Robinson, Olin Anthony, PD-0974-15

Background

Olin Anthony Robinson was convicted of assault on a public servant and sentenced to four years in TDCJ plus a fine; he began serving the sentence on December 28, 2011.
On the day he began serving, Robinson filed a motion for continuing-jurisdiction community supervision ("shock probation").
The trial court initially granted shock probation on February 2, 2012; the State appealed for lack of a required evidentiary hearing, and the Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion (Robinson II).
On remand the trial court held a full hearing and on October 21, 2013 again granted Robinson shock probation and conditioned payment of the fine.
The State appealed the October 21, 2013 order, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the grant occurred more than 180 days after execution of sentence began; the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held the order void, vacated it, and dismissed the cause.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Robinson)	Held
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant shock probation on remand after more than 180 days from start of execution of sentence	The trial court lost jurisdiction 180 days after execution began, so the October 21, 2013 grant was void	Remand restored the parties to the pre-appeal posture and permitted the trial court to hold a new hearing and grant relief despite elapsed time	Held: The court sustained the State's contention — the order was issued outside the 180‑day jurisdictional period, was void, and was vacated and the cause dismissed
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in treating the October 21 order as void for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction	The State urged the trial court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction under art. 42.12 §6 and related precedent	Robinson argued statutory and rules-based doctrines (art. 44.29, Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(d)) and remand principles preserved jurisdiction	Held: The appellate court concluded the trial court acted wholly without jurisdiction and that a void judgment is a nullity; it returned the parties to their pre-order positions
Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal by the State from an order granting shock probation	The State relied on art. 44.01(a)(2) arguing the order modified a judgment and was appealable	Robinson argued there is no authority for a direct State appeal from a shock‑probation order and appellate review is barred by precedent	Held: The court (following Robinson II) concluded the State had a right to appeal under art. 44.01(a)(2) and therefore entertained the appeal

Key Cases Cited

Ex parte Dotson, 76 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (canon that a specific statute controls over a general one)
Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (statutory interpretation principles and focus on plain text)
McNatt v. State, 188 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (remand without instructions restores parties to pre‑appeal status)
Neugebauer v. State, 266 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008) (analysis that art. 42.12 §6 jurisdiction runs from date execution actually begins)
Ex parte Busby, 67 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (trial court order granting shock probation after loss of jurisdiction is void)
Houlihan v. State, 579 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (discussion of effect of appeal on execution of sentence)
Basaldua v. State, 558 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (precedent addressing appeals related to shock probation)