Robert Jesurum v. WBTSCC Limited Partnership & a.
151 A.3d 949
| N.H. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff Robert Jesurum and the public used a gravel area called "Sanders Point" (adjacent to Little Harbor Beach in Rye) for parking and beach access from at least the 1950s through 2012.
- Defendants WBTSCC LP and trustee William H. Binnie own the adjoining golf course; increased public use led to tensions and defendants blocked off Sanders Point in October 2012.
- Jesurum sued for a declaratory judgment that he and the public had acquired a prescriptive easement for parking and beach access; the trial court granted summary judgment on easement existence and later held a hearing on scope.
- Trial court ruled the public holds a prescriptive easement limited to four short-term parking spaces (dawn to dusk) and pedestrian access to the beach (excluding carting/towing vessels).
- The trial court awarded attorney’s fees to Jesurum under the substantial-benefit theory; the trial court’s fee award was challenged on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a public prescriptive easement exists over Sanders Point | Jesurum: long, continuous, open public use (20+ years) put owners on notice; non-permissive | Defendants: use was incidental/minor or permissive; not adverse | Court: affirmed — public use was adverse, continuous, and sufficient to create a prescriptive easement |
| Scope of easement | Jesurum: parking and pedestrian access to beach (as historically used) | Defendants: scope should be limited to original activities (e.g., digging for worms); local ordinances/regulations should constrain scope | Court: affirmed — scope defined by character of use: parking and foot access (with specific limits) |
| Whether defendants interrupted continuity (construction/staging uses) | Jesurum: occasional staging did not interrupt continuous public use | Defendants: construction uses were acts that interrupted adverse use | Court: affirmed — intermittent staging was not unequivocal ouster; continuity satisfied |
| Award of attorney’s fees under substantial‑benefit theory | Jesurum: public benefited and plaintiff should recover fees | Defendants: trial court lacked jurisdiction after appeal; private defendants shouldn’t bear fees under public‑benefit theory | Court: reversed — awarding fees against private litigant under substantial‑benefit doctrine was unwarranted; trial court erred |
Key Cases Cited
- Greenan v. Lobban, 143 N.H. 18 (1998) (elements for prescriptive easement: 20 years’ adverse, continuous, uninterrupted use giving notice)
- Sandford v. Town of Wolfeboro, 143 N.H. 481 (1999) (scope of prescriptive easement defined by character and nature of use)
- Ellison v. Fellows, 121 N.H. 978 (1981) (adverse use need not be hostile; trespassory use may suffice)
- Bonardi v. Kazmirchuk, 146 N.H. 640 (2001) (burden‑shifting framework for proving adverse use)
- Cote v. Eldeen, 119 N.H. 491 (1979) (easement scope tied to line of use creating it)
- Claremont School Dist. v. Governor (Costs and Attorney’s Fees), 144 N.H. 590 (1999) (substantial‑benefit doctrine can justify fee awards where public also benefits)
- Bedard v. Town of Alexandria, 159 N.H. 740 (2010) (limits on awarding fees against private litigants/governmental roles)
- Silva v. Botsch, 121 N.H. 1041 (1981) (awarding fees when suit primarily benefits a larger constituency; factual context important)
