939 F.3d 925
8th Cir.2019Background
- Plaintiffs Rodney Minter and Anthony Bertolone are Iowa inmates convicted of sexual offenses who claim exclusion from Iowa’s Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP) prevents accrual of earned-time credits that reduce sentence length.
- SOTP is offered only at one overcrowded facility with limited capacity; plaintiffs allege IDOC’s administration of SOTP denies them procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, and Eighth Amendment necessary medical care.
- Complaint sought damages and an order requiring recalculation of earned-time credits and changes to SOTP administration (prospective relief).
- The district court dismissed the federal claims without prejudice, holding plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) and that claims seeking restoration of earned-time credits were Heck-barred.
- The Eighth Circuit reversed in part: it held state postconviction judicial remedies (Belk) are not § 1997e(a) “administrative remedies,” found the exhaustion defense unresolved on this record, affirmed that claims for restoration of earned-time credits are Heck-barred, and remanded as to Eighth Amendment and prospective-relief claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether state postconviction judicial remedies (e.g., Belk) are § 1997e(a) "administrative remedies" that must be exhausted | Belk-state postconviction relief is not an administrative remedy; § 1997e(a) requires only nonjudicial administrative exhaustion | Plaintiffs must exhaust available Belk postconviction remedies before suing under § 1983 | State postconviction judicial remedies are not § 1997e(a) "administrative remedies"; district court erred to treat Belk relief as PLRA exhaustion |
| Whether plaintiffs failed to exhaust prison administrative remedies under the PLRA | Plaintiffs need not plead exhaustion; exhaustion is an affirmative defense | Defendants contend plaintiffs did not use prison grievance procedures and failed to exhaust | Dismissal on exhaustion improper on this record—defendants failed to identify available administrative remedies and exhaustion availability must be resolved below |
| Whether claims seeking restoration/recalculation of earned-time credits are cognizable under § 1983 or Heck-barred | Plaintiffs seek damages and recalculation of earned-time credits under § 1983 | Defendants argue success would necessarily imply invalidity of lost earned-time credits, so habeas is the exclusive remedy | Claims seeking restoration of earned-time credits are Heck-barred; habeas, not § 1983, is the exclusive federal remedy for such relief |
| Whether Eighth Amendment medical-care claims and prospective injunctive relief are barred by Heck | Plaintiffs assert constitutional denial of necessary care and seek prospective procedural relief distinct from credit restoration | Defendants/ district court treated entire suit as barred by Heck | Prospective injunctive and Eighth Amendment claims do not necessarily imply invalidity of good-time credit loss and may proceed; district court did not resolve these and the record is inadequate—case remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (§ 1983 claim that would imply invalidity of conviction or sentence is barred until conviction is invalidated)
- Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy for challenges seeking immediate or speedier release, including restoration of good-time credits)
- Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) (Heck applied to § 1983 claims that necessarily imply invalidity of prison disciplinary deprivation of good-time credits)
- Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to a § 1983 action)
- Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001) (PLRA exhaustion aims to reduce and improve prisoner suits by using administrative remedies)
- Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002) (explanation of PLRA exhaustion purpose and scope)
- Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) (availability standard for administrative remedies under § 1997e(a))
- Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (exhaustion is an affirmative defense; prisoners need not plead exhaustion in complaint)
- Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002) (habeas rather than § 1983 is the exclusive remedy for restoring good-time credits)
- Martin v. Iowa, 752 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 2014) (standard of review for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6))
- Belk v. State, 905 N.W.2d 185 (Iowa 2017) (Iowa postconviction relief available when SOTP is a necessary prerequisite to parole)
- Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004) (prospective relief challenging prison procedures may be cognizable under § 1983 even if they affect time to be served)