Robert B. Silliman v. Lou Ann Cassell, 688 F.3d 1291

Cassell inherited $220,000 in late 2008 while both she and J&L Arborists, LLC were insolvent.
She purchased a single-premium fixed annuity on May 1, 2009, with the inheritance, and began $1,389.14 monthly payments in June 2009 for life, with a ten-year guarantee period for beneficiaries if she dies early.
Cassell filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy on May 11, 2010, listing the annuity as Schedule B asset and claiming exemption under Ga. Code Ann. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E).
The trustee argued the annuity was not an exemptable “annuity” under Georgia law because it was funded by inheritance, not wages, and payments were not necessarily for age or reasonable necessity.
The bankruptcy court and the district court held the annuity qualified as an exempt “annuity” and that payments were on account of age; the district court remanded for the reasonably necessary issue, which was conceded by the trustee on appeal.
The Eleventh Circuit certified questions to the Georgia Supreme Court due to unsettled state-law issues regarding what constitutes an “annuity” and what qualifies as “on account of age” under Ga. Code Ann. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is a single-premium fixed annuity purchased with inherited funds an “annuity” under Ga. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E)?	Cassell argues plain meaning of 'annuity'.	Trustee argues not an annuity under Georgia law due to inheritance funding and nonconformity with federal analogs.	Questions certified; Georgia Supreme Court to decide.
Are Cassell's annuity payments made “on account of age” under Ga. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E)?	Payments arise from age considerations or age-based tax treatment should show causation.	No clear Georgia-standard basis; age linkage uncertain; reliance on tax treatment is not controlling.	Questions certified; Georgia Supreme Court to decide.
Whether the payments are “reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor” under Ga. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E)?	Conceded by trustee that payments are reasonably necessary.	Not necessary to decide if state-law questions unresolved.	Not necessary to decide here; certified on broader state-law questions.
Should the court certify the state-law questions to the Georgia Supreme Court rather than decide them?	State-law uncertainty capable of repetition and needing authoritative Georgia resolution.	Certification is appropriate given unsettled issues and potential repetition.	Certification granted; Georgia Supreme Court to answer.

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (state courts ultimate expositors of state law)
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc. v. Nielsen, 116 F.3d 1406 (11th Cir. 1997) (state supreme court final arbiter of state law)
Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320 (Supreme Court 2005) (plain meaning of 'annuity' in federal exemption; substitute for wages)
In re Andersen, 259 B.R. 687 (8th Cir. BAP 2001) (multifactor test for whether an annuity is exemptible)
In re Eilbert, 162 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 1998) (annuity funding source considerations for exemption)
In re Bramlette, 333 B.R. 911 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005) (Georgia exemption considerations for annuities)
In re Michael, 339 B.R. 798 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005) (Georgia exemption considerations for annuities)
In re TCL Investors, 775 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1985) (bankruptcy appellate context for finality and jurisdiction)
World Harvest Church, Inc. v. Guideone Mut. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2009) (certification as a tool for novel state-law questions)
Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (pre-1981 Fifth Circuit binding precedent)