Rivas v. Fischer
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24800
| 2d Cir. | 2015Background
- Hector Rivas was convicted in 1993 of second-degree murder for the 1987 strangulation of Valerie Hill; sentence 25 years-to-life.
- Prosecution’s case was circumstantial and depended primarily on Dr. Erik Mitchell’s trial testimony that Hill likely died Friday night, March 27, 1987 — a time when Rivas had no alibi.
- At the scene and in early reports Mitchell initially estimated death on Saturday night or early Sunday; by trial he had revised that opinion to include Friday, citing purported review of "brain slides."
- Post-conviction evidence (CPL § 440.10) produced an unchallenged forensic opinion (Dr. Wecht) concluding Hill likely died Saturday afternoon/evening, undermining the Friday-time-of-death theory; additional evidence indicated Mitchell was under investigation and that the referenced brain slides did not exist.
- State court denied ineffective-assistance and other claims; after federal litigation the Second Circuit held Rivas showed actual innocence sufficient to overcome AEDPA time bars and remanded for merits review.
- On merits review this court concludes the state court unreasonably applied Strickland: trial counsel’s failure to investigate Mitchell’s change of opinion (and to retain a forensic expert or probe Mitchell’s credibility and the basis for his opinion) was deficient and prejudicial; the court reverses and orders conditional habeas relief unless the state promptly retries Rivas.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Rivas) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial counsel provided effective assistance under Strickland by failing to investigate the medical examiner’s revised time-of-death opinion | Calle failed to investigate or retain a forensic pathologist, review the documents/slides, or probe Mitchell’s misconduct investigations; this was objectively unreasonable given the centrality of time of death | Counsel reasonably pursued an alibi strategy; impeachment via newspaper/grand jury statements sufficed; further investigation was unnecessary | State court unreasonably applied Strickland; counsel’s performance was deficient because the time-of-death issue was central and the alibi was incomplete during a key window |
| Whether counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense (reasonable probability of different outcome) | Absent the failures, expert rebuttal and impeachment of Mitchell would have created reasonable doubt because the case depended on proving death on Friday | Even if Mitchell were discredited, circumstantial evidence and other gaps (e.g., parts of weekend uncorroborated) still supported conviction | Prejudice established: reasonable probability the outcome would differ; prior finding of actual-innocence gateway supports that conclusion |
| Whether AEDPA deference bars relief because the state court’s ruling was reasonable under clearly established law | N/A (procedural posture: Rivas already shown actual innocence to overcome AEDPA time bar) | The state court made reasonable factual findings and applied Strickland correctly | The state court’s denial amounted to an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland under § 2254(d) |
| Remedy: whether habeas relief must issue or state may retry | Rivas seeks habeas release or relief | State urged deference and denial of relief; District Court previously denied on merits | Court reverses and remands: District Court must issue writ within 60 days unless the state promptly and substantially proceeds to retry Rivas |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (counsel’s investigation and tactical choices tested for reasonableness; look to known evidence prompting further inquiry)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (§ 2254(d) mandates objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; doubly deferential review of counsel claims)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (framework for evaluating § 2254(d) review of state-court decisions)
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (actual innocence gateway requires a stronger showing than Strickland prejudice standard)
- McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013) (actual innocence, if proved, allows overcoming AEDPA procedural bars)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (habeas review under § 2254(d) is limited to the state-court record)
- Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263 (2014) (defense counsel’s obligation to obtain experts when reasonable and necessary to the defense)