Robert Fair, Independent of the Estate of Wilton Fair, and Barton Walker Fair, Jr. v. Arp Club Lake, Inc., 437 S.W.3d 619

The 84.3-acre tract includes the Fairs' 36.24-acre parcel and was leased in 1936 to named lessees for 99 years; the lease was recorded in 1941.
ACL is a corporation that, as of 2010, had 38 shareholders and is in possession of the 84.3 acres; there is no written assignment from the lessees to ACL.
In 2010, the Fairs recorded an instrument claiming fee simple title to the 36.24 acres; ACL denied access when the Fairs attempted possession that year.
The Fairs sued to remove a cloud on title and quiet title to the 36.24 acres; ACL answered and moved for summary judgment; the Fairs cross-moved for partial summary judgment.
The trial court granted ACL’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Fairs’ claims against ACL; the Fairs appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether DJA can be used given the exclusive remedy of trespass to try title	Fairs argue they may pursue DJA for rights under the 1936 lease.	ACL argues trespass to try title is the exclusive remedy; DJA should not control title rights here.	DJA may be invoked for determining rights; trespass remains relevant, but DJA is not foreclosed.
Whether ACL is entitled to summary judgment on its affirmative defenses	Fairs contend ACL failed to prove equitable estoppel, waiver, laches, or limitations.	ACL contends these defenses preclude the Fairs’ claims.	ACL failed to prove all elements of any affirmative defense; summary judgment on defenses improper.
Whether the presumed grant doctrine applies to the 1936 lease	Fairs contend ACL bears limitation-free possession; presumed grant may apply.	ACL relies on presumed grant to establish possession under the lease.	Presumed grant doctrine does not apply as a matter of law to the lease; ACL not entitled to summary judgment on this ground.
Whether the trial court properly denied partial summary judgment	Fairs sought judgment on title and lease construction; partial judgment requested on other issues.	ACL opposed; court denied partial relief.	Denial of partial summary judgment is not reviewable because it did not dispose of all claims.

Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. 2004) (trespass to title as controlling remedy for title disputes)
Lile v. Smith, 291 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2009) (trespass to try title as exclusive remedy)
MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., L.P., 292 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2009) (presumed grant/long-continued possession principles)
Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985) (basic summary judgment standard)
City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1979) (summary judgment principles and burden shifting)
Conley v. Comstock Oil & Gas LP, 356 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011) (presumed grant doctrine discussion context)
Adams v. Slattery, 295 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1956) (elements of the presumed grant doctrine)
Love v. Eastham, 154 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. 1941) (knowledge imputation for acquiescence)
Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. 1989) (laches and title defenses limitations context)
Roark v. Stallworth Oil & Gas, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. 1991) (limitations and accrual in summary judgment analyses)
Diversicare Gen. Partners, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. 2005) (summary judgment evidence standards for limitations)
In re D.W.G., 391 S.W.3d 154 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2012) (cross-motions for summary judgment review scope)