68 F.4th 81
2d Cir.2023Background
- Genting New York LLC (Resorts World Casino) abruptly closed the Aqueduct Buffet on January 6, 2014, laying off 177 employees without 60/90 days' notice. Plaintiffs sued under the federal WARN Act and New York WARN Act.
- The Buffet was one of ~30 food outlets at the casino, operated under the Casino’s centralized Food & Beverage (F&B) department; it used shared services (purchasing, warehouse, garde manger, HR, payroll, maintenance, stewarding) but had Buffet-specific managers, a designated cost center, some unique menu items and an all-you-can-eat format.
- A collective bargaining agreement covered non-management F&B employees with uniform job classifications, pay structure, and seniority rules across outlets; the Union later prevailed in a grievance interpreting “department” to mean the overall F&B department.
- The district court granted Genting’s summary judgment motion, concluding as a matter of law that the Buffet was neither an "operating unit" nor a "single site of employment" under the WARN Acts, and dismissed the complaint.
- On appeal the Second Circuit solicited the Department of Labor (DOL) views (amicus). The DOL emphasized that the operating-unit inquiry is fact‑intensive and suggested the district court erred to resolve the issue as a matter of law on the record.
- The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of Plaintiffs’ summary judgment, vacated the grant of Genting’s summary judgment, and remanded because a reasonable fact‑finder could conclude the Buffet was an operating unit (precluding summary judgment for Genting). The court did not resolve whether the Buffet was a single site of employment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Aqueduct Buffet was an "operating unit" under the WARN Acts | Buffet was organizationally/operationally distinct (Buffet-specific managers, cost center, distinct menu and all-you-can-eat format, distinct uniforms for some staff) | Buffet was not distinct: dependent on Casino's centralized services and management, unified CBA and common staffing/practices across outlets | A genuine issue of material fact exists; summary judgment for Genting vacated and case remanded for fact-finding on this question |
| Whether the Buffet was a "single site of employment" | Plaintiffs alternatively argued buffet itself qualified | Genting argued the Casino as a whole was the single site, not the Buffet | Court declined to resolve on appeal; left for district court on remand if needed |
| Weight to accord DOL's amicus views interpreting "operating unit" and "organizationally/operationally distinct" | DOL: term requires fact-intensive, totality-of-evidence analysis; entities need not be independent companies to qualify | Genting: DOL amicus improperly tries to usurp the court; DOL views deserve limited weight | Court treated the DOL brief as persuasive guidance but declined to grant Chevron deference to the amicus interpretation; regulations/preamble remain useful for guidance |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate for either party | Plaintiffs sought summary judgment that Buffet was an operating unit | Genting sought summary judgment that Buffet was not an operating unit or single site | Court affirmed denial of Plaintiffs' SJ, vacated the grant for Genting, and remanded because the record is "somewhat mixed" and raises genuine factual disputes |
Key Cases Cited
- Guippone v. BH S & B Holdings LLC, 737 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2013) (describing WARN Act notice requirement and purpose)
- Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 2001) (DOL factors usefully guide WARN Act analysis)
- Ramos v. Baldor Specialty Foods, Inc., 687 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 2012) (agency interpretations of regulations in some contexts are persuasive but not binding)
- Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757 (10th Cir. 1995) (contiguity and operational/managerial/labor factors in single-site determinations)
- Loc. 217, Hotel & Rest. Emps. Union v. MHM, Inc., 976 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1992) (WARN Act remedies are exclusive)
- Pavao v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 844 F. Supp. 890 (D.R.I. 1994) (example of operating unit finding where unit had managers, separate budget/cost center, and specialized workforce)
- Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to agency regulations)
- Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (limitations on deference to agency interpretations outside formal rulemaking)