Roger Nicklaw v. CitiMortgage, Inc.
855 F.3d 1265
11th Cir.2017Background
- Roger Nicklaw paid off his mortgage in July 2012; CitiMortgage recorded the certificate of discharge 107 days later (October 2012), beyond New York's 30/60/90-day statutory deadlines that impose escalating statutory damages for late recording.
- Nicklaw filed a putative class action in October 2014 alleging statutory violations but did not allege any concrete past injury or ongoing risk of harm at the time he sued.
- The panel held Nicklaw lacked Article III standing under Spokeo because he alleged only a past statutory violation that had been remedied before suit and no concrete or material risk of future harm.
- Judges Pryor and Marcus (concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) endorsed the panel: statutory violations alone are insufficient absent a concrete or material risk of harm.
- Judge Martin dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, arguing Spokeo and other precedents permit standing where a statute identifies an intangible harm and the plaintiff alleges a real risk of the harms the statute was designed to prevent (e.g., clouded title, credit/marketability effects).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III injury-in-fact from late recording of mortgage satisfaction | Nicklaw: New York statutes create a right to truthful public title information; a delayed recording caused a material risk of harm (clouded title, impaired marketability/credit) sufficient for standing under Spokeo | CitiMortgage: Plaintiff alleges only a past statutory violation that was remedied before suit and alleges no concrete past harm or ongoing risk; Spokeo requires a concrete injury or material risk of harm | Held: No standing. Alleged statutory violation was remedied before filing and complaint did not allege concrete injury or a continuing/material risk of harm sufficient under Spokeo |
| Whether a statutory procedural violation alone establishes concreteness | Nicklaw: Where legislature elevated an intangible harm, alleging the statutory harm or the risk it guards against suffices | CitiMortgage: Bare procedural violations without concrete or material risk of harm cannot confer Article III standing | Held: Legislative creation of a right does not automatically supply concreteness; courts must assess whether the violation entails a material risk of real harm |
| Applicability of Havens/Akins as governing analogies | Nicklaw: Havens and Akins recognize informational harms as concrete when statute confers a right to truthful information — applies here because title information is protected | CitiMortgage: Those cases involved plaintiffs personally deprived of information; Nicklaw already knew he had discharged the mortgage and only third-party public notice was late, so those precedents are distinguishable | Held: Court treated the NY statutes as more analogous to the FCRA/Spokeo context (procedural risk) than Havens/Akins and required a material risk of harm beyond statutory violation |
| Remedyability and timing (remedied violation before suit) | Nicklaw: The statutory violation created the injury/risk when it occurred; pleading that risk at the pleading stage suffices | CitiMortgage: Because the recording occurred two years before suit, any risk had passed and no live injury remained | Held: Recording remedied the risk before suit; therefore plaintiffs failed to show an ongoing or imminent concrete injury |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (injury-in-fact must be concrete and particularized; statutory violations require assessment of whether violation entails a material risk of real harm)
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (statute can create an informational right whose denial may constitute a concrete injury)
- FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (statutory disclosure duties can confer a concrete informational injury)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing elements: injury-in-fact, causation, redressability; pleading standards for injury)
- Palm Beach Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2015) (violation of statutory right requires a concrete, particularized, personal injury to establish Article III standing)
- Braitberg v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2016) (statutory retention/misuse of information without a material risk of harm does not establish a concrete injury)