Roberto Solorio-Ruiz v. Jefferson Sessions
881 F.3d 733
9th Cir.2018Background
- Petitioner Roberto Solorio-Ruiz, a Mexican national, was convicted in 1995 of California carjacking (Cal. Penal Code § 215(a)) and sentenced to a lengthy term; the government sought removal as an aggravated felon under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
- The government argued the carjacking conviction qualified as an aggravated felony either as a "crime of violence" (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)) or as a "theft offense" (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G)).
- The immigration judge found the offense met both definitions and pretermitted Petitioner’s application for relief under former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) because of an aggravated felony sentence over five years.
- The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed on the ground that California carjacking is a crime of violence and did not reach the theft-offense ground.
- On petition for review, the Ninth Circuit reevaluated whether California § 215(a) categorically requires the level of "violent force" defined in Johnson v. United States and remanded the unresolved theft-offense issue to the BIA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether California carjacking (§ 215(a)) is a "crime of violence" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) | Solorio-Ruiz: § 215(a) does not necessarily require the "violent force" Johnson requires | Government: § 215(a) is categorically a crime of violence (pre-Johnson precedent) | Held: Not a crime of violence; Nieves‑Medrano is no longer good law after Johnson |
| Whether the Ninth Circuit is bound by its prior decision in Nieves‑Medrano | Solorio-Ruiz: Nieves‑Medrano was undermined by Johnson’s violent‑force requirement | Government: Nieves‑Medrano controls | Held: Nieves‑Medrano effectively overruled by intervening Supreme Court authority (Johnson) |
| Whether state-court interpretations of § 215(a) affect the categorical analysis | Solorio-Ruiz: State cases show only slight force is required to convict | Government: pre-Johnson federal cases treated similar offenses as violent | Held: California cases (e.g., People v. Hudson) show § 215(a) can be satisfied by non‑violent, slight force, so categorical match fails |
| Whether the BIA’s alternate holding (theft offense) must be decided by the agency | Solorio-Ruiz: BIA did not decide theft ground; matters for remand | Government: N/A (not decided below) | Held: Case remanded to the BIA to decide in the first instance whether the conviction is a theft offense under § 1101(a)(43)(G) |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (establishing that a "crime of violence" requires "violent force")
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (describing the categorical approach to statutory offenses)
- Nieves‑Medrano v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir.) (prior Ninth Circuit holding that California carjacking is a crime of violence; court held it no longer controls)
- Becerril‑Lopez v. United States, 541 F.3d 881 (9th Cir.) (earlier Ninth Circuit robbery analysis relied upon in Nieves‑Medrano)
- Laurico‑Yeno v. INS, 590 F.3d 818 (9th Cir.) (case that analyzed level of violence required under a different California statute)
- United States v. Gutierrez, 876 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir.) (holding federal carjacking is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 2119; distinguished from California § 215(a))
- United States v. Molinar, 876 F.3d 953 (9th Cir.) (discussing Johnson’s effect on prior circuit precedent)