted subsequently acqui- by Congress, expressly adopted by esced this Court practices Lau, I would hold that VI bars that have discriminatory impact justified legitimate and cannot be on frankly grounds.15 reasoning I concede that our in Bakke Rights Program, See Civil Hearings President’s 1963: before the —the (1963) (col Judiciary, Sess., Cong., Senate Committee on the 88th 1st loquy Attorney Kennedy); between Ervin Rights: Sen. General Civil Hearings on H. R. Judiciary, 7152 before the House on Committee the (1963) Cong., Sess., 88th 1st 2765-2766 (colloquy Rep. between Mathias (remarks Attorney id,., Kennedy); General Rep. Celler); at 1890 of (1964) (remarks Cong. (remarks Selden); Rep. id., Rec. 2498 of at 12320 of Byrd). Sen. 42 U. S. C. 2000d-l. Cong. (quoting See 110 Rec. 2499 amend Rep. Lindsay). ment of disproportionate impact Proof of the program activity is, racial aof or course, prima showing the end of the case. Rather a facie of dis criminatory impact recipient shifts the burden the to of federal funds to nondiscriminatory justification demonstrate a sufficient program for (CA2 1980) activity. Bryan Koch, 612, (Kearse, J., See v. 627 F. 2d concurring part dissenting part). case, respondents In this failed provide adequate justification. an to White, ante, with agree 584, I 2, also at n. that the adminis- regulations assuming, arguendo, trative are valid even that VI itself proscribe disparate-impact does not discrimination. that The statement it should have been. was broader than Equal “absolutely Protec- coextensive” with was Title VI clearly superfluous to the was Clause, S., tion 438 U. relationship precise be- in that case. Whatever decision may Equal be, Protection Clause Title VI and the tween designed perverse to to construe a statute been would have plight to the victims of racial discrimination ameliorate voluntarily employ- recipients prohibit from of federal funds past ing the effects of to eliminate measures race-conscious (opinion of Id., 336-350, 353-355 societal discrimination. JJ.).16 Blackmun, Brennan, White, Marshall, HH HH Appeals requir- agreeing m erred While discriminatory ing proof has ad- intent, Justice White affirming ground the Court an alternative dressed compensatory Appeals judgment. relief He concludes plaintiffs in the Title VI not be awarded should discriminatory agree. proof I animus. cannot absence

A legal rights in- have been that where It is “well settled” any remedy make available “federal courts use vaded, wrong good Hood, done.” Bell Hunting g., Park, Little e. See, Sullivan (1969); Nashville R. v. Louisville & Steele in Bakke that our reasoning cast serious 16 Although recognized we Lau, fully consist pains explain that our decision was doubts on we took Indeed, noted that the exist ent with Lau. at 353. we voluntary impact “strongly supports the view that ence of an standard Ibid. As under Title VI.” permissible remedial action is race-conscious enough to demon discriminatory impact racial alone is explained, we “[i]f violation, it to believe prima least a facie Title VI is difficult strate at correct attempting from the Title would forbid the Medical School policy during the first racially exclusionary effects of its initial admissions Ibid. years operation.” two School’s

Co., 323 U. S. 192, 207 (1944) (courts have a to “duty” provide injunctive remedies violation of damages Labor command Railway represent Act’s union members Independence Deckert v. without discrimination); racial Corp., 311 U. Shares Texas N. O. R. & 282, (1940); S. Railway Clerks, Co. (1930). v. 548, 281 U. S. In ac 569-570 cord with Bell v. Hood, the Court has found no previously merit “the contention that such are limited remedies I. v. Borak, J. Co. Case relief.” prospective 426, U. S. Theatres v. States, (1964). Schine United Cf. 334 U. S. (1948) (Court from the in “start[s] that an premise” future junction against violations of statute is inadequate). all use of available judicial remedies, including compen relief, is less satory no to redress appropriate discrimination in violation of Title VI. has “Congress legislated and made its purpose clear; has federal law . . . provided enough from which remedies even appropriate may fashioned they rest on though inferences. Otherwise we impute Congress a inconsistent with the futility this great design Corp., Republic United States Steel v. legislation.” (1960). S. In Title 482, 492 U. VI as other actions, suits for violations of federal statutes, the federal judiciary remedies employ reasons related to the “according substantive social embodied in an act law.” policy positive Agents, Bivens v. Unknown Six Federal Narcotics 403 U. S. n. 4 388, 403, (Harlan, J., concurring judgment). g., Hunting supra, See, e. Park, Sullivan Little v. at 239; Wyandotte Transportation Co. States, v. United (1967); Sola Electric Co. Co., Electric Jefferson Greaney, Deitrick (1942); S. 190,

