Rivera v. Hillard
89 Cal.App.5th 964
Cal. Ct. App.2023Background
- David and Joanna separated and relocated to Virginia; a custody/support agreement (CSA) and a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) (incorporated into Virginia court orders) gave David exclusive use and possession of the marital home at Eagle Drive.
- On Sept. 25, 2019, an altercation at Eagle Drive led to David’s arrest and a temporary protective order; Joanna obtained a TRO that temporarily excluded David and remained in the house until January 2020.
- While David was excluded, Joanna (and two assistants) searched the house, damaged locks and electronics, and removed cash, artwork, jewelry, hard drives, and large quantities of gold and silver coins; David filed dueling domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) petitions in Marin County.
- After a bench trial the family court found both parties committed domestic violence, issued mutual restraining orders, found Joanna had falsely procured exclusion and had confiscated/damaged David’s property, and reserved restitution for a later hearing.
- Following a nine-day restitution trial, the court ordered Joanna to return specified items or pay monetary equivalents (plus interest), and to pay David’s out-of-pocket lodging/car expenses and repair costs; Joanna appealed multiple grounds.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed: it held Joanna’s attack on the restraining order was untimely; it upheld the restitution award as within the DVPA’s remedial scope and supported by substantial evidence; claims regarding judicial bias and certain jurisdictional/contentions were procedurally barred or rejected.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Joanna) | Defendant's Argument (David) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of appeal from restraining order | Appeal was timely because restraining order reserved restitution and was not final until restitution resolved | Restraining order was a separately appealable injunction; appeal window ran from entry (6 months) | Appeal of restraining order untimely; court lacked jurisdiction to review those claims |
| Scope of restitution under Fam. Code §6342(a)(1) | §6342(a)(1) only allows out-of-pocket costs like medical care or housing, not compensation for stolen/damaged property | §6342 should be broadly construed to allow restitution for pecuniary losses (lost/damaged property) directly caused by abuse | §6342 permits restitution for pecuniarily measurable losses (including lost/damaged property) incurred as a direct result of abuse; statutory context and policy support broad construction |
| Subject-matter / Full Faith & Credit / concurrent jurisdiction with Virginia | Virginia had exclusive jurisdiction over property division and MSA/release barred California restitution | California court retained subject-matter jurisdiction over DVPA petitions and possessory remedies; it did not purport to divide marital property | California court acted within its concurrent authority; it limited relief to possessory/restitution remedies and did not characterize or divide property, so full faith & credit claim fails |
| Sufficiency of evidence, notice, and judicial-bias challenges | Insufficient evidence that Joanna removed the gold; David’s testimony contradicted by video and civil-standby events; procedural/due-process defects and judge bias | Trial court made credibility findings; David gave detailed accounting and valuations; Joanna had notice and hearing; bias claims were procedurally unpreserved | Substantial evidence supports restitution findings (including gold); Joanna forfeited some procedural/due-process and bias claims; restitution award and expense awards affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- County of San Diego v. State of California, 15 Cal.4th 68 (1997) (preliminary injunctions are immediately appealable)
- People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., 33 Cal.4th 653 (2004) (limits on collateral attack where timely appeal available)
- Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., 54 Cal.3d 245 (1991) (distinguishing restitutive damages from general compensatory damages)
- In re Marriage of Nadkarni, 173 Cal.App.4th 1483 (2009) (DVPA to be broadly construed; courts have latitude in remedies)
- Poole v. Orange County Fire Authority, 61 Cal.4th 1378 (2015) (statutory interpretation principles; consider context and purpose)
- Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation, 39 Cal.4th 1164 (2006) (plain meaning governs if statutory language unambiguous)
- Burquet v. Brumbaugh, 223 Cal.App.4th 1140 (2014) (use of dictionary and context in statutory construction)
- In re William M.W., 43 Cal.App.5th 573 (2019) (notice and hearing satisfy entitlement to restitution under DVPA)
- S.A. v. Maiden, 229 Cal.App.4th 27 (2014) (DVPA actions are family law proceedings; policy favors accessible relief)
- In re Marriage of Carlisle, 60 Cal.App.5th 244 (2021) (DVRO orders are appealable as injunctions)