Robert Leflar v. Target Corporation
57 F.4th 600
8th Cir.
2023

Background

  • Plaintiff Robert Leflar bought a laptop from Target and asserted Target withheld pre-sale access to written product warranties in violation of the Magnuson‑Moss Warranty Act’s Pre‑Sale Availability Rule.
  • Leflar filed a putative class action on behalf of Arkansas purchasers of Target products over $15 subject to written warranties, seeking only injunctive and declaratory relief.
  • Target removed under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), asserting minimal diversity, a class over 100, and an amount in controversy exceeding $5 million.
  • Leflar moved to remand, arguing the amount in controversy did not meet CAFA’s $5 million threshold; the district court granted remand.
  • Target sought permission to appeal the remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1); the Eighth Circuit granted review because the issues are recurring and otherwise escape meaningful appellate review.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether an anti‑removal presumption applies when assessing CAFA removal at pleading and evidentiary stages Leflar argued doubts should be resolved in favor of remand (apply anti‑removal presumption). Target argued no anti‑removal presumption applies under CAFA; removal allegations should be accepted if plausible and evidence weighed under preponderance standard. The court held no anti‑removal presumption applies under CAFA; Dart controls and courts must accept good‑faith allegations at pleading stage and weigh evidence at the evidentiary stage.
Whether the district court erred by ignoring Target’s post‑removal declaration estimating compliance costs Leflar relied on the evidence before the court and argued Target’s post‑removal estimate was unsupported or irrelevant. Target argued the post‑removal Beckmann declaration supplying detailed compliance‑cost estimates was proper supplemental evidence bearing on amount in controversy. The court held the district court should have considered the post‑removal Beckmann declaration because supplemental evidence that illuminates the situation at removal is permissible.
Proper standard for showing CAFA’s amount in controversy at pleadings and after challenge Leflar contended Target failed to show by a preponderance that the case exceeds $5 million. Target maintained its notice plausibly alleged CAFA jurisdiction and, with supporting evidence (including post‑removal declaration), could meet the preponderance standard. The court reiterated two steps: at pleading, accept plausible allegations made in good faith; after challenge, defendant must prove by a preponderance that amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.

Key Cases Cited

  • Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (clarifies pleading and evidentiary standards for removal and rejects anti‑removal presumption under CAFA)
  • Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588 (describes CAFA jurisdictional framework)
  • Pirozzi v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, 938 F.3d 981 (8th Cir.) (explains plausibility test for notice of removal)
  • Hartis v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 694 F.3d 935 (8th Cir.) (discusses evidentiary standard for amount in controversy after challenge)
  • Waters v. Ferrara Candy Co., 873 F.3d 633 (8th Cir.) (addresses post‑removal jurisdictional proof)
  • Pudlowski v. The St. Louis Rams, LLC, 829 F.3d 963 (8th Cir.) (allows supplementation of removal record after filing)
  • Raskas v. Johnson & Johnson, 719 F.3d 884 (8th Cir.) (uses sales figures to establish amount in controversy)
  • Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920 (9th Cir.) (permits reasonable assumptions for defendant’s amount‑in‑controversy showing)
  • Harmon v. OKI Sys., 115 F.3d 477 (7th Cir.) (test for whether post‑removal evidence illuminates situation at removal)
  • Coll. of Dental Surgeons of P.R. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 33 (1st Cir.) (discusses appellate reviewability of remand orders under CAFA)
  • Hargett v. RevClaims, LLC, 854 F.3d 962 (8th Cir.) (addresses standards for granting permission to appeal remand)
  • Wilkinson v. Shackelford, 478 F.3d 957 (8th Cir.) (example of pre‑Dart anti‑removal presumption in ordinary diversity cases)
  • Smith v. United States, 726 F.2d 428 (8th Cir.) (explains meaning of preponderance of the evidence)
  • Westerfield v. Indep. Processing, LLC, 621 F.3d 819 (8th Cir.) (notes CAFA broadened federal jurisdiction for class actions)
Read the full case