Roberto Lepe Moran v. William Barr, 960 F.3d 1158

Petitioner Roberto Alexis Lepe Moran, a Mexican national admitted as a nonimmigrant in 2014, pleaded guilty in California state court in 2016 to two felonies arising from the same incident: VC §2800.4 (willful vehicular flight while driving the wrong way) and VC §20001(b)(1) (hit-and-run causing injury).
He received concurrent 16‑month prison sentences; immigration authorities charged him as removable based on the §2800.4 conviction.
An immigration judge and the BIA concluded §2800.4 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(i), and denied relief (asylum, withholding, CAT).
Petitioner appealed only the CIMT determination; the Ninth Circuit reviews the statute’s elements de novo and then asks whether those elements categorically fit the federal definition of a CIMT, applying Skidmore deference to the BIA’s unpublished decision.
The court focused on §2800.4’s elements: willful flight from police (per §2800.1) plus willfully driving on a highway in the wrong direction; “willfully” is intentional and a California “highway” includes public streets.
The Ninth Circuit denied the petition, holding §2800.4 is categorically a CIMT because the combination of intentional flight and intentional wrong‑way driving inherently creates a substantial risk of harm to others.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Cal. Veh. Code §2800.4 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude	Lepe: §2800.4 can cover innocuous conduct; legislative history shows deterrence of a pursuit tactic, not moral baseness; minimal deference to BIA	BIA/Govt: the statute requires intentional (willful) wrong‑way driving during flight, which inherently and substantially endangers others and thus qualifies as a CIMT	Court: Affirmed — §2800.4 categorically a CIMT because the elevated mens rea (willfulness) plus the dangerous act (wrong‑way driving while fleeing) creates substantial risk of harm; no realistic probability statute would be applied to non‑dangerous conduct

Vinh Tan Nguyen v. Holder, 763 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir.) (two‑step categorical approach for CIMT analysis)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (focus on the least of the acts criminalized; require realistic probability analysis)
Ramirez‑Contreras v. Sessions, 858 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir.) (distinguishing aggravated flight statutes based on whether aggravating element increases risk and whether it requires willfulness)
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (framework for deference to unpublished BIA reasoning)
Gonzales v. Duenas‑Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (realistic probability standard for state application outside generic definition)
Leal v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir.) (mens rea and degree of risk weigh in CIMT analysis)
Fugow v. Barr, 943 F.3d 456 (9th Cir.) (non‑fraudulent offenses that seriously endanger others may be CIMTs)
Altayar v. Barr, 947 F.3d 544 (9th Cir.) (aggravating act—deadly weapon—can convert a non‑CIMT into a CIMT)
Cano‑Oyarzabal v. Holder, 774 F.3d 914 (7th Cir.) (examples of flight‑from‑police statutes held to be CIMTs when aggravating conduct increases risk)
Ruiz‑Lopez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 513 (6th Cir.) (fleeing while driving with wanton disregard for lives/property qualifies as CIMT)