Rodriguez v. Village Green Realty, Inc.
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9124
2d Cir.2015Background
- Plaintiffs Heidi and Juan Rodriguez sued Village Green Realty and its agent Blanca Aponte under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) after text messages in which Aponte said the prospective buyer/owner would likely not continue renting to the family because their daughter A.R. has autism and epilepsy.
- A.R., a minor, had diagnoses of Autism Spectrum Disorder and epilepsy, received an IEP and school-based special services, and experienced both petit mal and grand mal seizures in early 2011.
- Aponte’s texts referenced concerns about emergency-vehicle access, liability, and suggested the family should relocate or would not be rented to by the new owner; Aponte later admitted fabricating some statements attributing views to the buyer.
- Plaintiffs alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) & (2) (discrimination/making housing unavailable), § 3604(c) (expressing preference/discrimination in statements), and § 3604(d) (misrepresenting availability because of handicap).
- District court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding insufficient evidence that A.R. was disabled under the FHA and that Aponte’s statements did not indicate discrimination based on handicap; plaintiffs appealed.
- Second Circuit vacated and remanded, holding (1) triable issues exist that A.R. is disabled or was regarded as disabled under the FHA, (2) § 3604(c) can be violated by statements directed at an individual even if that individual is not actually disabled, and (3) the “ordinary listener” standard does not apply to § 3604(d).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether A.R. is "actually disabled" under the FHA (§3602(h)(1)) | A.R.’s autism and epilepsy substantially limit learning (IEP, seizures, medical/educational records) | Plaintiffs lacked objective/admissible medical evidence showing a substantial limitation | Reversed: evidence (IEP, testimony, medical records) creates genuine dispute that A.R. may be substantially limited in learning; summary judgment inappropriate |
| Whether A.R. was "regarded as" disabled (§3602(h)(3)) | Aponte’s texts show she perceived A.R. as unable to obtain or live in certain housing (liability/medical access concerns) | Texts only expressed ambulance/access concerns, not perception of substantial limitation | Reversed: jury could find Aponte perceived A.R. as substantially limited in obtaining housing or learning; triable issue exists |
| Applicability of the “ordinary listener” standard to §3604(c) statements | §3604(c) protects against communications that indicate preference based on handicap to an ordinary reader/listener; applies even when directed at an individual | District court required actual disability or that speaker subjectively regarded person as disabled | Affirmed-in-principle altered: §3604(c) violation depends on whether an ordinary listener would perceive the statement as indicating preference/discrimination based on handicap; this can be true even if the addressee is not actually disabled |
| Standard for §3604(d) misrepresentation-of-availability claims | §3604(d) requires proof defendant made availability representations because of handicap; plaintiffs argue ordinary listener not required | District court applied ordinary listener standard and dismissed for lack of actual disability | Reversed: §3604(d) requires proof the dwelling was represented to be unavailable "because of" handicap (an actually-disabled or regarded-as-disabled standard applies); the ordinary-listener standard is inapplicable |
Key Cases Cited
- Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35 (2d Cir.) (summary judgment de novo review and FHA/ADA interpretive guidance)
- Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (pre‑ADAAA standard for "substantially limits" requires individualized, significant limitation analysis)
- Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (mitigating measures considered in assessing substantial limitation pre‑ADAAA)
- Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898 (2d Cir.) (§3604(c) "ordinary reader" standard in discriminatory statements context)
- United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416 (2d Cir.) (§3604(c) protects against psychic injury from discriminatory housing statements)
- Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (Congress intended protection against myths/fears about disabilities; "regarded as" rationale)
- Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144 (2d Cir.) ("regarded as" requires showing defendant perceived impairment as substantially limiting)
- Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718 (2d Cir.) (context for when medical proof may be required to show substantial limitation)
- Emory v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 401 F.3d 174 (3d Cir.) (evidence of limitations in learning/processing information can create triable issue on substantial limitation)
- Gummo v. Village of Depew, N.Y., 75 F.3d 98 (2d Cir.) (summary judgment reversal where reasonable inferences favor non‑movant)