Robert Winter, Jr. v. Steven Wolnitzek
834 F.3d 681
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- Three Kentucky litigants (one sitting judge, two judicial candidates) challenged multiple provisions of the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct that restrict campaign speech and political activity.
- The Judicial Conduct Commission issued a probable-cause letter to one plaintiff and threatened enforcement against others; plaintiffs brought pre-enforcement First Amendment and related challenges.
- The district court certified questions to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which interpreted several canons; the district court then enjoined or upheld various provisions.
- The Sixth Circuit reviewed standing, ripeness, Younger abstention, and applied strict scrutiny to regulations of judicial campaign speech.
- The opinion analyzes eight contested canons: campaigning, speeches, contributions, endorsements, acting as a leader, false statements, misleading statements, and commitments (commits) clauses.
- Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the commits clause for further state clarification/construction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Campaigning clause (ban on campaigning "as a member of a political organization") | Clause is vague/overbroad; prevents candidates from identifying party affiliation (e.g., "I am a Republican"). | Clause valid to prevent implication of party endorsement in nonpartisan judicial elections. | Struck as unconstitutionally vague/overbroad as construed by KY Supreme Court. |
| Speeches clause (ban on making speeches for/against political orgs or candidates) | Bans protected campaign speech (e.g., expressing party support); under- and over-inclusive. | Protects judicial impartiality by barring partisan advocacy. | Struck as facially invalid (both under- and over-inclusive). |
| Contributions clause (ban on contributions to parties/candidates) | Money is speech; contributions should be allowed as part of campaign expression. | Contributions differ from candidate speech and may create quid pro quo/appearance problems; narrow, permissible regulation. | Upheld as constitutional. |
| Endorsements clause (ban on publicly endorsing/opposing other candidates) | Overbroadly restricts speech and political expression. | Prevents judges from entering partisan machines and avoids quid pro quo influence. | Upheld as narrowly tailored and constitutional. |
| Acting-as-leader clause (ban on holding office/leadership in political org) | Facial challenge: overbroad as applied to non-leadership political activity. | Permissible to bar leadership roles to preserve nonpartisan judiciary. | Upheld facially; Blau's proposed fundraiser hosting (as-applied) can be banned. |
| False-statements clause (ban on knowingly/recklessly false/material statements) | Facial challenge: protects integrity of judiciary but as-applied bans ambiguous statements like "re-elect." | Narrow mens rea and materiality save the provision. | Facial validity affirmed; as-applied challenge by Jones ("re-elect") reversed — her statement could be reasonably interpreted as true, so the as-applied ban fails. |
| Misleading-statements clause (ban on misleading statements) | Captures ambiguous or technically true statements that create misleading impressions; chills protected speech. | Necessary to prevent deception of voters and protect judicial integrity. | Struck as unconstitutional—cannot prohibit negligent or merely misleading statements beyond knowing falsehoods. |
| Commits clause (bans pledges/promises re: cases/issues likely to come before court) | Too vague about what constitutes an "issue" commitment; overbroad. | Narrowed language targets commitments inconsistent with impartial adjudication; protects judicial impartiality. | Vacated and remanded for clarification; may be upheld if construed to prohibit only commitments showing bias as to parties. |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (upheld restrictions on judicial campaign solicitations; applied strict scrutiny to judicial campaign regulations)
- Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (First Amendment limits on judicial campaign restrictions)
- Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189 (6th Cir. 2010) (prior Sixth Circuit analysis of commits clause and issue-level restrictions)
- Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014) (probable-cause findings can create credible threat for pre-enforcement standing)
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (recognition that contributions are a form of speech)
- Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982) (need for breathing space for political speech against overbroad regulation)
- Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002) (distinction between knowing falsehoods and negligent misstatements in campaign speech)
- Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (state interest in judicial integrity and avoiding appearance of bias)
- Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2016) (upheld narrower speeches/endorsement restrictions)
- Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing speech about one’s own campaign from contributions/endorsements)
- Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2010) (upheld narrow commits/related provisions)