Robinson, Timothy Lee
2012 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1221
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2012Background
- Robinson was convicted of possession with intent to deliver cocaine (200-400 grams) and given 20 years’ imprisonment with a $10,000 fine.
- A Texarkana Court of Appeals unpublished opinion reversed, holding no abuse in suppression but egregious harm for failing to give a 38.23(a) instruction, remanding for a new trial.
- Texas SPA sought discretionary review solely on the propriety of denying an Article 38.23(a) jury instruction.
- Motion to suppress argued the traffic stop was pretextual and tainted by an anonymous tip, with suppression denied at trial.
- Trial evidence centered on an anonymous tip about Robinson’s return with cocaine, and a traffic stop for not signaling when Ninth Street merged with Margaret Drive.
- Key issue at trial: whether the roadway configuration required signaling and whether this factual dispute warranted a 38.23(a) instruction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| entitlement to Article 38.23(a) instruction | Robinson argued a disputed historical fact existed requiring 38.23(a). | Robinson claimed no genuine factual dispute; issue was legal, not factual. | No entitlement; no material factual dispute existed; issue was legal. |
| nature of the roadway at Ninth Street and Margaret Drive | Evidence suggested a dispute about whether Ninth Street merged into or turned onto Margaret Drive. | Disagreement was about legal significance, not contested historical facts. | Dispute was legal, not factual; 38.23(a) instruction not required. |
| role of officer's reasonable belief in signaling | Officer's belief about signaling could be a contested factual issue for 38.23(a). | Belief about signaling is a question of law, not a factual dispute for jury determination. | Legal question for the trial judge; no 38.23(a) instruction required. |
| impact of missing 38.23(a) instruction on evidence | Absence of instruction could render evidence obtained via stop inadmissible. | Undisputed facts negate need for instruction; admissibility governed by law. | Admissibility controlled by law; 38.23(a) instruction not warranted. |
| appellate remand vs. reinstatement | Appellate court erred by remanding rather than reinstating original suppression ruling. | Court must resolve legal questions afresh if needed; 38.23 issue non-justiciable by jury. | Court of Appeals erred; Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further consideration on the first point. |
Key Cases Cited
- Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (three requirements for 38.23(a) instruction; issue of historical fact vs. law)
- Mahaffey v. State (Mahaffey II), 364 S.W.3d 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (whether driver’s signaling related to lane change; law vs. fact framework refined)
- Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (deference to trial court on historical facts; standard for factual review)
- Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (mistakes of fact vs. law; impact on probable cause/stop analysis)
- Stone v. State, 703 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (conflicting testimony about stop credibility; historical fact issues)
- Morr v. State, 631 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (fact issues when defendant denies officer’s testimony)
- Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (egregious harm standard for jury-charge errors)
- Weiss v. State, 201 S.W.3d 233 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2006) (no 38.23 instruction where no disputed historical facts)