Denying private plaintiffs right to recover compen- relief for satory all violations with a involving programs effect discriminatory would frustrate the fundamental pur- of Title VI. Section 601 creates victims’ pose unequivocally remedy right rights. has little an effective But a without Hunting supra, meaning. at Park, v. Little See Sullivan Message Kennedy his stated 238. As President equity Rights, “[t]he law venerable code of on Civil ” wrong, remedy.’ every H. R. Doc. No. a ‘for commands (1963). Noncompensatory Cong., relief Sess., 1st 88th “remedy” injustice very has an cannot its nature adequately already for indi- A failure to correct occurred. specifically depreciates which was law, vidual violations injustices racial and humiliations of to deal with “the intended Rep. Cong., R. No. 88th H. and other discrimination.” Sess., 1st retrospective remedy may unavailability

Indeed, any deprivation of relief whatsoever. in the often result receiving Many programs federal financial as- and activities necessarily projects, are short as construction sistance, such private plaintiff By that a had suc- the time duration. challenging cessfully brought in such a discrimination suit nullity. g., prospective program, e. Cf., be a relief could Redevelopment Agency, 395 P. Norwalk Norwalk CORE v. (CA2 1968)(urban completed by project renewal 2d 920 sue). standing recognized plaintiff’s time the court “necessary retrospective relief also constitutes Private supplement” enforcement mechanism to the administrative supra, Borak, I. Co. v. contained Title VI. See J. Case statutory suffi- sanction of a fund cutoff cannot 432. The compliance ciently general of Title ensure with the command quantity financial assistance the sheer of federal VI, because impracti- programs enforcement alone makes Government widely cutoff is too Draconian to be cal and because a fund Inc., Piggie Enterprises, 400, 401 Newman Park 17 See (1968) (“When Rights passed, 1964 was it was evident the Civil Act of rely in would have to prove difficult and that the Nation enforcement would compliance with upon private litigation securing as a means of broad part law”). performance under Title VI The Federal Government’s actual Weinberger, Brown Supp. 417 F. very inadequate. has been Retrospective liability

used.18 for Title VI violations com- plements by providing administrative enforcement a more against realistic deterrent unlawful behavior. Moreover, “remedy” past the fund cutoff no all victims of acts of merely discrimination because assures that other innocent individuals will also be denied the benefits federal assist- Regardless ance.19 alternative administrative sanc- tion, individual acts of still discrimination violate the law and only compensatory Restricting can be remedied relief. prospective only encourage recipients relief to remedies can acting comply in bad faith to make no effort to with the stat- private litigants knowledge justice ute and to stall in the delayed justice will be denied.

B many by necessary “Unless a statute in words, so a and inescapable jurisdiction inference, restricts court’s equity, scope jurisdiction recognized the full of that to be applied.” Porter Warner Co., 395, 398 (1946). Jewelry, See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Inc., 361 (DC (DC 1976); Weinberger, Supp. 1975); Adams 391 F. 269 U. S. Rights, Commission on The Rights: (1978); Civil State of Civil 1977 U. S. Rights, (1977); Commission on The Rights: Civil State of Civil 1976 U. S. Rights, Commission on Rights Civil Federal Civil Enforcement Effort (1970); Comptroller General, Agencies Providing When Federal Financial Compliance Assistance Should Ensure (B-197815, Apr. 15, with Title VI 1980);Wing, VI Substance, Title and Health Facilities: Forms Without 30 Hastings (1978); Note, 689, L. J. 137 (1980); Cornell L. Rev. 692-695 Note, 721, (1976); Comment, 85 Yale L. J. 727-728 36 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (1968). 18See, g., Lamber, e. Agency Private Causes of Action Under Federal (1978) Statutes, 859, 888, Nondiscrimination Conn. L. Rev. n. (because sanction, Health, of “extreme and harsh” nature of Educa tion, Department funding only and Welfare had terminated three edu years). in 14 cational institutions

19 Congress noted a itself cutoff was a last resort after devices, including lawsuits, See, g., Cong. other e. Rec. failed. (Sen. (Sen. (Sen. Ribicoff); id., Humphrey); id., at 7103 Javits). Congress enacting Title VI, U. S. prospective clearly or non- relief to to restrict did not choose compensatory remedies.20 pri- place on restrictions has intended

When Rights rights Act of in the Civil of action vate example, saying explicitly. capable proved so For has private provides action on a suit court defer II that a Community referring Relations Services. the case to the §2000a-3(d). Similarly, Title VII conditions C. U. S. having brought plaintiff’s a first action on Opportunity Equal Employment Commis- claim before V). (1976 nothing Supp. seq. But 2000e et ed. sion. history supports a restriction on a federal in its Title VI or remedy statutory ability violation. court’s

C justify departure attempts the from White large part principles by relying in remedial well-established Hospital 451 Halderman, v. Pennhurst State School on Pennhurst involved ante, 1 at 596-597. U. S. Rights Developmental^ Bill of Disabled Assistance and the (1976 V), §6000 Supp. seq. et ed. and U. S. C. Act, grant program pro- through which the Federal Government § funding 111 of the The Court focused on vides States. rights states various §6010, the U. S. C. which Act, “Noticeably developmental persons disabilities. ab- with provision “any language suggesting was sent” from Advisors, Lewis, Mortgage in Transmerica Inc. By contrast, U. S. ante, (1979), 595-596, Act had created an at the Investment Advisors see section, of a remedy precluded implicit which creation explicit in one remedy VI, by contrast, explicit private damages remedy. Title contains no Similarly, in Can clearly remedy not exclusive. and the administrative University Chicago, non this Court U. S. mechanism was the exclusive rejected the notion that an administrative remedy Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. under receipt funding.” 6010is a ‘condition’for federal

