Robert Reeves v. Sherman Campbell, 708 F. App'x 230

Background

Reeves used the internet to communicate with an undercover officer posing as a 14‑year‑old and was arrested when he arrived to meet the purported child.
He pleaded guilty to (1) using a computer to arrange child sexually abusive activity (Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.145d) and (2) the lesser‑included offense of arranging child sexually abusive activity (Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.145c); sentenced to concurrent 6½–20 year terms.
Reeves filed state and federal postconviction challenges; an earlier federal habeas was dismissed for failure to exhaust; he later sought state relief under Mich. Ct. R. 6.502 and then filed a second federal § 2254 petition.
The state trial court denied relief citing Rule 6.508(D)(3) (procedural default) and also rejected the double jeopardy claim on the merits; the district court likewise denied habeas relief as procedurally defaulted and on the merits.
The Sixth Circuit held Reeves’s § 2254 petition was timely, excused the procedural default because appellate counsel’s omission of the double jeopardy claim was ineffective assistance, and concluded the two convictions are the "same" under Blockburger/Brown—warranting further review.
Because Respondent raised for the first time on appeal potentially dispositive arguments (legislative authorization of cumulative punishments and that Reeves committed multiple criminal acts), the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for the district court to consider those arguments in the first instance.

Issues

Issue	Reeves' Argument	Campbell/Respondent's Argument	Held
Timeliness of §2254 petition	Petition filed within AEDPA year after tolling for earlier federal petition and state postconviction; total days < 365	Petition untimely because limitations began after district court dismissal and Reeves delayed filing state relief	Timely — limitations tolled while earlier federal petition and state postconviction were pending; petition filed within 365 days
Procedural default (Rule 6.508(D)(3))	Default excused because appellate counsel ineffectively omitted a "significant and obvious" double jeopardy claim	Default valid; state rule bars claim for failure to raise on direct appeal	Default excused: counsel deficient for not raising claim; prejudice satisfied because omitted claim had merit (ineffective assistance excuses default)
Double jeopardy merits (Blockburger/Brown)	Convictions violate Double Jeopardy because §750.145c is a lesser‑included offense of §750.145d; lesser requires no proof beyond greater	Convictions distinct or otherwise permissible	Reeves: The two statutes are the same under Blockburger/Brown; state court contradicted Supreme Court precedent and AEDPA does not bar relief
New arguments raised on appeal (legislative authorization / multiple acts)	N/A (Reeves seeks relief based on Double Jeopardy error)	State for first time argues Missouri v. Hunter permits cumulative punishments if legislature authorized them; also argues multiple acts justify multiple punishments	Forfeiture noted; because these arguments could be outcome determinative, case VACATED and REMANDED for district court to consider them in the first instance

Key Cases Cited

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (establishes test for whether two offenses are the same for double jeopardy)
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (greater and lesser‑included offenses are the same for double jeopardy)
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (legislative authorization can permit cumulative punishments)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (equitable tolling principles for AEDPA limitations)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (AEDPA deference standards)
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (Double Jeopardy Clause applies to the states)
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (stay‑and‑abeyance and exhaustion considerations)
Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (when a petition is "pending" for tolling purposes)