Rita Ann Stevens v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 2014 Minn. App. LEXIS 69

At noon on Nov. 19, 2012, officers arrested Rita Ann Stevens for suspected DWI after her Jeep hit a parked car repeatedly; she failed field sobriety testing and refused a preliminary breath test.
At 12:47 p.m. Stevens received the implied-consent advisory and declined an attorney; at 1:07 p.m. she agreed to a breath test but the equipment malfunctioned.
Officer re-read the advisory and offered blood or urine; Stevens verbally agreed to give urine but failed to provide a sample despite three opportunities, and a female officer observed she was not making a good-faith effort.
The arresting officer deemed Stevens to have refused chemical testing and signed the implied-consent form at 2:52 p.m.; the commissioner revoked her license.
Stevens sought judicial review; the district court sustained the revocation, finding refusal by conduct and rejecting her constitutional challenge; she appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether record evidence was sufficient to find Stevens refused chemical testing	Stevens: record fails to show how much time she was allowed to produce urine, so refusal-by-conduct not proven	Commissioner: refusal-by-conduct may be found from words/actions; no statutory requirement to prove a specific time period; officers offered multiple opportunities and observed noncompliance	Court: Evidence sufficient; finding of refusal not clearly erroneous
Whether Minnesota’s implied-consent statute violates the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine (i.e., coercively conditions driving privilege on waiver of Fourth Amendment)	Stevens: statute forces choice between invoking Fourth Amendment and losing driving license — unconstitutional coercion	Commissioner: doctrine does not apply here; statute does not authorize unreasonable searches and, in any event, is a reasonable regulatory condition given strong public-safety interests and existing safeguards	Court: Rejected Stevens’ claim for multiple reasons — doctrine not shown to apply to Fourth Amendment here; statute does not, by itself, authorize unconstitutional searches; even if it did, the statute is reasonable under Fourth Amendment balancing and is not coercive in a way that offends the doctrine; revocation upheld

State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 2013) (express-consent analysis and discussion of coercion under implied-consent regime)
State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202 (Minn. 2009) (discussion of unconstitutional-conditions doctrine and requirement that statute authorize an unconstitutional search)
Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (special-needs/reasonableness balancing for drug/alcohol testing of regulated employees)
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (reasonableness balancing where special needs justify warrantless searches)
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979) (upholding administrative license suspensions under implied-consent laws as serving public safety)
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (addressing use of refusal and license-suspension consequences; recognized penalty for refusal as legitimate)
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (upholding civil consequence for refusing a search tied to a government benefit)
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (validating warrantless administrative inspections as reasonable in heavily regulated contexts)
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (similar validation of warrantless inspections under regulatory schemes)
State v. Lauseng, 183 N.W.2d 926 (Minn. 1971) (noting a driver’s election of alternative chemical tests presupposes ability to supply a sample within a reasonable time)