Rivera-Díaz v. Humana Insurance of Puerto Rico, Inc.
748 F.3d 387
| 1st Cir. | 2014Background
- Rivera-Díaz worked for Humana; six weeks later he was fired over purported disability-related reasons and alleged a rigged test.
- EEOC charges: first charge for disability discrimination; later second charge for retaliation, both regarding the same timeframe.
- First right-to-sue letter issued April 17, 2012; plaintiff sued September 6, 2012, beyond 90 days.
- Second charge filed within time but sought an immediate right-to-sue letter; EEOC issued second letter two months later.
- District court dismissed federal ADA claims for timeliness and declined supplemental jurisdiction over Puerto Rico-law claims; affirmed on appeal.
- Court analyzes exhaustion of administrative remedies under Title VII framework and whether equitable tolling or relation-back salvages timeliness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of first ADA claim under right-to-sue letter | Rivera-Díaz seeks equitable tolling to extend 90 days. | Failure to sue within 90 days bars the claim. | First claim untimely; tolling not applicable. |
| Equitable tolling appropriateness | Equitable tolling should apply due to second charge as reconsideration. | No exceptional circumstances; tolling not warranted. | District court did not abuse discretion; no tolling. |
| Relation back of second charge to first charge | Second charge relates back to first, curing timeliness deficit. | Not preserved; lack of timely, coherent argument in district court. | Relation-back theory waived/unpreserved; not timely. |
| Supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims | Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction after federal claims dismissed. | Discretionary decline appropriate when federal claims are eliminated early. | District court did not err in declining supplemental jurisdiction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jorge v. Rumsfeld, 404 F.3d 556 (1st Cir. 2005) (exhaustion requires timely EEOC charge and right-to-sue letter)
- Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Inc., 194 F.3d 275 (1st Cir. 1999) (filing period for discrimination claims; 180 vs 300 days)
- Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (U.S. 1980) (longer vs shorter statutory filing windows in deferral jurisdictions)
- Irwin v. Dep't of Vets. Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (U.S. 1990) (equitable tolling applicable to timely filing requirements)
- Loubriel v. Fondo del Seguro del Estado, 694 F.3d 139 (1st Cir. 2012) (ninety-day suit filing after right-to-sue letter)
- Brown v. Mead Corp., 646 F.2d 1163 (6th Cir. 1981) (EEOC reconsideration of right-to-sue letter; tolling implications)
- Redondo Construction Corp. v. Izquierdo, 662 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2011) (contextualizes exercise of supplemental jurisdiction after federal claims dismissed)
- Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (U.S. 1988) (abstention from supplemental jurisdiction when federal claims drop)
- Jorge v. Rumsfeld, 404 F.3d 556 (1st Cir. 2005) (reiterates exhaustion framework)