605 U.S. 443
U.S.2025Background
- Danny Rivers was convicted in Texas state court of sexual abuse and child pornography offenses and failed on direct appeal and state habeas.
- Rivers filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254; the district court denied relief, and Rivers appealed.
- While his appeal was pending, Rivers discovered new evidence (an investigator’s report) and attempted to supplement the appellate record; the Fifth Circuit denied his request.
- Rivers then filed a second §2254 petition in the district court, relying on the newly discovered evidence.
- The district court ruled the second filing was a “second or successive” habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b), transferred it to the Fifth Circuit for authorization, and this was affirmed on appeal.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split regarding whether a second-in-time habeas petition filed while the first is still on appeal is "second or successive" under §2244(b).
Issues
| Issue | Rivers’s Argument | Guerrero’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does a second-in-time habeas filing during appeal of the first qualify as “second or successive” under §2244(b)? | It does not, because appeal is pending so the first case is not final; new claims can be added by amendment. | Once judgment enters on the first petition, any second-in-time filing is "second or successive" regardless of appeal status. | Yes; once the district court enters judgment, a second-in-time filing is “second or successive” and must meet §2244(b) requirements. |
| Should Rivers’s filing be treated as a Rule 15 motion to amend and thus not subject to §2244(b)? | Yes, because the second filing attempted to amend the first petition with new evidence. | No; the argument was not raised below, and the district court lacked authority to grant it while on appeal. | Court declined to address; theory was not presented below and is not supported by the facts. |
| Does Rivers lack standing or is the case moot? | N/A (Petitioner) | Rivers lacks standing because the first petition has finished on appeal; also, no custody for the child pornography conviction. | Rivers has standing; remains in custody on related convictions and challenges are still live. |
| Do AEDPA’s purposes and history support Rivers’s interpretation? | Yes; rules should not encourage piecemeal litigation or inefficiency, and history is unclear. | Opposite; drawing line at judgment entry promotes efficiency and finality, discourages piecemeal litigation. | AEDPA’s structure favors drawing the "second or successive" line at entry of district court judgment, not after appeal. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 (headnotes are not binding as part of the opinion)
- Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504 (motions to alter or amend judgment under FRCP 59(e) are not second or successive; distinguishes post-judgment context)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (Rule 60(b) motions post-judgment may be "second or successive"; defines what counts as a habeas application)
- Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (meaning of "second or successive" petitions)
- Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (describes AEDPA's gatekeeping and res judicata role in habeas)
- Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (general principles of AEDPA gatekeeping and exhaustion)