Robinson v. Alameda County
3:12-cv-00730
N.D. Cal.Aug 19, 2013Background
- Robinson worked as a Juvenile Institutional Officer (Intermittent) for Alameda County from 1998 to 2011 and alleges long‑running sex and age discrimination and retaliation by supervisors, primarily Herbert Robinson.
- Throughout her employment she received repeated adverse attendance evaluations and discipline; she also made multiple internal complaints and filed DFEH/EEOC charges (2005, 2009, 2011).
- In 2010–2011 the County required applicants for regular JIO I positions to pass a psychological exam. Dr. Debra Tong evaluated Robinson and concluded she was "poorly suited," and Robinson was not hired or scheduled for shifts thereafter.
- Robinson later had an internal affairs investigation arising from an alleged threatening comment to a coworker (Toy); that investigation led to a proposed suspension and ultimately to termination in 2013.
- Robinson sued under the ADEA (age discrimination/harassment) and Title VII (retaliation). The County moved for summary judgment; the court limited actionable acts to those within the 300‑day window before Robinson’s October 19, 2011 EEOC filing and declined to allow claims based on the Toy termination (not exhausted). The court granted summary judgment for Alameda County.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness / scope of actionable claims | Earlier incidents and complaints are relevant background and support pattern; later acts are related | Only acts within 300 days before Oct. 19, 2011 (Dec. 23, 2010 onward) are timely; some post‑EEOC acts not exhausted | Court: discrete pre‑period acts are time‑barred under Morgan; actionable period begins Dec. 23, 2010; Toy‑based termination claims not exhausted and excluded |
| ADEA age discrimination (failure to promote / loss of shifts) | Robinson claims direct and circumstantial evidence of age animus (oldest intermittent; comments re: "younger males"; singled out for psych testing) | Denial of promotion and loss of shifts were because Robinson failed the required psychological exam and thus did not meet statutory POST/§1031 qualifications | Court: Robinson lacked direct evidence; failed psych exam meant she was unqualified, so no prima facie discrimination and no pretext shown; summary judgment for County |
| Title VII retaliation (for filing complaints) | Robinson engaged in protected activity (internal complaints, DFEH/EEOC filings); adverse actions (not scheduled, denied promotion) followed; causal link/inference of retaliation | County contends adverse actions were nonretaliatory (psych exam result/legitimate qualification reasons) and many alleged retaliatory acts predate the operative EEOC charge | Court: Robinson established protected activity and some adverse acts within period, but County produced legitimate nonretaliatory reasons (psych fail); Robinson failed to show pretext or but‑for causation under Nassar; summary judgment for County |
| Credibility and evidentiary sufficiency (e.g., interception/alteration of psych report; altered timesheets) | Testimony and declarations raise factual disputes as to tampering, altered time records, and supervisors' animus | County points to Dr. Tong's sealed, competent evaluation and statutory duty; argues plaintiff's assertions are speculative, uncorroborated, and inadmissible | Court: plaintiff's assertions are speculative and unsupported; evidentiary defects and failure to rebut Dr. Tong mean no triable issue of fact |
Key Cases Cited
- Morgan v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (discrete discriminatory acts are time‑barred if not timely charged; prior acts can be background evidence)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination claims)
- Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (ADEA requires plaintiff to prove age was the but‑for cause)
- Univ. of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but‑for causation)
- Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2012) (McDonnell Douglas framework applies at summary judgment in ADEA cases)
- Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2008) (pretext standards and evaluation of motive at summary judgment)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard; draw inferences for nonmovant)