Robin Allman v. Kevin Smith, 764 F.3d 682

Plaintiffs are former city employees who sued the mayor and the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for firing them over political affiliations in violation of the First Amendment.
The mayor argued that political affiliation was a permissible job qualification and sought qualified immunity from suit.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the mayor for nine of eleven plaintiffs, but denied for two due to job differences; it also denied interlocutory appeal and stayed proceedings.
The city sought pendent appellate jurisdiction to appeal the denial of the stay, arguing it should be a party to the mayor’s appeal.
The court discussed whether the mayor’s appeal and the city’s stay request could proceed under pendent appellate jurisdiction and how that would affect proceedings.
The court stayed the district court proceedings against both the mayor and the city pending resolution of the merits panel’s review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the city may appeal denial of stay under pendent appellate jurisdiction	City claims pendent jurisdiction permits its appeal.	Pendent jurisdiction is narrow and limited to stay denial.	Pendent jurisdiction exists but narrowly limited to stay-denial challenge.
Whether the district court should be stayed pending the mayor's qualified-immunity appeal	Stay pending appeal avoids waste and inconsistent results.	Stay is appropriate to conserve resources and avoid hardship.	Yes, the district court proceedings against both are stayed.
Whether whether political affiliation is a permissible criterion is a question of law fit for interlocutory review	There are factual nuances that affect immunity analysis.	Court should treat the question as a question of law for appeal.	Yes, it is a question of law suitable for interlocutory appeal.
What is the scope of pendent appellate jurisdiction in this case	City can participate broadly in the mayor’s appeal.	Scope is very narrow and limited to the stay denial.	Scope is exceedingly narrow; city cannot appeal other district-court rulings.

Riley v. Blagojevich, 425 F.3d 357 (7th Cir. 2005) (whether political affiliation is a permissible job criterion; interlocutory appeal)
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (U.S. 1985) (qualified immunity is an entitlement from suit; stay contemplated)
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (U.S. 1991) (qualified immunity as immunity from suit)
Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 123 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 1997) (necessity of stay when appealing immunity ruling)
Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1989) (interlocutory appeal distinct from final judgment)
Swint v. Chambers County Commission, 514 U.S. 35 (U.S. 1995) (limitations on pendent appellate jurisdiction)
Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2012) (course of pendent appellate jurisdiction after Swint)
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (U.S. 1997) (additional guidance on ancillary appeals)
Hidden Village, LLC v. City of Lakewood, 734 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2013) (plural circuits recognizing pendent jurisdiction)
Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2006) (pendent appellate review across circuits)
Avalos v. City of Glenwood, 382 F.3d 792 (8th Cir. 2004) (scope of pendent jurisdiction)
Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2003) (limits of pendent appellate jurisdiction)