Roderick Payton v. State, 03-17-00322-CR

Background

On March 25, 2016 Robin Harris was accosted in his parked car; one man (Herron) struck Harris in the temple and displayed a knife while a second man (Payton, the appellant) searched the car and took property (phone, wallet, key fob). Harris identified Payton in a photo lineup. Latent prints tied Payton to items in the passenger side of the car.
Payton was charged by indictment with aggravated robbery (Tex. Penal Code §§ 29.02(a)(1), 29.03(a)(2)): in the course of committing theft and with intent to obtain/maintain control of the property, intentionally/knowingly/recklessly caused bodily injury to Harris by striking him with his fist/hand, and used/exhibited a deadly weapon (knife).
At trial Payton denied having the knife, denied striking Harris, and claimed he acted out of fear/coercion by Herron (a third party who assaulted Harris); his defense emphasized lack of specific intent to cause bodily injury and lack of participation in the assaultive act.
The jury charge included abstract law on robbery, aggravated robbery, mens rea, and the law of parties in the abstract, but the application paragraph did not reference liability as a party, did not tailor the mens rea language to the result-oriented element (causing bodily injury), and did not instruct that conviction as a party required intent to promote or assist the result (bodily injury).
Appellant asserts three points of error: (1) the charge failed to apply the law of parties to the facts; (2) the charge authorized conviction without requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Payton possessed the specific intent to cause bodily injury to Harris; and (3) the charge authorized conviction without requiring unanimous juror findings on all essential elements (including intent to cause bodily injury).

Issues

Issue	Appellant's Argument	State's/Prosecution Argument	Held
1. Failure to apply law of parties in application paragraph	Charge included abstract parties instruction but application paragraph omitted parties language, so jury could convict without finding Payton was criminally responsible for Herron’s act; this is fundamental error.	Prosecution relied on parties theory at trial and argued evidence supports party liability.	Not resolved in this brief (issue preserved for appeal); appellant argues reversible error requiring retrial.
2. Mens rea for result element (specific intent to cause bodily injury)	The indictment charged a result offense (caused bodily injury) so jury must find Payton specifically intended the result; the charge’s disjunctive/untailored mens rea language allowed conviction without that specific finding.	Prosecution argued elements proven (theft, injury, deadly weapon) and invoked parties doctrine; closing emphasized participation/role.	Not resolved in this brief; appellant contends the charge authorized conviction absent required specific intent.
3. Jury unanimity on essential elements	Because the charge could be read in alternative ways (cause bodily injury vs. threaten/place in fear; principal vs. party) jurors could convict non‑unanimously as to the essential element (intent to cause bodily injury).	Prosecution argued law of parties makes Payton responsible for all that occurred once he joined in.	Not resolved in this brief; appellant argues error caused egregious harm and requests reversal.
4. Egregious harm from charge error and deliberation evidence	Jury questions during deliberations showed confusion whether Payton himself had to strike Harris or merely be a party; this demonstrates the charge errors likely affected verdict.	Prosecution pointed to corroborating evidence (prints, photo ID, conduct) and argued reasonable inferences support guilt.	Not resolved in this brief; appellant contends jury notes and record support finding of egregious harm requiring reversal.

Key Cases Cited

Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (standard for harm review when charge error is not preserved)
Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (Almanza factors and law-of-parties charge principles)
Plata v. State, 926 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (requirements for applying abstract party instruction to the facts in the application paragraph)
Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (party liability and culpable mental state for result‑oriented offenses)
Cooper v. State, 430 S.W.3d 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (elements/means distinctions in robbery and aggravated robbery contexts)
Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (gravamen analysis—when offense is result‑oriented and mens rea must be applied to the result)
Brown v. State, 716 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (charge error where state’s case depends on conduct of another and law of parties must be applied to facts)
Castillo-Fuentes v. State, 707 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (jury note as direct evidence of jury confusion and charge error affecting deliberations)
Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (use of hypothetically correct jury charge in sufficiency review)