525 F. App'x 357
6th Cir.2013Background
- Mackey was convicted in 1998 in Ohio and sentenced to 28 years; health issues arose during direct appeal proceedings.
- Appellate counsel initially filed a direct appeal but did not pursue it; the Ohio Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of prosecution in 1999 without notice to Mackey.
- A 2007 Rule 26(B) motion to reopen was denied in 2008 as untimely, with Ohio Supreme Court later dismissing the appeal on non-substantial constitutional questions.
- Mackey filed a 2009 federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising multiple claims including ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
- In 2011 Mackey received a de novo resentencing in state court to impose post-release controls, affecting the procedural posture but not the federal statute of limitations.
- The district court dismissed the 2009 petition as untimely under AEDPA § 2244(d)(1)(A); the Sixth Circuit affirmed, denying relief on timeliness grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2244(d)(1)(A) bars the petition as untimely | Mackey argues the 1998 sentence or 2011 de novo sentence start dates toll limitations. | Respondent contends the limitation runs from the 1998 final judgment and 2000 expiry, untolled by post-resentencing proceedings. | Petition denied; untimely under § 2244(d)(1)(A). |
| Whether the 2011 de novo resentencing affected the limitations period | Mackey posits the 2011 resentencing restarted the clock under Burton/Rashad logic. | Bezak/Fischer framework limits resentencing to post-release controls; no restart of the federal clock. | No restart; limitations ran from 1998 sentence. |
| Whether the 1998 sentence remained cognizable for federal review despite state-law voidness | Mackey contends the 1998 sentence was void under Ohio law, delaying finality for AEDPA. | Federal finality does not require state-law validity; judgment is cognizable under AEDPA. | Finality for § 2244(d)(1)(A) did not require state-law validity; the petition is untimely. |
Key Cases Cited
- Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (U.S. 2007) (one-year clock can be triggered by resentencing effects; used to discuss timing of clock)
- Rashad v. Lafler, 675 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2012) (distinguishes resentencing timing post-direct-review on clock restart)
- Frazier v. Moore, 252 F. App’x 1 (6th Cir. 2007) (sentence voidness does not bar federal habeas review; finality under § 2244(d) is separate from state law)
- Gonzalez v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 641 (U.S. 2012) (finality for AEDPA purposes; time to seek discretionary review rules)
- Bezak, State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St. 3d 94 (Ohio 2007) (recognizes complete de novo resentencing rights in Ohio prior to Fischer)
- Fischer, State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92 (Ohio 2010) (limits de novo resentencing to imposition of mandatory post-release controls)
- Bezak v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92 (Ohio 2010) (state-law framework for resentencing following Bezak)
- Watson v. McCabe, 527 F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1975) (state-law questions resolved under Rules of Decision Act in federal habeas context)