472 S.W.3d 467
Tex. App.2015Background
- Lawanna Keeth, a diabetic, crossed into oncoming traffic and collided head-on with a tractor-trailer driven by Robert Williams; Keeth later died and Williams sued Keeth’s heir, Russell Parker, for negligence, negligence per se, and negligent entrustment.
- At the scene Keeth’s blood sugar was low; there was evidence she had prior diabetic episodes (including loss of consciousness) and carried candy for such events.
- Witnesses and Williams gave statements that Keeth’s head was upright, eyes open, and she appeared to be steering immediately before impact; another witness reported weaving but maintaining speed.
- Parker moved for summary judgment (traditional and no‑evidence) on all claims, asserting unforeseeable incapacity and lack of evidence on essential elements; the trial court granted the motion without specifying grounds.
- The appellate court reviewed de novo, addressed no‑evidence grounds first where applicable, and considered whether Parker conclusively negated elements or whether fact issues existed that precluded summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ordinary negligence — duty/breach/proximate cause | Williams: Keeth’s conduct breached duty and proximately caused the collision | Parker: Keeth experienced an unforeseeable incapacity (loss of consciousness/control) negating liability | Reversed — evidence raised fact issues on foreseeability and incapacity; summary judgment improper |
| Negligence per se — statutory violation and excuse | Williams: Keeth violated traffic statute; Parker must prove any statutory excuse | Parker: No evidence violation was unexcused; alternatively incapacity excused violation | Reversed — Parker misallocated burden; no‑evidence motion improper and fact issues exist on excuse |
| Negligent entrustment — owner’s knowledge of driver incompetence | Williams: Parker knew or should have known of Keeth’s diabetic episodes making her incompetent | Parker: Keeth had a valid license; no evidence she was incompetent or that Parker knew | Reversed — evidence of prior diabetic episodes rebutted presumption of competency and created fact issue on Parker’s knowledge |
| Trial court’s grant of summary judgment | Williams: multiple fact questions preclude summary judgment on all claims | Parker: his combined traditional and no‑evidence motions were meritorious | Reversed and remanded — appellate court found errors in granting summary judgment on all pleaded grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2015) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Nall v. Plunkett, 404 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2013) (summary judgment must be based on grounds presented)
- FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2000) (affirming when any ground in motion meritorious)
- Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. 2004) (address no‑evidence motion before alternative traditional motion on same element)
- IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. 2004) (elements of negligence)
- Western Invs. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2005) (proximate cause components)
- Missouri P. R.R. Co. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1977) (negligence per se and statutory standard of care)
- Moughon v. Wolf, 576 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1978) (burden regarding proof of statutory violation and excuses)
- Impson v. Structural Metals, Inc., 487 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1972) (incapacity as legally acceptable excuse)