S.,U. at 13. This omission stood stark contrast to other receipt sections of the Act. Because of federal funds was not compliance on conditioned §6010, Court held that §6010 imposed rights obligations. no enforceable or The analogized power spending legislation Court to a contract, stating impose “if intends to a condition on the grant moneys, unambiguously.” it must federal do so Id., 17.21 statutory provision

In contrast to the in Pennhurst, Title Rights unambiguously imposes ofYI the Civil Act a condition grant moneys. on the of federal Section of Title VI person “[n]o ground states . . . on shall, race, origin, participation color, or be national excluded from subjected of, be or in, denied benefits to discrimina- any program activity receiving tion under Federal finan- §2000d. Recipients cial assistance.” 42 U. S. C. of federal automatically subject financial assistance are to the non- obligation imposed by discrimination the statute. statutory hardly escape Every mandate can notice.

application for federal financial must, assistance “as condi- approval any tion to its and the extension Federal financial program comply assistance,” contain assurances that the will requirements imposed pursuant all with Title and with VI 21Only in question dicta did the Court appropriate also discuss the remedy for violation of conditions in an contained Act. 451 29. Appeals Because the had not the issue, even addressed this Court purport question merely did resolve remedial but remanded the Id., in Rosado Similarly, matter for further 30. consideration. at Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 the Court propriety never addressed the of retrospective plaintiffs relief requested declaratory because had id., injunctive against relief enforcement of a state law. See 421. Rosado, ante, Justice White finds solace 596-597, see though even emphasized authority that decision of a federal court to oversee use of notwithstanding lodged in a suit federal funds had in an department power noncompliance executive to cut off federal funds statutory requirements. with at 420.

630 regulations under fact, issued Title VI.22 the executive literally sign applicants contracts for federal assistance they agree comply Title VI and to “imme- which with necessary” any diately so. This to do as- take measures given “in of” and the aid, consideration federal surance is “in on” the extends assistance reliance Federal Government Cappalli, compliance.23 R.3 Federal Grants assurance of (written (1982) § merely p. are n. 12 assurances 57, and 19:20, statutory applies formality and is en- a mandate because the agreement). any apart from the text of forceable § upon obligation comply place 601 with does not unanticipated any recipient recipient because must burdens Certainly having comply anticipate with law. no applicant legitimate expectation has a that he can evade the statutory obligation expense compliance en and the extending grants tail. ways has Indeed, United States al right retained an inherent to sue for enforcement of the judicial recipient’s obligation.24 All traditional remedies can 22 (1982) (1982) §15.4 §8.5 (Dept. Agriculture); of 15 See CFR CFR (1982) (Dept. Commerce); Defense); § (Dept. of 32 CFR 300.6 of 34 CFR (1982) (1982) Education); § § (Dept. (Dept. of of 100.4 CFR 1040.4 En (1982) ergy); (Dept. Services); § 45 CFR 80.4 of Health Human CFR (1982) § (Dept. Housing § 1.5 of Development); and Urban 43 CFR 17.4 (1982) (1982) (Dept. Interior); Justice); §42.105 (Dept. of the 28 CFR (1982) (1982) (Dept. Labor); § 31.6 (Dept. State); CFR 22 CFR 141.4 (1982) (Dept. §21.7 Transportation); §51.59 49 CFR 31 CFR (Dept. Treasury). 23See, g., e. Compliance Health, the Department Assurance of Education, Regulation Rights and Welfare under VI of the Civil Act (1982). 1964, reprinted Grants, in 3 R. Cappalli, Appendix Federal 19-G g., States, 24 E. Rex Trailer Co. 148, United (1956); 350 U. S. Francisco, United v. San States Cotton v. United (1940); States, States, Dugan v. United (1851); How. 3 Wheat. respect by As this grant Court once said with of lands Federal Government to a State: upon

“It is that the grant not doubted the United to the States State conditions, acceptance State, grant and the constituted a con- transaction, competent tract. All the elements of in the a contract met —

631 applied such situations.25 to This sue is right equally to Title 42 U. applicable § VI. See S. C. 2000h-3. For ex County in United Dist., States Marion School v. ample, 625 (CA5 F. 2d 1980), 607 the court concluded “that the United States is entitled to sue to enforce contractual assurances of with Title compliance prohibition Vi’s against discrimination in the operation federally-funded schools, and that United States is entitled to whatever relief is to necessary enforce such assurances, including relief.’” ‘transportation Id., at 617.26

