685 F.Supp.3d 1033
D. Colo.2023Background
- Plaintiffs: Rocky Mountain Gun Owners (RMGO) and two Colorado residents, Tate Mosgrove and Adrian S. Pineda, both aged 18–20, challenged Colorado Senate Bill 23-169 (SB23-169) before it took effect.
- SB23-169 (signed Apr. 27, 2023) bars persons under 21 from purchasing firearms from private sellers and licensed dealers, with limited exceptions (active-duty military, on-duty peace officers, POST-certified).
- Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages; they moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement when the statute became effective in August 2023.
- The district court held a pre-enforcement challenge: it found RMGO lacked organizational standing but found the two individual plaintiffs had Article III standing to seek injunctive relief.
- Applying Bruen’s framework, the court held the individuals were likely to succeed on the merits (Second Amendment covers 18–20 year olds and includes acquisition/purchase), found the Governor failed to show a historical tradition justifying the age-based ban, and concluded plaintiffs showed irreparable harm; it enjoined enforcement of SB23-169 statewide and required no bond.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Organizational standing of RMGO | RMGO represents affected members and can sue on their behalf | RMGO did not identify specific harmed members or show organizational injury | RMGO lacks standing; plaintiffs' motion denied as to RMGO |
| Pre-enforcement Article III standing of individual plaintiffs | Mosgrove and Pineda intend to purchase firearms for home defense and face a credible threat of prosecution under SB23-169 | Challenge premature because law had not taken effect and declarations are conclusory | Individuals have standing: intent + credible threat suffice for pre-enforcement relief |
| Whether 18–20 year olds are part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment | The Second Amendment’s text and related constitutional protections include ordinary, law‑abiding adults aged 18–20 | Historical use of “the people” and status of minors at founding justify excluding 18–20 year olds | Court adopts presumption that “the people” includes 18–20 year olds and finds plaintiffs likely to succeed on this point |
| Whether SB23-169 is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition (Bruen) | A categorical age‑based purchase ban lacks a founding-era analogue and therefore fails Bruen’s historical‑tradition test | There is a longstanding tradition of age‑based firearms restrictions and some historical laws regulating minors or sales support SB23-169 | Government failed to carry its historical burden; plaintiffs likely to succeed on the merits |
Key Cases Cited
- New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (U.S. 2022) (establishes text-and-history framework for Second Amendment review)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (U.S. 2008) (recognizes individual right to possess handguns for self-defense in the home)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (U.S. 2010) (incorporates Second Amendment against the states)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (standing is assessed at commencement of suit)
- Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (U.S. 2014) (pre-enforcement challenges require intent to engage in proscribed conduct and a credible threat of enforcement)
- Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (U.S. 1979) (pre-enforcement standing principles)
- Range v. Attorney General, 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023) (third-circuit en banc analysis that “the people” includes groups previously thought excluded)
- Bonidy v. United States Postal Service, 790 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2015) (discusses Heller’s list of presumptively lawful regulations)
- RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2009) (four-factor preliminary injunction standard)
- Free the Nipple–Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins, 916 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2019) (constitutional-right infringement alone can constitute irreparable harm)
