130 F.4th 241
1st Cir.2025Background
- José M. Rojas-Tapia pleaded guilty in 2000 to multiple federal charges stemming from two postal robberies in Puerto Rico, including mail robbery, use of a firearm during a crime of violence, and felon in possession of a firearm.
- He was sentenced to a total of 682 months in prison, with enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on prior Puerto Rico felony convictions.
- In 2017, Rojas sought post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions invalidated his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and his ACCA-based sentence.
- The district court denied both petitions, concluding his predicate offenses still qualified as "crimes of violence" and "violent felonies."
- On appeal, the First Circuit granted a certificate of appealability (COA) only on the question of whether his federal mail robbery convictions could serve as predicates for his § 924(c) convictions after Supreme Court precedent, but not on his ACCA claim.
Issues
| Issue | Rojas's Argument | U.S. Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal mail robbery under § 2114(a) is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c) after Johnson II/Davis | § 2114(a) does not have force as an element for simple mail robbery; aggravated mail robbery can be committed without force | The predicate offense was aggravated mail robbery (placing lives in jeopardy with dangerous weapons), which necessarily involves force | Federal mail robbery, as committed by Rojas, is a crime of violence under § 924(c) force clause |
| Effect of aiding and abetting liability on § 924(c) force clause | Aiding and abetting does not require the defendant himself to use/attempt/use force; thus, it should not qualify | Aider and abettor is treated as principal; categorical approach focuses on elements of the offense, not the defendant's personal conduct | No distinction for accomplice liability—convictions as aider and abettor qualify |
| Are predicate offenses for ACCA enhancement valid post-Johnson II? | Puerto Rico prior offenses no longer qualify as violent felonies after residual clause invalidated | Attempted murder, murder, and armed carjacking qualify under force clause as violent felonies | Claim not reviewed; no COA issued, court declines to reach merits |
| Divisibility and means/elements in § 2114(a) | Recidivism/repeated offense and infliction of injury are mere means, not elements—statute not divisible | Each listed method (wounding, jeopardizing life) is a distinct element; indictment and pleas specify use of dangerous weapon | Court agrees statute is divisible, and that Rojas was convicted under provision requiring force |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (invalidated the residual clause of ACCA as unconstitutionally vague)
- United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019) (extended vagueness holding to § 924(c)'s residual clause)
- Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016) (sets parameters for the categorical/divisibility analysis)
- Taylor v. United States, 596 U.S. 845 (2022) (reaffirmed categorical approach for § 924(c) force clause)
- Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014) (clarified elements of aiding and abetting liability)
- Lassend v. United States, 898 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2018) (categorical approach considers offense elements, not defendant's actual conduct)
- United States v. Báez-Martinez, 950 F.3d 119 (1st Cir. 2020) (Puerto Rico murder/attempted murder are violent felonies for ACCA)