Robert Holleman v. Dushan Zatecky
951 F.3d 873
| 7th Cir. | 2020Background
- Plaintiff Robert Holleman, an Indiana prisoner and experienced jailhouse lawyer, filed multiple grievances, a March 2015 lawsuit, an October 11, 2015 newspaper statement, and an October 14, 2015 grievance while housed at Pendleton Correctional Facility.
- Pendleton superintendent Dushan Zatecky arranged Holleman’s transfer to Wabash Valley in exchange for another prisoner, stating the transfer was because of Holleman’s multitude of complaints and that a newer facility would benefit him.
- The transfer occurred November 20, 2015; both facilities are maximum-security and Holleman was in general population at each.
- Holleman alleged adverse effects: reduced law-library access (7→4 hours/week), loss of single cell (now has a cellmate), greater witnessed violence (and an unreported assault), and disruption of his established living situation.
- The district court found Holleman engaged in protected First Amendment activity and that his speech was a motivating factor, but granted qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that such a transfer violated constitutional rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding no First Amendment retaliation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the transfer motivated by Holleman's protected activity (causation)? | Zatecky’s admission that Holleman was transferred because of his many complaints shows retaliatory motive. | Transfer was motivated by desire to remedy complaints or provide a better facility (change of scenery), not retaliation. | Transfer was motivated by the substance of Holleman's complaints, not the fact of his protected activity; causation not established. |
| Was the transfer an "adverse action" likely to deter a person of ordinary firmness? | Reduced law-library time, loss of single cell, more violence, and relocation disruption were adverse and deterrent. | Transfer between comparable maximum-security facilities did not materially worsen conditions; not objectively deterrent. | Transfer was not sufficiently adverse—no major increase in restrictions or demonstrated risk to deter ordinary firmness. |
| Did the transfer violate Holleman’s First Amendment right to be free from retaliation? | Combining motive and adverse effect, the transfer violated Holleman’s rights. | No—either motive or adversity lacking, so no constitutional violation. | No constitutional violation: plaintiff failed both the causation and adversity requirements. |
| Was the right clearly established (qualified immunity)? | Holleman contends retaliation law protects against transfers as retaliation. | Defendants contend no precedent clearly establishes a right to remain in a particular prison placement. | Court did not need to decide clarity because no violation was found; lower court’s view that right was not clearly established was affirmed implicitly. |
Key Cases Cited
- Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996) (prisoner can state retaliation claim for transfer even if transfer itself is not an independent constitutional violation)
- Hoskins v. Lenear, 395 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2005) (conduct not independently unconstitutional can support retaliation claim if motivated by improper purpose)
- Sisneros v. Nix, 95 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 1996) (distinguishes transfers motivated by remedying complaints from transfers motivated by the fact of suing)
- Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 1996) (transfer into segregated, more restrictive housing can be retaliatory)
- Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1978) (transfer from minimum- to maximum-security can amount to retaliation)
- Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (prisoner has no protected liberty interest in assignment to a particular prison)
- Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (courts must afford wide deference to prison administrators in maintaining order and security)
- Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (limits judicial involvement in day-to-day prison management)
- Surita v. Hyde, 665 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 2011) (adverse-action standard: likely to deter a person of ordinary firmness)
- Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999) (prisoners must tolerate more than citizens before action is deemed adverse)
- Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2009) (elements required to prove a First Amendment retaliation claim)
- Estate of Clark v. Walker, 865 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2017) (standard of de novo review for qualified immunity on summary judgment)
