Roe v. Lynch, 997 F.3d 80

Richard Roe, a police officer, disclosed adverse incidents during a pre-employment polygraph; he was nevertheless hired by a municipal police department in Lynch's prosecutorial district.
The new police chief sent two "letters of concern" to the District Attorney's Office reporting prior incidents; the chief alleged Roe had credibility problems and that Roe lied in at least one instance.
DA Marianne Lynch sent two Giglio-related letters: the first advised her office would disclose certain impeachment materials; the second stated her office might be unwilling to prosecute cases in which Roe was involved (a "Giglio‑impairment").
The town manager later terminated Roe; Roe alleges the termination resulted from Lynch's Giglio determination. Roe sued Lynch in state court alleging U.S. and Maine due process violations for lack of notice and an opportunity to respond; Lynch removed the case to federal court.
The district court dismissed Roe's claims on state‑law timeliness grounds; the First Circuit affirmed dismissal but on the merits, holding Roe failed to state a due process violation against the DA.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Roe alleged deprivation of a protected property or liberty interest	Roe: DA's Giglio determination deprived him of employment-related interests (reputation and ability to perform duties) triggering due process	Lynch: Prosecutorial charging/disclosure decisions are discretionary; Lynch was not Roe's employer and did not itself terminate him	Held: No protected interest established; prosecutorial disclosure/charging decisions are not a protectable property interest and Lynch did not make the termination decision
Whether Roe can state a "stigma‑plus" due process claim	Roe: The Giglio determination stigmatized him and led to termination (the "plus")	Lynch: Stigma and termination derived from different actors; stigma alone insufficient	Held: Stigma‑plus fails because the reputational stigma (Lynch) and the employment deprivation (Town Manager) came from distinct sources
Jurisdictional and procedural viability of claims against DA (removal / remedies sought)	Roe sought mandamus and declaratory relief; removed to federal court on federal-question grounds	Lynch removed and moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1); argued lack of timely state‑law mandamus and failure to state a federal claim	Held: First Circuit exercised Article III jurisdiction but affirmed dismissal on the merits for failure to state a due process claim (did not rely on district court's state‑law timeliness reasoning)

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (constitutional duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (prosecution must disclose impeachment information about government witnesses)
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (public employees' property interest in employment and required procedural protections)
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (no protected interest when government action is discretionary)
Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37 (1st Cir.) (prosecutorial judgments about witness usefulness are discretionary and insulated from damages/injunctive suits)
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (stigma‑plus doctrine requires stigma plus a separate, tangible deprivation)
URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett, 631 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (stigma‑plus requires the stigma and the "plus" to derive from the same source)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (Brady principles encourage erring on the side of disclosure)