497 P.3d 481
Ariz.2021Background
- Plaintiffs (families of Guadalupe Suarez and Jesus O. Torres Guillen) sued Villanueva and JAI Dining Services (owner of Jaguars Club) after Villanueva, intoxicated from drinks at Jaguars, struck and killed Suarez and Guillen.
- After being ejected from the club ~2:30 a.m., Villanueva drove to a brother’s house, later had his truck driven to his home, slept briefly, was driven once by a friend to drop off a passenger, then resumed driving and caused the fatal crash shortly after 5:00 a.m.
- Villanueva was criminally convicted of two counts of manslaughter; plaintiffs pursued common-law negligence and dram shop claims against JAI for overserving him.
- Jury found JAI 40% at fault, Villanueva 60%, and awarded $2 million; trial court denied JAI’s motions for judgment as a matter of law claiming an intervening/superseding cause.
- The court of appeals reversed, holding that once an overserved patron safely reached home and slept, a later decision to drive was an unforeseeable superseding cause as a matter of law.
- Arizona Supreme Court granted review, vacated the court of appeals, held the resumption of driving after reaching home is not a superseding cause as a matter of law and is generally a jury question, and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an overserved patron’s return home and later decision to drive is an intervening and superseding cause as a matter of law | Risk from overserving persists so long as patron drives intoxicated; resuming driving is within the foreseeable risk | The foreseeable risk ends once patron safely reaches home or similar repose; later driving is unforeseeable and superseding as a matter of law | Not as a matter of law; foreseeability continues while patron remains intoxicated; usually a jury question (vacated appellate reversal) |
| Whether plaintiffs’ common-law negligence and dram shop claims are preempted by A.R.S. § 4-312(B) | (Plaintiffs did not brief this on review) | JAI argues statutory preemption of the common-law claims | Court declined to decide on review; remanded to court of appeals to consider in the first instance |
Key Cases Cited
- Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500 (1983) (establishes tavern owner duty and that serving an intoxicated motorist creates foreseeable risk of subsequent driving-related harm)
- Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc., 163 Ariz. 539 (1990) (discusses intervening and superseding cause and proximate cause principles)
- Rossell v. Volkswagen of Am., 147 Ariz. 160 (1985) (scope-of-risk analysis for intervening causes)
- Dupray v. JAI Dining Servs. (Phx.), Inc., 245 Ariz. 578 (App. 2018) (recent dram shop precedent distinguishing foreseeability facts)
- Glazer v. State, 237 Ariz. 160 (2015) (standard of review for judgment as a matter of law)
- Ryan v. Napier, 245 Ariz. 54 (2018) (elements of negligence claim in Arizona)
- Patterson v. Thunder Pass, Inc., 214 Ariz. 435 (App. 2007) (example where patron’s post‑home conduct was unforeseeable and held superseding as a matter of law)
- Ono v. Applegate, 612 P.2d 533 (Haw. 1980) (cited for foreseeability of harm from serving intoxicated drivers)