RL BB ACQ I-GA CVL, LLC v. WORKMAN Et Al., 341 Ga. App. 127

Background

Rialto obtained a $1.97 million judgment against Cooper Village and Howard Workman and then served post-judgment discovery on Howard’s wife Honey Workman and 16 LLCs she managed.
The Third Parties limited responses to documents tied to the Judgment Debtors; Rialto later served broad discovery subpoenas on Fidelity Bank for account records.
The Third Parties obtained a protective order limiting discovery from Fidelity; the protective-order motion did not request fees/costs.
Weeks later, after an email exchange about scheduling Honey’s deposition in which Rialto’s counsel did not appear, the Third Parties filed a sanctions motion seeking fees/costs under OCGA § 9-15-14, § 9-11-26, § 9-11-30, and § 9-11-37.
The trial court awarded $41,602 in attorney fees and $616.73 in costs to the Third Parties, and barred Rialto from deposing Honey for five years. Rialto appealed.

Issues

Issue	Rialto's Argument	Third Parties' Argument	Held
Whether OCGA § 9-15-14 authorizes fee awards for post-judgment discovery conduct	§ 9-15-14 does not apply because it governs positions asserted during a civil action, not post-judgment discovery after final disposition	§ 9-15-14 applies because Rialto’s post-judgment discovery conduct was unreasonable and sanctionable	Court: § 9-15-14 does not apply to post-judgment discovery; reversal of parts of order relying on § 9-15-14
Whether a party who did not request expenses when moving for a protective order may recover them later via a separate sanctions motion under OCGA §§ 9-11-26/37	Trial court lacked authority to award fees on a later separate sanctions motion; awarding them expands and fragments proceedings	The Third Parties can seek fees under § 9-11-26/37 and raised § 9-11-26 in reply and at hearing, so award is proper	Court: Question unresolved on appeal; vacated award for protective-order fees and remanded for trial court to decide whether seeking fees later was waived or allowed
Whether OCGA § 9-11-30(g) authorized fees/costs for Rialto’s alleged failure to appear at Honey’s deposition (based on email exchange)	Email exchange did not satisfy written notice requirements (no time, not served on all parties including Judgment Debtors); thus § 9-11-30(g) award improper	The emails sufficed as notice and Rialto’s failure to appear justifies fees under § 9-11-30(g)	Court: Email did not meet statutory notice requirements; reversed award of deposition-related fees
Whether the trial court could bar Rialto from deposing Honey for five years as a sanction	Non-monetary ban exceeded the Civil Practice Act’s sanction authority (only certain monetary or contempt remedies permitted absent order violation)	Sanction justified by conduct and to prevent harassment	Court: Five-year deposition bar reversed—court lacked authority to impose that non-monetary sanction here

Key Cases Cited

North Druid Dev. v. Post, 330 Ga. App. 432 (trial courts have broad discovery control; appellate review for abuse of discretion)
Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170 (statutory interpretation: plain meaning; strictly construe fee-shifting statutes)
Doster v. Bates, 266 Ga. App. 194 (fee-shifting statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed)
Horesh v. DeKinder, 295 Ga. App. 826 (defining "final disposition"/final judgment for § 9-15-14 timing)
Fairburn Banking Co. v. Gafford, 263 Ga. 792 (interpretation of § 9-15-14 filing timing)
Ostroff v. Coyner, 187 Ga. App. 109 (post-judgment discovery governed by Civil Practice Act; court may control scope and impose sanctions)
Mayer v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 243 Ga. 436 (limits on discovery sanctions—must be tied to violation of court order or complete refusal)
Joyner v. Raymond James Financial Svcs., 268 Ga. App. 835 (Georgia law requires statutory or contractual authorization for attorney-fee awards)
Carter v. Glenn, 243 Ga. App. 544 (appellate reversal appropriate when trial court applies statute incorrectly)