parties, proper subject-matter, consideration, sufficient and consent of Mathis, binding upon minds. This State.” McGee contract was v. 4 143, Wall. 155 25See, g., States, e. supra, Rex Trailer Co. v. United United 151; at Stevenson, States, States v. Cotton v. United 190, (1909); U. 215 S. 197 supra, Dugan States, 231; supra, at United v. 181. 26Accord, g.: e. Califano, Brown 235, 246, App. v. D. C. 627 F. S. Dist., 1221, (1980); United States v. Tatum Independent School 2d 1232 (ED Frazer, 285, 1969); F. Supp. United States 306 288 Tex. 297 F. (MD (MD 1970) (broad 1968), Supp. 319 Supp. Ala. 317 F. Ala. 1079 reme Education, order); (SD United States v. Board dial Supp. F. 295 1041 1969). also, g., County, Miss., e. United States v. Harrison Ga. See (CA5 1968), denied, (1970); F. 2d 485 United States cert. County Bd., (ED 1963). School Supp. 221 F. Rights Va. The Civil Act provides compliance any 1964 itself other lawful means and for 2000d-l; § 602, 1103, § § suits Government. U. S. C. 42 U. S. C. (1964)(Sen. Pastore) Cong. (agency may 2000h-3. See 110 Rec. 7060 sue (Sen. id., requirement); enforce contractual nondiscrimination Ribicoff) (calling way agency such a suit “the most effective for an proceed”). Shortly passed, agencies charged after the Act was with its availability governmental execution confirmed the suits to enforce Title (HEW). g., (1964) VI. E. Reg. Reg. 29 Fed. 31 Fed. (1966) VI) (Department of Guidelines of Title for Enforcement (“Possibilities judicial specific enforcement include to obtain a suit .”). Indeed, . . enforcement assurances even before enactment of the Rights authority impose Civil Act of the President had asserted obligations nondiscrimination on the extension of certain forms of federal (1959-1963 financial assistance. See Exec. Order No. 3 CFR 448 (1959-1963 Comp.); Exec. Comp.). Order No. 3 CFR 774 Title VI any questions authority resolved about the President’s enforce such expended respondents requested, fed- received, and When pay policemen and eral to trainees funds the salaries Supp. programs, 466 F. to finance recruitment (SDNY 1979), duty not to was manifest. their discriminate comply obligation the time The to with the law attached at money, respondents agreed Dis- take federal not the to when respondents had the law. concluded that violated trict Court remedy past properly provided a the District Thus, Court statutory carry obligation. fash- The relief failure to out the remedy requires respondents by the District to ioned the to the burden that existed from their failure shoulder funding. they moment received federal acceptance analogy in Pennhurst between the drawn spending legislation a and the formation of of funds under only propriety awarding retrospec- the contract reinforces Having tive from federal financial assist- relief. benefited recipi- obligation discriminate, on an not to ance conditioned part bargain. aid be held their ents of federal must to recipients the White would allow to violate Yet, until viola- of their contracts a court identifies the conditions enjoins recipient tion either its continuance or orders the receipt begin performing duties incident to its surely money. at ante, 602-603. This is federal See view of law.27 bizarre contract

Only by retrospective private litigants providing relief to can fulfill terms of the “contract” the courts between obligations undisputed since it that had the constitutional was power Spending attach conditions reasonable under Clause. See supra, R. Cappalli, § 19:14, that the Federal at 38. can recipients

Comment a. do The obvious this is to parties good position they in as as would have been had the performed. requires precisely contract been This the kind of rejects, remedy make-whole that see ante, White despite at his 602-603, accurate characterization of Title VI “ spending-power provision,” ante, as a 'contractual’ at 599.28 approach fraught is also with the serious difficulties Justice White’s attempting classify retrospective in prospec inherent relief as either example, Judge For thought tive. Meskill that the order that a new ser geant’s given prospective noncompensatory, examination be was 2d, 255-256, 43, at adopts contrary position, F. n. but Justice White the ante, 605, thought seniority at Judge 606. Coffrin that constructive was noncompensatory. “This court a remedy should not view such as retro spective compensation past judicial process for simply harm because the 2d, 274, (concurring). takes time.” F. at n. Justice White obvi ously ante, disagrees, 606. analysis Jordan,

Justice White rests his on Edelman v. ante, see at 604. But Eleventh Amendment considerations absolutely have no respondents relevance to this case because are not state municipal Healthy City rather Mt. but entities. See School Dist. Bd. of (1977) (local Doyle, Education v. governments have no immunity against liability). accepting retroactive Even the relevance of Edelman, resulting ques- the characterizations of the relief in this case are instance, placing police tionable. For the order the officers who were seniority position they victims of discrimination in the on the roster occupied discriminatory certainly would have but examinations al- employment ters their program status for future. Just because a “compensatory” clearly controlling also nature is under the Eleventh

