Rivera v. Rent A Center, Inc.
2015 Ohio 3765
Ohio Ct. App.2015Background
- Rivera sued Rent-A-Center (RAC) and his supervisor, Jeffrey Owens, for race discrimination after termination; amended complaint named only Owens.
- Owens moved to dismiss or stay the case pending arbitration, attaching Rivera’s 2010 Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate with RAC.
- Rivera opposed, arguing the agreement was only between him and RAC because Owens did not sign it.
- The trial court denied Owens’s motion; Owens appealed the denial under R.C. 2711.02(C).
- The key legal question was whether a nonsignatory supervisor (Owens) can enforce the arbitration agreement as an agent or third‑party beneficiary, and whether the agreement’s delegation clause requires the arbitrator to decide arbitrability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Rivera) | Defendant's Argument (Owens) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the delegation clause requires the arbitrator to decide arbitrability | Delegation clause in the agreement applies only if Owens is a party; because Owens did not sign, the court must decide arbitrability | Delegation clause applies and arbitrator should decide threshold issues about formation/applicability | Court analyzed de novo and recognized the ‘‘chicken-or-egg’’ issue but proceeded to decide whether Owens is covered; ultimately found arbitration applicable to Owens |
| Whether a nonsignatory employee/supervisor can enforce the arbitration agreement | Agreement is only between Rivera and RAC (the "Company"); it does not bind individual employees who did not sign | Agreement broadly covers claims against the Company’s "officers, directors, employees, or agents" and thus Owens can enforce it under agency/third‑party beneficiary principles | Court held nonsignatory Owens may enforce the agreement because claims arise out of employment/agency and agreement’s language covers employees in their capacity as such or otherwise |
| Whether Rivera’s R.C. Chapter 4112 claims against Owens in his individual capacity are subject to arbitration | Individual liability under Ohio law means the agreement with RAC does not bar suit against Owens individually | Agreement’s phrase "in their capacity as such or otherwise" covers employees sued in individual capacity for employment‑related claims | Court construed "otherwise" to include individual‑capacity claims and ordered stay pending arbitration |
| Whether trial court erred by denying stay/dismissal | Trial court refused to compel arbitration | Owens sought stay/compel arbitration | Appellate court reversed and remanded with instruction to stay proceedings pending arbitration |
Key Cases Cited
- Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (Supreme Court) (delegation clauses can commit arbitrability questions to arbitrator subject to limited judicial review)
- Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 117 Ohio St.3d 352 (Ohio 2008) (Ohio presumes disputes falling within arbitration provisions should be arbitrated)
- Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 63 Ohio St.3d 708 (Ohio 1992) (arbitration provides relatively expeditious and economical dispute resolution)
- Genaro v. Cent. Transport, Inc., 84 Ohio St.3d 293 (Ohio 1999) (supervisors/managers may be individually liable under R.C. Chapter 4112)
- Cheek v. Indus. Powder Coatings, Inc., 84 Ohio St.3d 534 (Ohio 1999) (individual employee liability recognized under Ohio discrimination law)