Robert Carlson v. Scott Fewins, 801 F.3d 668

Background

Officers responded to 911 calls (family worried Carlson was armed, suicidal, and might provoke police) and surrounded Carlson’s well‑lit house overnight with an Emergency Response Team of ~60 officers.
Carlson fired one shot into the woods late evening; negotiators spoke with him multiple times; officers believed he was alone and contained.
Over many hours the Team shut off utilities, illuminated the house, flattened a vehicle’s tires, and refused family requests or the suspect’s requests for an officer to enter.
Without obtaining a warrant, officers fired two rounds of tear gas into Carlson’s home and deployed a “throw phone” with hidden surveillance; hours later Carlson appeared at a window and a sniper (Jetter) shot and killed him.
The district court granted summary judgment for Grand Traverse County, Sheriff Fewins, and Team leader Drzewiecki (finding perpetual exigent circumstances), but declined summary judgment as to the sniper; a jury later found for the sniper.
The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the county and supervising officers (remanding for jury trial) and affirmed the district court’s rulings at the sniper’s trial (use‑of‑force policy and spoliation instructions).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether warrantless use of tear gas/throw phone and related intrusions were justified by exigent circumstances	Estate: no pressing, ongoing emergency justified bypassing a warrant after hours of containment; officers had time to obtain one	County/commanders: suspect was armed, had fired, and posed imminent danger; exigency persisted through the standoff	Reversed summary judgment; factual dispute on exigency for jury—warrantless actions may not have been reasonable
Whether officers’ prolonged siege terminated any initial exigency	Estate: delay and loss of control of circumstances negated exigency; passage of time and containment reduced danger	Defendants: the risk remained constant or increased; exigency continued through morning	Court: passage of time and police control can negate exigency; material questions preclude summary judgment
Admissibility/use of internal Use of Force Policy to show Fourth Amendment standard	Estate: policy required warning before lethal force and showed Jetter acted unreasonably	Jetter/defense: policy is internal and not identical to constitutional standard; impractical for a sniper to warn	Affirmed district court: policy may inform negligence/discipline but cannot establish constitutional standard; limiting instruction proper
Whether adverse‑inference (spoliation) jury instructions were warranted for missing comms logs and clothing	Estate: gaps in 911 logs and missing shirt were relevant and defendants culpably caused loss; jury should infer evidence would favor Estate	Defendants: gaps explained by routine unmonitored radio frequencies; no proof Jetter caused loss of clothing	Affirmed district court: record supported nonculpable explanations; no abuse of discretion denying spoliation instructions

Key Cases Cited

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (warrant requirement protects against officers deciding intrusions without a neutral magistrate)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (warrants generally required; exceptions are narrow)
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (exigent‑circumstances limits on warrant requirement)
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (minor offenses generally do not justify warrantless home entries)
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (need both compelling need and inability to get a warrant for exigency)
Jones v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 1125 (in civil damages suits, existence of exigent circumstances is for the jury when evidence allows disagreement)
O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990 (delay can undercut claimed exigency)
Bing v. City of Whitehall, 456 F.3d 555 (exigency ends when factors creating it are negated)
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (municipal liability requires a deliberate policy decision)
Smith v. Freeland, 954 F.2d 343 (departmental policy does not alone set Fourth Amendment standard)
Adkins v. Wolever (Adkins II), 692 F.3d 499 (adverse inference for spoliation requires culpability and relevance)