D foregoing I has reasons, hold that a court would For remedy violations Title VI actions discretion to broad determining brought by private parties. course, Of equi- appropriate must a court exercise its discretion relief, myriad tably. requires of a of factors consideration This hardship party including potential to the for unreasonable mitigation, like. details breach, the extent of normally judg- left the sound the relief would best noted, the District District Court. As Court ment provide guide- adopted in a useful Title VII suits remedies Supp., Against post. 1287; 466 F. see also Association Supp. City Bridgeport, 479 F. Discrimination (Conn. 1979). my view, the relief ordered the District entirely appropriate. in this case was petitioners relief received was Because the available justified and because that relief was VI, them under discriminatory proof I intent, would reverse without Appeals. Accordingly, judgment I the Court of dissent. compensatory pro- considering In and remedial educational Amendment. (1977), Bradley, in Milliken v. grams 267 stated: S. we ‘compensatory’ change are not programs “That the also nature does prospectively operates they part plan bring fact that are of a about delayed unitary system. of a school benefits We therefore hold Id., by prospective relief is not barred the Eleventh Amendment.” such omitted). (footnote (emphasis original) at 290 Finally, applied, if the relief not even Eleventh Amendment would Co., Parden v. Terminal R. necessarily inappropriate. be by choosing operate railroad, we held Alabama became imposed by Liability Act, subject Employers’ to duties the Federal and damages in an for for of these duties. could be held liable action violations analysis applied respect receipt could of federal A similar be funds.

Justice with whom Stevens, Justice Brennan Justice Blackmun join, dissenting. easy an

It task to harmonize the Court’s cases under Rights Title VI of the Civil 1964, Act of Stat. as (1976 V). §2000d seq. Supp. amended, U. S. C. et ed. and repudiate already Unless the Court is to what it has written, judgment Appeals I however, believe of the Court of by answering must be I reversed. reach this conclusion (1) separate questions: three whether federal law authorizes private damages injuries individuals to recover caused by regulations promulgated violations of Title VI and the (2) requires recipients thereunder; if whether so, Title VI any engaging of federal funds to do more than refrain from performed by if would, conduct that State, violate the (3) Amendment; Fourteenth if not, an whether adminis- agency may validly impose requirements trative additional recipients agency. on of funds from that I shall each discuss question in turn.

I years eight In the last five at least Members of this Court compara- have VI, endorsed the view that Title as well as the provisions ble IX of Title of the Education Amendments of may private against recipients in a enforced action respondents funds, federal such as the in this case.1 This BurgeR, Six Members of the Court —Chief Justice Justice Bren Stewart, nan, Marshall, Rehnquist, Justice Justice and Jus private tice right Stevens —endorsed the view that a of action exists University Chicago, directly under Title VI and Title IX. Cannon (1979); University Bakke, Regents S. U. U. S. of California (Stevens, J., joined Burger, J., 418-421 C. and Stewart Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). Two Members of Court —Justice White and Justice Blackmun —endorsed the view that individ uals enforce Title IX against appropriate VI and Title defendants Cannon, supra, (WHITE, J., joined under C. 1983. Blackmun, J., dissenting). 636 Lau in at four such cases. authorized relief least

Court has (1974); 425 Gautreaux, Hills v. Nichols, v. U. S. Regents (1976);University Bakke, v. of California (1978); University Chicago, 441 Cannon U. S. 677 plaintiffs prevail suggests that who some White only to a limited form of in are entitled suits under Title VI surprising, suggestion prospective is somewhat relief.2 That Lau, Bakke, or Cannon no Member of the Court since Presumably, on it such limitation remedies. mentioned enacting Congress, in intended VI, on a belief that rests distinguish prospective and relief. to retroactive between improbable that contem- it to most Yet plated seems me significant on and unusual a limitation the forms so said discrimination, relief available a victim racial but absolutely nothing it in the It is about text statute. thing Cannon, as the Court did that conclude, one Congress, legislating implied when action causes of reasonably exception, the rule rather than the assumed were intended of Title VI would able to that the beneficiaries rights quite thing vindicate their court. It is another Congress substantially qualified that the believe thought unnecessary Judiciary assumption but to tell the qualification. about the reaching scope his conclusion novel about of avail- heavily

able relief under Title on VI, Justice White relies proposition Hospital Pennhurst State School “presumption Halderman, U. S. establishes injunctive granted limited relief should be a rem- as edy passed pursuant spending for violations of statutes power.” seriously Ante, at 602. That characterization dis- opinion torts the Court which Pennhurst, concerned statutory rights, the existence or nonexistence of not reme- analysis He his discriminatory limits to situations where no intent Ante, shown. at 597.

