Robert Lewis III v. State of Indiana
34 N.E.3d 240
| Ind. | 2015Background
- On April 1, defendant Robert Lewis III left a bar with victim Jennifer Kocsis; she was later found beaten and manually strangled in an abandoned school parking lot.
- Evidence showed severe blunt-force injuries, Kocsis’s tooth embedded in her car, Lewis’s blood on her steering wheel, a shoeprint matching Lewis’s burned sneakers on her arm, and DNA from a non-Kocsis source on and inside Kocsis’s anus.
- Lewis was arrested after a high-speed chase; he and a companion burned bloody clothing and shoes and discarded Kocsis’s car keys shortly after the homicide.
- A jury convicted Lewis of murder, murder in perpetration of criminal deviate conduct, criminal deviate conduct, and resisting law enforcement; the jury deadlocked on sentencing and the judge then sentenced Lewis to life without parole plus three years.
- On appeal Lewis challenged (1) sufficiency of evidence for criminal deviate conduct, (2) omission of a "reasonable theory of innocence" jury instruction, (3) admission of testimony about his prior conduct when drinking as habit evidence, and (4) the adequacy of the sentencing order imposing life without parole.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for criminal deviate conduct | DNA on and in victim's anus plus surrounding physical and circumstantial evidence supports nonconsensual deviate conduct | DNA evidence insufficient or contaminated; lack of anal injuries and possibility of consensual sex mean conviction unsupported | Evidence sufficient: jury could infer nonconsensual contact or penetration by penis or object given totality of forensic and circumstantial evidence |
| Omission of "reasonable theory of innocence" instruction | Not required because actus reus not proved only by circumstantial evidence; direct and corroborative evidence exists | Needed because DNA was the critical inferential step and consensual sex is a reasonable theory of innocence | No fundamental error: Hampton instruction required only where actus reus is established exclusively by circumstantial evidence; here direct/corroborative evidence dispelled that requirement |
| Admission of testimony about prior conduct while drinking (Rule 406 habit vs. Rule 404(b) bad-acts) | Testimony was admissible as habit evidence showing a regular response when drinking | Testimony was prior-bad-act/character evidence and inadmissible under Rule 404(b) | Admission was erroneous as habit evidence but harmless given overwhelming other evidence of aggressive sexual propositions and conduct that night |
| Adequacy of sentencing order imposing life without parole | Sentencing order complied with statutory findings authorizing LWOP | Sentencing order lacked the judge's personal statement that LWOP was appropriate as required by Harrison when court alone imposes sentence | Sentence reversed and remanded: trial court must issue a revised sentencing order containing the judge's personal conclusion that LWOP is appropriate, per Harrison and Pittman |
Key Cases Cited
- Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. 1995) (trial court must state findings, reasons, balancing, and personal conclusion when imposing capital or LWOP sentence)
- Pittman v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1246 (Ind. 2008) (Harrison requirements apply when sentencing is to the court alone under current statute)
- Hampton v. State, 961 N.E.2d 480 (Ind. 2012) ("reasonable theory of innocence" instruction required when actus reus is proved exclusively by circumstantial evidence)
- Downey v. State, 726 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (distinguishes non-penetrative contact as insufficient for criminal deviate conduct when no forensic evidence of contact)