Robert Allen Barker v. Donald H. Capotosto and Thomas M. Magee
875 N.W.2d 157
| Iowa | 2016Background
- Robert Barker was charged with attempted enticement of a minor and (later amended) solicitation of a minor; he pleaded guilty to solicitation pursuant to a plea agreement and was placed on probation with sex-offender treatment and registration requirements.
- Post-plea events included probation revocations and eventual incarceration after violations; Barker later filed a postconviction ineffective-assistance claim challenging the factual basis for his solicitation plea.
- The district court granted postconviction relief, concluding there was no factual basis for the solicitation offense, and vacated Barker’s conviction and sentence for that charge.
- Barker then sued his former defense attorneys (Magee and Capotosto) for legal malpractice, alleging they advised him to plead to a non-existent crime.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing Barker could not maintain a criminal-malpractice claim without proving actual innocence of the underlying or transactionally related offenses; the district court granted summary judgment on that ground.
- The Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding postconviction relief is required but an independent actual-innocence prerequisite is not; guilt/innocence remains relevant to the malpractice causation inquiry.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether proof of actual (factual) innocence is a separate prerequisite to sue counsel for criminal legal malpractice | Barker: postconviction relief has been obtained; no separate actual-innocence requirement should bar his malpractice claim | Defendants: plaintiff must prove actual innocence of all transactionally related offenses to pursue malpractice; otherwise suit barred | Held: No separate actual-innocence prerequisite. Postconviction relief is required, but innocence/guilt factor into causation and can be considered by factfinder |
| Role of guilt/innocence in causation for malpractice | Barker: causation can be established without categorical exoneration; facts of guilt relate to but do not automatically foreclose malpractice recovery | Defendants: client’s guilt supersedes counsel’s negligence as cause of incarceration and thus defeats causation | Held: Guilt/innocence are relevant to both but-for and proximate causation and will be resolved in the malpractice claim; they do not create an extra jurisdictional bar |
| Whether public-policy concerns require an actual-innocence rule (e.g., avoid profiting from crime, protect defense bar) | Barker: policy concerns are outweighed by tort principles and existing screens (postconviction relief, need for experts, malpractice defenses) | Defendants: actual-innocence rule prevents profit from crime, preserves public confidence, and avoids chilling defense representation | Held: Court found policy concerns insufficient to justify an extra innocence requirement beyond postconviction relief |
| Applicability of statute protecting appointed counsel (Iowa Code § 815.10(6)) to imply an innocence requirement | Barker: statutory immunity for appointed counsel requires postconviction proof of ineffective assistance but contains no actual-innocence requirement; common law should align | Defendants: legislative choice suggests adoption of an innocence threshold as policy | Held: Court regarded statute as consistent with postconviction-relief screen but noted it does not impose an actual-innocence requirement and declined to impose one by common law |
Key Cases Cited
- Wiley v. County of San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532 (Cal. 1998) (adopting actual-innocence requirement for criminal malpractice plaintiffs)
- Ang v. Martin, 154 Wash.2d 477 (Wash. 2005) (requiring actual innocence; holding innocence essential to causation and noting public-policy concerns)
- Mashaney v. Bd. of Indigents’ Def. Servs., 302 Kan. 625 (Kan. 2015) (refusing to adopt an actual-innocence requirement; criticizing policy bases for rule)
- Levine v. Kling, 123 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing problems of awarding damages to guilty defendants whose counsel’s negligence led to conviction)
- Dombrowski v. Bulson, 19 N.Y.3d 347 (N.Y. 2012) (recognizing limits on criminal malpractice recovery and adopting an actual-innocence requirement for pecuniary damages)