dies.3 heldWe that will not Congress be to have presumed created substantive under the legal obligations spending so power by legislation ambiguous that “a State unaware the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected it.” 451 S.,U. at 17.4 In we on dictum,6 went to speculate “ an that injunction State requiring provide ‘appropriate’ in treatment the ‘least restrictive’ environment” might be that improper, the Eleventh noting prohibits Amendment federal courts from States to requiring pay money damages. Id., at 29-30. Without why, Justice di- explaining White vines a general principle statutory interpretation from this discussion the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment no obviously has relevance in most Title VI liti- it is not in gation; certainly implicated this suit the against opinion We framed our as follows: § “Petitioners first contend that 42 U. S. C. 6010 does not create in favor mentally any rights ‘appropriate the retarded substantive treatment’ Assuming Congress the ‘least restrictive’ environment. that did intend right, petitioners question authority create such a of Congress the to im- pose obligations these spending affirmative on the States under either its power §or of5 the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners next assert that any rights created only by the Act are enforceable in federal court the Government, by private parties. Finally, petitioners Federal not argue scope rights the court read any that below created Act too broadly powers requiring and far exceeded its remedial the Common- wealth to move its residents to less restrictive environments and create in- plans mentally agree dividual habilitation for the Because we retarded. petitioners’ mth contention —that does simply not create sub- first rights it unnecessary remaining stantive to address the issues." —we find added). S., (emphasis at 10-11 4Obviously, argument respondent there can no Police De partment obligations. in this case of its Both was unaware the statute and regulations clearly prohibit discrimination, they racial so at the did respondent accepted money. time the the federal ante, fragment quoted After the sentence Court concluded: questions. “These are Appeals all difficult Because the Court of has issues, however, these we addressed remand the issues for consideration light of our 30. decision here.” 451 I cannot York. of New City and agencies officials analogizes regularly Congress supposition fathom the power legis- ts spending when draf Amendment Eleventh text or the legislative nothing certainly There is lation. so. did the 1964 suggest Title VI to history Title VI authorizes now that settled by not Even if it were vic retroactive, relief, prospective both appropriate of fed hands of recipients at the of racial discrimination tims this case because would follow same result eral funds, § C. 1983. relief under U. S. sought have the petitioners § 1983 funds, federal of to all recipients Title VI applies While “under those who act of persons: class a different governs or custom, usage, ordinance, statute, regulation, color of any establish that decisions Our Territory.” past any State § 1983 case is bound this Police Department respondent City Dept. New York Monell v. Title VI. as by as well Services, decisions past Social Our 436 U. S. Ibid. remedy. damages § 1983 provides also establish is intended remedy § that the it is clear And finally, all valid federal secured of rights the deprivation redress the force of having regulations statutes and laws, including (1980).6 Thiboutot, Maine See also law. See (White, J., dissenting); ante, Cannon, S., at 722-724 n. 17. in support advances Justice White arguments policy There well be sound. perfectly of his position may en- that strict retroactive one would fear situations which grant would discourage of a federal condition grant forcement are, These that are a federal high priority.7 applications statutes, regulations. Its itself involved federal Thiboutot however, regulations analysis applies equally to administrative Brown, 441 U. Chrysler Corp. of law. having the force regulations have (discussing types what of administrative law”). effect “the force and out, however, gives case no basis point 7 1 that the record this must appropriate damages peti to the thinking that the cost of an award of respondents’ subsidy. exceed the total amount of federal tioners would And, proposition, usually that a cutoff of federal general as a assumed arguments Congress

however, that should be addressed rather than to a cf. court, Cannon, 441 U. S., 709-710, already implicitly since has authorized the Federal Judiciary appropriate private parties to award relief to in- jured by petitioners violations of Title VI. Whether these special question are within that is, course, class another which I now turn. University Regents In v. Bakke, of California expressed opinion

at 412-418, four Justices that Title prohibition against significantly Vi’s racial discrimination is protection provided by Equal than broader Protection position Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That awas dissenting unequiv- one, however; five Members the Court ocally rejected it. opinion announcing judgment his Court, Jus- legislative history reviewed the of Title VI and

tice Powell concluded: legislative

“In view of clear Title intent, VI must proscribe only be held to those racial classifications that Equal would violate Protection Clause or the Fifth Id., Amendment.” 287. at Brennan,

Justice Justice White, Marshall, and Justice Blackmun reached the same conclusion. They wrote: prohibits only

“In our view, Title VI those uses of ra- cial criteria that would violate the Fourteenth Amend- employed by agencies. if ment a ...” Id., State its at 328.8 significantly remedy

funds would be more drastic than an individualized Cannon, S., for the of a VI 705, victim Title violation. See 441 U. n. 38. 8Accord, S., 332, 333, 334, 336, U. n. 338. Towards the end Brennan, White, MARSHALL, Justices opinion, their and Blackmun expressly rejected argument considered and the Court’s earlier Nichols, decision in Lau v. (1974), U. reading S. foreclosed their Title VI. 438 U. at 352-353. they opinion, reasoning in Later their summarized led them that conclusion:

“Congress’ prohibition equating of Title Vi’s Fifth Amendments, commands of the and Fourteenth precisely its refusal to define that racial discrimination prohibit, expectation which it intended to and its in the statute would be administered manner, flexible compel the conclusionthat intended the mean- ing prohibition of the statute’s to evolve with the inter- pretation Id., commands of the Constitution.” at 340.9 interpretation adopted by majority of Title in VI subsequent opinions

Bakke was confirmedin two of the Court. (1979), In Steelworkers v. n. 6 Weber, 193, 206, S. distinguished the Court Title from Title VII VI on the provision incorpo- basis that the former “was not intended to particularize rate and the commands of the Fifth and Four- teenth Education, Amendments.”10 And Board New City (1979), York Harris, v. the Court first Emergency (ESAA), concluded that the 1972 SchoolAid Act contemplates funding response Stat. cutoffs in course, Washington Davis, (1976), Of 426 U. S. 229 the Court held purposeful only by that the Fourteenth Amendment is violated state racial discrimination. explained: The Court University Rights “Title VI of the Civil Act of considered Regents Bakke, provision 438 U. S. 266 contains no California

comparable 703(j) §to [of VII]. This because Title VI was an exer- power cise of federal over a matter which the Federal Government was already directly prohibitions against involved: the race-based conduct con- governed ‘program[s] tained in Title receiving VI Federal activities] §2000d. financial assistance.’ 42 Congress legislating U. S. C. was improper VII, assure federal funds would not be used in an manner. Title contrast, by pursuant power regulate was enacted to the commerce purely private decisionmaking incorporate and was not intended particularize the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. pari read in VI, therefore, materia.” Title VII and Title cannot be 443 S., 206, n. 6.

