163 F. Supp. 3d 529
N.D. Ill.2016Background
- Rodriguez applied for a Sprint retail job in June 2015 and signed Sprint’s multi-purpose "Authorization for Background Investigation," after which Sprint obtained a consumer report.
- Rodriguez sued under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A), alleging Sprint’s form did not "consist[] solely of the disclosure" as required for employment background checks.
- He sought statutory and punitive damages under § 1681n(a) and attorneys’ fees; Sprint removed the case to federal court.
- Sprint made an offer of judgment for $1,000, which lapsed; it then moved to dismiss for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction, arguing Rodriguez lacked Article III standing because he alleged no actual damages.
- The court rejected Sprint’s argument that the lapsed offer mooted the case (Campbell‑Ewald) and focused on whether a statutory FCRA violation alone suffices for injury‑in‑fact.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rodriguez has Article III standing for an FCRA §1681b(b)(2)(A) claim | A statutory violation of the FCRA creates a concrete injury; statutory damages under §1681n(a) are available without proof of actual harm | No concrete injury alleged because Rodriguez seeks no actual damages and alleges no concrete, non‑speculative harm | Court: Rodriguez alleged a cognizable injury — Congress created a rights‑creating statutory protection and §1681n(a) supplies statutory damages; that suffices for standing |
Key Cases Cited
- Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2003) (pleading‑stage factual allegations accepted as true)
- Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169 (7th Cir. 2015) (distinguishing facial and factual jurisdictional challenges)
- Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440 (7th Cir. 2009) (facial vs. factual jurisdictional framework)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing elements and Congress’s ability to elevate injuries via statute)
- Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (injury‑in‑fact must be concrete and particularized)
- Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (courts construe pleadings in favor of the complaining party for standing analysis)
- Johnson v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 783 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2015) (three‑factor test for whether a statute creates enforceable rights)
- Bontrager v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 697 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2012) (rights‑creation factors summarized)
- Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014) (statutory violation under FCRA can constitute injury even without actual damages)
- Beaudry v. TeleCheck Services, Inc., 579 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2009) (FCRA statutory violation suffices for injury‑in‑fact)
- Hammer v. Sam’s East, Inc., 754 F.3d 492 (8th Cir. 2014) (same conclusion regarding FCRA statutory violations)
- Campbell‑Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) (lapsed offer of judgment does not moot a live controversy)