641 forms of discrimination are not “discrimination in the Fourteenth Amendment sense.” 444 S.,U. at 149. The distinguish Court then in on, went considered dictum, ESAA from Title VI:

“A violation of Title VI in a result cutoff of all fed- likely Congress eral it funds, and is would wish this only drastic result when discrimination is intentional. In contrast, ESAA funds are rendered unavailable when an ESAA violation is found.” Id., at 150.11 question today to be decided is not whether the Court Congress has misread the actual intent that enacted Rights unequiv the Civil Act of 1964. For when the Court rejects ocally reading one of a statute, its action should be respected litigation. Compare in future United States v. Board rs Sheffield, Comm’ 435 Ala., 110, U. S. 140-150 (1978) dissenting), Dougherty County J., (Stevens, (1978) (Ste Board Education v. White, 32, U. S. concurring), City J., v. Rome United States, vens, (1980) concurring). 156, U. S. J., See (Stevens, Runyon McCrary, also v. U. S. 189-192 concurring). J., If a statute is to be amended (Stevens, authoritatively after has been construed this Court, always performed by Congress.12 that task should almost Justices Powell opinion, Stewart, In his dissenting joined by Rehnquist, noted that also Title VI “has been construed to contain standard, disparate-impact not a mere but a standard of intentional dis crimination.” 159-160. most, Like proposition wholly this of law is exceptions. without Congress phrased sweeping, terms, some older general expect statutes ing to interpret legal the federal courts developing them rules on a case- by-case example basis the common-law tradition. One clear of such a Society National Act, statute Sherman Stat. 209. of Profes Engineers States, sional United Associ v. (1978); U. S. 687-688 California, ated General Carpenters, Contractors Inc. V., T. reason, Continental Inc. v. GTE For that Inc., Sylvania stare (1977), 433 U. S. 36 decisis did not the doctrine preclude overruling prior the Court from its decision United States Arnold, Co., Schwinn & though 388 U. S. 365 even had it has said mean what this Court Title VI must therefore thought regardless it have what some of us means, Today, proof spoke. of invidi- this meant before necessary component purpose of a valid Title VI ous claim.

Ill Department sought, respondent case The Police this grants pay expended the salaries of federal received, and programs. policemen its recruitment order and to finance Depart Department Labor, the from the to obtain funds Housing Department and Urban Justice, ment and required promise Development, App. not A123, it was see comply it VI, Title but also that with that would departmental regulations implementing would abide Departments had all three have Ever since statute.13 virtually regulations. Significantly, implementing identical grant recipi merely prohibit regulations do more than those discriminatory administering pur from the funds with a ents grants pose; they recipients require in a administer the racially discriminatory no manner that has effects.14 City intervening York during acted decade. Cf. Monell New (overruling an erro Services, Dept. Social (1961), de interpretation Pape, §of 1983in Monroe v. 365 U. S. 167 neous action). spite from those congressional the absence of Title VI is different statutes, Congress expected lawmaking per most interstitial be because agencies, formed administrative not courts. following application requires form certification: One standard regu- grantee hereby comply it will “The assures and certifies that with lations, policies, respect accept- guidelines requirements to the Also, federally-assisted program. funds ance use Federal for this grantee gives respect grant to the that: assurances and certifies with “(6) compliance with: grant will be conducted and administered in “(a) (Pub. 88-352) Rights imple- VI of the Civil Act L. added). menting regulations (emphasis . . . Form HUD example, regulations provide: For provided recipient, determining “A . . . under benefits which will any may not, directly through . . or other program, such . contractual repeatedly upheld validity

This Court has of those regulations and their “effects” standard. Lau v. Nichols, (Stewart, concurring); 414 at S., 568; id., at J., (1980)(opinion v. Klutznick, 448, Fullilove U. S. J.). explicitly The C. reason is that Title VI Burger, “[e]ach department agency authorizes Federal which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance ... provisions by issuing effectuate the of section 601 ... rules, regulations, general applicability or orders of which shall be objectives consistent with achievement of the of the statute authorizing the financial . . .” assistance . 252, Stat. §2000d-1. Nothing regulations U. S. C. in the is inconsist any authorizing ent with of the statutes disbursement grants respondent Department that the Police received.15 Congress explicitly It is well settled when authorizes agency promulgate regulations imple an administrative menting governs completely private a federal statute that regulations long conduct, those have the force of so law as they “reasonably purposes enabling are related to the of the ” legislation. Mourning Family Service, v. Publications Inc., (1973). Chrysler Corp. 356, See also v. (1979); 441 U. Brown, S. Batterton Francis, generally 432 U. n. K. Davis, Ad (2d 1982). §7.8 Supp. ministrative Law Treatise ed. 1980and presumption validity strong must be least as awhen regulation independ does not seek to control the conduct of private parties, merely ent but defines the on terms which By money. grant prohibiting someone seek federal recipients adopting procedures program deny from any group, benefits to members of racial the administrative arrangements, utilize criteria. . . which.. . have the defeating effect of or substantially impairing accomplishment objectives of the program as respect persons particular race, color, of a origin.” national CFR 1.4(b)(2) 42.104(b)(2) (1982); 31.3(b)(2) (1982). § (1982); § § 28 CFR 29 CFR 15Indeed, VI, even the absence of expect one would admin agencies istrative grants way to distribute the in a that will benefit all segments of they the communities seek to serve.

agencies in a have acted reasonable manner farther purposes of Title VI.16 implementa agencies’ method of

The reasonableness opinion City apparent Rome from Court’s tion States, 173-178, held that even United which purposeful prohibits if 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment voting, Congress may implement racial discrimination prohibition by banning voting practices that are discrimina tory century, the dawn this this unani effect. At regulation’s mously conformity to held that an administrative statutory authority towas be measured the same stand conformity authority. to constitutional ard as a statute’s Comingore, Boske U. S. we wrote: determining regulations promulgated “In the whether Secretary Treasury] by [the of the are consistent with apply we must the rule of decision which controls law, being an is when act of assailed as not within powers upon by the conferred the that is Constitution; say, regulation adopted a under 161of Re- to section the disregarded vised should not be or un- Statutes annulled judgment plainly palpa- in less, court, the it is and bly Those a inconsistent with law. who insist that such regulation invalidity is invalid make its so manifest must except the no that retary court has choice to hold that the Sec- authority employed has exceeded his means specified appropriate that are at all to end in the the Congress.” act of appropriate

Since an “effects” standard is an means for Con- gress implement prohibition against a constitutional dis- regulation equally appropriate an crimination, “effects” an purposes statutory language: Those are evident the from race, person shall, ground color, in the na- “No the United States on or origin, participation be excluded from denied [or] tional the benefits any program activity receiving of. . . or financial assistance.” Federal §2000d. Stat. S. C.

means for an administrative agency implement compara- ble statutory prohibition.17

Thus, had to although petitioners the re- prove actions were motivated an spondents’ invidious intent order violation of the prove statute, they had to show that the respondents’ actions were discrimi- producing natory effects order to prove a violation of valid fed- eral law.

r*H <i The District Court found that Police respondent De- in this partment case was making entry-level appointments a manner that had a on discriminatory impact blacks His- That conduct panics. violated the petitioners’ under rights regulations promulgated by Department of Labor, Department Justice, and the Department Housing Urban Development. petitioners were therefore enti- tled compensation they sought under U. S. C. §1983 and were awarded I District Court.18 would reverse the of the Court of judgment Appeals. opinion Earlier in Boske the Court had noted there was “cer

tainly no expressly by necessary statute which implication forbade the adoption regulation.” S., of such a 177 U. at 469. The same be said regulations in although at issue this case. For Court has deter standard, mined that Title VI not compel application does of an effects supra, 639-642,1 see at do not believe that should be understood prohibited standard, regulations adopting have especially given such legislative passages history Bakke, from the of Title VI identified 413-418, 11, 13, 15, 16, 19, (Stevens, nn. J., dissenting), Congress’ acquiescence regulations those since 1964. respondent Because Police Department acted under color state law making appointments, it, against authorizes a lawsuit on its based governing violation of the regulations. administrative This does not mean, suggests, ante, as Justice Powell n. that a similar action against similarly would be unavailable private party. situated Whether against private a cause of parties directly regula action exists under the and, so, if liability tions what be, the standard such an action would questions presented by are that are not case. this who funds. See Justice White fail to comply ante, with notes grant agreements n. 24. But this merely and force Government demonstrates violators sue repay recip any expectations injunc- legitimate ients do not have limited Moreover, remedy tive relief is available as a for violations of the statute. agreements specifically the grant compliance under Title VI mention regulations, unambiguously incorporate which effects executive an standard. recipients Federal Government and of federal financial assist- exchange moneys, recipients ance. for federal have promised not to discriminate. Because VI is intended person” subject to ensure that “no discrimination federally programs, parties assisted function as third- party to (Stewart, beneficiaries these contracts. Lau v. Nichols, result). concurring n. 2 J., (Second) §304 Restatement of Contracts When a recipient court concludes has breached its contract, it promise by protecting expecta- should enforce the broken recipient tion that the would discriminate. See id. 344, way put private

Case Details

Case Name: Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York City

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Jul 1, 1983

Citation: 463 U.S. 582

Docket Number: 81-431

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS