WYMAN, COMMISSIONER OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, ET AL. v. JAMES
No. 69
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Argued October 20, 1970—Decided January 12, 1971
400 U.S. 309
Brenda Soloff, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellant Wyman. With her on the brief were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, and Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, for appellant Wyman, and J. Lee Rankin for appellant Goldberg, Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York.
Jonathan Weiss argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was David Gilman.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Stephen F. Gordon and Ernest Fleischman for the Social Service Employees Union Local 371, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, and by Lois P. Sheinfeld for the Legal Aid Society of San Mateo County.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal presents the issue whether a beneficiary of the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)1 may refuse a home visit by the caseworker without risking the termination of benefits.
The District Court majority held that a mother receiving AFDC relief may refuse, without forfeiting her right to that relief, the periodic home visit which the cited New York statutes and regulations prescribe as a condition for the continuance of assistance under the program. The beneficiary‘s thesis, and that of the Dis-
Judge McLean, in dissent, thought it unrealistic to regard the home visit as a search; felt that the requirement of a search warrant to issue only upon a showing of probable cause would make the AFDC program “in effect another criminal statute” and would “introduce a hostile arm‘s length element into the relationship” between worker and mother, “a relationship which can be effective only when it is based upon mutual confidence and trust“; and concluded that the majority‘s holding struck “a damaging blow” to an important social welfare program. 303 F. Supp., at 946.
I
The case comes to us on the pleadings and supporting affidavits and without the benefit of testimony which an extended hearing would have provided. The pertinent facts, however, are not in dispute.
Plaintiff Barbara James is the mother of a son, Maurice, who was born in May 1967. They reside in New York City. Mrs. James first applied for AFDC assistance shortly before Maurice‘s birth. A caseworker made a visit to her apartment at that time without objection. The assistance was authorized.
Two years later, on May 8, 1969, a caseworker wrote Mrs. James that she would visit her home on May 14. Upon receipt of this advice, Mrs. James telephoned the worker that, although she was willing to supply information “reasonable and relevant” to her need for public assistance, any discussion was not to take place at her home. The worker told Mrs. James that she was re-
On May 13 the City Department of Social Services sent Mrs. James a notice of intent to discontinue assistance because of the visitation refusal. The notice advised the beneficiary of her right to a hearing before a review officer. The hearing was requested and was held on May 27. Mrs. James appeared with an attorney at that hearing.5 They continued to refuse permission for a worker to visit the James home, but again expressed willingness to cooperate and to permit visits elsewhere. The review officer ruled that the refusal was a proper ground for the termination of assistance. His written decision stated:
“The home visit which Mrs. James refuses to permit is for the purpose of determining if there are any changes in her situation that might affect her eligibility to continue to receive Public Assistance, or that might affect the amount of such assistance, and to see if there are any social services which the Department of Social Services can provide to the family.”
A notice of termination issued on June 2.
Thereupon, without seeking a hearing at the state level, Mrs. James, individually and on behalf of Maurice, and purporting to act on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, instituted the present civil rights suit under
II
The federal aspects of the AFDC program deserve mention. They are provided for in Subchapter IV, Part A, of the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 627, as amended,
“Whenever the State agency has reason to believe that any payments of aid made with respect to a child are not being or may not be used in the best interests of the child, the State agency may provide for such counseling and guidance services with respect to the use of such payments and the management of other funds by the relative... in order to assure use of such payments in the best interests of such child, and may provide for advising such relative that continued failure to so use such payments will result in substitution therefor of protective payments or in seeking the appointment of a guardian or in the imposition of criminal or civil penalties . . . .”
III
When a case involves a home and some type of official intrusion into that home, as this case appears to do, an immediate and natural reaction is one of concern about Fourth Amendment rights and the protection which that Amendment is intended to afford. Its emphasis indeed is upon one of the most precious aspects of personal security in the home: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects . . . .” This Court has characterized that right as “basic to a free society.” Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27 (1949); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967). And over the years the Court consistently has been most protective of the privacy of the dwelling. See, for example, Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626-630 (1886); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969); Vale v. Louisiana, 399
“Nevertheless, one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.” 387 U. S., at 528-529.
He pointed out, too, that one‘s Fourth Amendment protection subsists apart from his being suspected of criminal behavior. 387 U. S., at 530.
IV
This natural and quite proper protective attitude, however, is not a factor in this case, for the seemingly obvious and simple reason that we are not concerned here with any search by the New York social service agency in the Fourth Amendment meaning of that term. It is true that the governing statute and regulations appear to make mandatory the initial home visit and the subsequent periodic “contacts” (which may include home visits) for the inception and continuance of aid. It is also true that the caseworker‘s posture in the home visit is perhaps, in a sense, both rehabilitative and investigative. But this latter aspect, we think, is given too broad a character and far more emphasis than it deserves if it is equated with a search in the traditional criminal law context. We note, too, that the visitation in itself is not forced or compelled, and that the beneficiary‘s denial of permission is not a criminal act. If consent to the visitation is withheld, no visitation takes
V
If however, we were to assume that a caseworker‘s home visit, before or subsequent to the beneficiary‘s initial qualification for benefits, somehow (perhaps because the average beneficiary might feel she is in no position to refuse consent to the visit), and despite its interview nature, does possess some of the characteristics of a search in the traditional sense, we nevertheless conclude that the visit does not fall within the Fourth Amendment‘s proscription. This is because it does not descend to the level of unreasonableness. It is unreasonableness which is the Fourth Amendment‘s standard. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 9 (1968); Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 222 (1960). And Mr. Chief Justice Warren observed in Terry that “the specific content and incidents of this right must be shaped by the context in which it is asserted.” 392 U. S., at 9.
There are a number of factors that compel us to conclude that the home visit proposed for Mrs. James is not unreasonable:
1. The public‘s interest in this particular segment of the area of assistance to the unfortunate is protection and aid for the dependent child whose family requires such aid for that child. The focus is on the child and, further, it is on the child who is dependent. There is no more worthy object of the public‘s concern. The dependent child‘s needs are paramount, and only with hesitancy would we relegate those needs, in the scale of comparative values, to a position secondary to what the mother claims as her rights.
2. The agency, with tax funds provided from federal as well as from state sources, is fulfilling a public trust. The State, working through its qualified welfare agency,
3. One who dispenses purely private charity naturally has an interest in and expects to know how his charitable funds are utilized and put to work. The public, when it is the provider, rightly expects the same. It might well expect more, because of the trust aspect of public funds, and the recipient, as well as the caseworker, has not only an interest but an obligation.
4. The emphasis of the New York statutes and regulations is upon the home, upon “close contact” with the beneficiary, upon restoring the aid recipient “to a condition of self-support,” and upon the relief of his distress. The federal emphasis is no different. It is upon “assistance and rehabilitation,” upon maintaining and strengthening family life, and upon “maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection . . . .”
5. The home visit, it is true, is not required by federal statute or regulation.6 But it has been noted that the
6. The means employed by the New York agency are significant. Mrs. James received written notice several days in advance of the intended home visit.8 The date
7. Mrs. James, in fact, on this record presents no specific complaint of any unreasonable intrusion of her home and nothing that supports an inference that the desired home visit had as its purpose the obtaining of information as to criminal activity. She complains of no proposed visitation at an awkward or retirement hour. She suggests no forcible entry. She refers to no snooping. She describes no impolite or reprehensible conduct of any kind. She alleges only, in general and nonspecific terms, that on previous visits and, on information and belief, on visitation at the home of other aid recipients, “questions concerning personal relationships, beliefs and behavior are raised and pressed which are unnecessary for a determination of continuing eligibility.” Paradoxically, this same complaint could be made of a conference held elsewhere than in the home, and yet this is what is sought by Mrs. James. The same complaint could be made of the census taker‘s questions. See MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL‘S opinion, as United States Circuit Judge, in United States v. Rickenbacker, 309 F. 2d 462 (CA2 1962), cert. denied, 371 U. S. 962. What Mrs. James appears to want from the agency that provides her and her infant son with the necessities for life is the right to receive those necessities upon her own
8. We are not persuaded, as Mrs. James would have us be, that all information pertinent to the issue of eligibility can be obtained by the agency through an interview at a place other than the home, or, as the District Court majority suggested, by examining a lease or a birth certificate, or by periodic medical examinations, or by interviews with school personnel. 303 F. Supp., at 943. Although these secondary sources might be helpful, they would not always assure verification of actual residence or of actual physical presence in the home, which are requisites for AFDC benefits,10 or of impending medical needs. And, of course, little children, such as Maurice James, are not yet registered in school.
9. The visit is not one by police or uniformed authority. It is made by a caseworker of some training11 whose
10. The home visit is not a criminal investigation, does not equate with a criminal investigation, and despite the announced fears of Mrs. James and those who would join her, is not in aid of any criminal proceeding. If the visitation serves to discourage misrepresentation or fraud, such a byproduct of that visit does not impress upon the visit itself a dominant criminal investigative aspect. And if the visit should, by chance, lead to the discovery of fraud and a criminal prosecution should follow,12 then, even assuming that the evidence discovered upon the home visitation is admissible, an issue upon which we express no opinion, that is a routine and expected fact of life and a consequence no greater than that which necessarily ensues upon any other discovery by a citizen of criminal conduct.
11. The warrant procedure, which the plaintiff appears to claim to be so precious to her, even if civil in nature, is not without its seriously objectionable features in the welfare context. If a warrant could be obtained (the plaintiff affords us little help as to how it would be obtained), it presumably could be applied for ex parte, its execution would require no notice, it would justify entry
It seems to us that the situation is akin to that where an Internal Revenue Service agent, in making a routine civil audit of a taxpayer‘s income tax return, asks that the taxpayer produce for the agent‘s review some proof of a deduction the taxpayer has asserted to his benefit in the computation of his tax. If the taxpayer refuses, there is, absent fraud, only a disallowance of the claimed deduction and a consequent additional tax. The taxpayer is fully within his “rights” in refusing to produce the proof, but in maintaining and asserting those rights a tax detriment results and it is a detriment of the taxpayer‘s own making. So here Mrs. James has the “right” to refuse the home visit, but a consequence in the form of cessation of aid, similar to the taxpayer‘s resultant additional tax, flows from that refusal. The choice is entirely hers, and nothing of constitutional magnitude is involved.
VI
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), and its companion case, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967), both by a divided Court, are not incon-
But the facts of the three cases are significantly different from those before us. Each concerned a true search for violations. Frank was a criminal prosecution for the owner‘s refusal to permit entry. So, too, was See. Camara had to do with a writ of prohibition sought to prevent an already pending criminal prosecution. The community welfare aspects, of course, were highly important, but each case arose in a criminal context where a genuine search was denied and prosecution followed.
In contrast, Mrs. James is not being prosecuted for her refusal to permit the home visit and is not about to be so prosecuted. Her wishes in that respect are fully honored. We have not been told, and have not found, that her refusal is made a criminal act by any applicable New York or federal statute. The only consequence of her refusal is that the payment of benefits ceases. Important and serious as this is, the situation is no different than if she had exercised a similar negative choice initially and refrained from applying for AFDC benefits. If a statute made her refusal a criminal offense, and if this case were one concerning her prosecution under that statute, Camara and See would have conceivable pertinency.
Our holding today does not mean, of course, that a termination of benefits upon refusal of a home visit is to be upheld against constitutional challenge under all conceivable circumstances. The early morning mass raid upon homes of welfare recipients is not unknown. See Parrish v. Civil Service Comm‘n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P. 2d 223 (1967); Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 Yale L. J. 1347 (1963). But that is not this case. Facts of that kind present another case for another day.
We therefore conclude that the home visitation as structured by the New York statutes and regulations is a reasonable administrative tool; that it serves a valid and proper administrative purpose for the dispensation of the AFDC program; that it is not an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and that it violates no right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
Reversed and remanded with directions to enter a judgment of dismissal.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the judgment and joins the opinion of the Court with the exception of Part IV thereof.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
We are living in a society where one of the most important forms of property is government largesse which some call the “new property.”1 The payrolls of government are but one aspect of that “new property.” Defense contracts, highway contracts, and the other multifarious forms of contracts are another part. So are subsidies to air, rail, and other carriers. So are
In 1969 roughly 127 billion dollars were spent by the federal, state, and local governments on “social welfare.”3 To farmers alone almost four billion dollars were paid, in part for not growing certain crops. Almost 129,000 farmers received $5,000 or more, their total benefits exceeding $1,450,000,000.4 Those payments were in some instances very large, a few running a million or more a year. But the majority were payments under $5,000 each.
Yet almost every beneficiary whether rich or poor, rural or urban, has a “house“—one of the places protected by the Fourth Amendment against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”5 The question in this case is whether receipt of largesse from the government makes the home of the beneficiary subject to access by an inspector of the agency of oversight, even though the beneficiary objects to the intrusion and even though the Fourth Amendment‘s procedure for access to one‘s house or home is not followed. The penalty here is not, of course, invasion of the privacy of Barbara James, only her loss of federal or state largesse. That, however, is merely rephrasing the problem. Whatever the seman-
We spoke in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, of the denial of tax exemptions by a State because of exercise of First Amendment rights.
“It cannot be gainsaid that a discriminatory denial of a tax exemption for engaging in speech is a limitation on free speech. ... To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to fine them for this speech.” Id., at 518.
Likewise, while second-class mail rates may be granted or withheld by the Government, we would not allow them to be granted “on condition that certain economic or political ideas not be disseminated.” Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U. S. 146, 156.
In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, a State providing unemployment insurance required recipients to accept suitable employment when it became available or lose the benefits. An unemployed lady was offered a job requiring her to work Saturdays but she refused because she was a Seventh Day Adventist to whom Saturday was the Sabbath. The State canceled her unemployment benefits and we reversed, saying:
“The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on
“Nor may the South Carolina court‘s construction of the statute be saved from constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment compensation benefits are not appellant‘s ‘right’ but merely a ‘privilege.’ It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege. . . . [T]o condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant‘s willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.” Id., at 404, 406.
These cases are in the tradition of United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 282 U. S. 311, 328-329,7 where Mr. Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court, said:
“[T]he rule is that the right to continue the exercise of a privilege granted by the state cannot be made to depend upon the grantee‘s submission to a condition prescribed by the state which is hostile to the provisions of the federal Constitution.” 8
What we said in those cases is as applicable to
Is a search of her home without a warrant made “reasonable” merely because she is dependent on government largesse?
Judge Skelly Wright has stated the problem succinctly:
“Welfare has long been considered the equivalent of charity and its recipients have been subjected to all kinds of dehumanizing experiences in the government‘s effort to police its welfare payments. In fact, over half a billion dollars are expended annually for administration and policing in connection with the Aid to Families with Dependent Children pro-
gram. Why such large sums are necessary for administration and policing has never been adequately explained. No such sums are spent policing the government subsidies granted to farmers, airlines, steamship companies, and junk mail dealers, to name but a few. The truth is that in this subsidy area society has simply adopted a double standard, one for aid to business and the farmer and a different one for welfare.” Poverty, Minorities, and Respect For Law, 1970 Duke L. J. 425, 437-438.
If the welfare recipient was not Barbara James but a prominent, affluent cotton or wheat farmer receiving benefit payments for not growing crops, would not the approach be different? Welfare in aid of dependent children, like social security and unemployment benefits, has an aura of suspicion. There doubtless are frauds in every sector of public welfare whether the recipient be a Barbara James or someone who is prominent or influential. But constitutional rights—here the privacy of the home—are obviously not dependent on the poverty or on the affluence of the beneficiary. It is the precincts of the home that the
“[S]tudies tell us that the typical middle income American reaches retirement age with a
bundle of interests and expectations: as homeowner, as small investor, and as social security ‘beneficiary.’ Of these, his social security retirement benefits are probably his most important resource. Should this, the most significant of his rights, be entitled to a quality of protection inferior to that afforded his other interests? It becomes the task of the rule of law to surround this new ‘right’ to retirement benefits with protections against arbitrary government action, with substantive and procedural safeguards that are as effective in context as the safeguards enjoyed by traditional rights of property in the best tradition of the older law.” 11
It may be that in some tenements one baby will do service to several women and call each one “mom.” It may be that other frauds, less obvious, will be perpetrated. But if inspectors want to enter the precincts of the home against the wishes of the lady of the house, they must get a warrant. The need for exigent action as in cases of “hot pursuit” is not present, for the lady will not disappear; nor will the baby.
I would place the same restrictions on inspectors entering the homes of welfare beneficiaries as are on inspectors entering the homes of those on the payroll of government, or the homes of those who contract with the government, or the homes of those who work for those having government contracts. The values of the home protected by the
What Lord Acton wrote Bishop Creighton 12 about the corruption of power is increasingly pertinent today:
“I cannot accept your canon that we are to judge Pope and King unlike other men, with a favourable presumption that they did no wrong. If there is any presumption it is the other way against holders of power, increasing as the power increases. Historic responsibility has to make up for the want of legal responsibility. Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority: still more when you superadd the tendency or the certainty of corruption by authority.”
The bureaucracy of modern government is not only slow, lumbering, and oppressive; it is omnipresent. It touches everyone‘s life at numerous points. It pries more and more into private affairs, breaking down the barriers that individuals erect to give them some insulation from the intrigues and harassments of modern life.13 Isolation is not a constitutional guarantee; but the sanctity of the sanctuary of the home is such—as marked and defined by the
I would sustain the judgment of the three-judge court in the present case.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1970, p. 277.
SOCIAL WELFARE EXPENDITURES, BY SOURCE OF FUNDS AND PUBLIC PROGRAM: 1967 το 1969
(In millions of dollars)
| PROGRAM | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 (prel.) | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Federal | State and local | Federal | State and local | Federal | State and local | |
| Total. | 53,244 | 46,449 | 60,548 | 51,497 | 68,595 | 58,206 |
| Social insurance | 30,544 | 6,724 | 35,391 | 7,302 | 40,824 | 7,896 |
| Old-age, survivors, disability, health ins. | 24,581 | (X) | 28,748 | (X) | 33,889 | (X) |
| Health insurance for the aged | 3,395 | (X) | 5,347 | (X) | 6,598 | (X) |
| Railroad retirement | 1,278 | (X) | 1,417 | (X) | 1,547 | (X) |
| Public employee retirement 1 | 3,725 | 2,178 | 4,167 | 2,416 | 4,739 | 2,740 |
| Unemployment ins. and employment serv.2 | 790 | 1,963 | 873 | 2,055 | 932 | 2,021 |
| Railroad unemployment insurance | 38 | (X) | 46 | (X) | 45 | (X) |
| Railroad temporary disability insurance | 38 | (X) | 36 | (X) | 58 | (X) |
| State temporary disability insurance 3 | (X) | 530 | (X) | 574 | (X) | 635 |
| Hospital and medical benefits | (X) | 64 | (X) | 65 | (X) | 68 |
| Workmen‘s compensation 3 | 94 | 2,054 | 103 | 2,257 | 114 | 2,500 |
| Hospital and medical benefits | 14 | 681 | 15 | 750 | 17 | 833 |
| Public aid | 5,244 | 3,567 | 6,455 | 4,637 | 7,851 | 5,592 |
| Public assistance | 5,250 | 3,567 | 6,455 | 4,637 | 7,851 | 5,592 |
| Vendor medical payments | 1,157 | 1,226 | 1,760 | 1,821 | 2,186 | 2,235 |
| Other 4 | 979 | ... | 1,205 | ... | 1,462 | ... |
| Health and medical programs 5 | 3,681 | 4,128 | 4,233 | 4,038 | 4,497 | 4,621 |
| Hospital and medical care | 1,596 | 2,658 | 1,835 | 2,708 | 1,967 | 2,827 |
| Civilian programs | 164 | 2,658 | 187 | 2,708 | 200 | 2,827 |
| Defense Department 7 | 1,432 | (X) | 1,648 | (X) | 1,766 | (X) |
| Maternal and child health programs 8 | 130 | 171 | 161 | 176 | 192 | 190 |
| Medical research | 1,290 | 65 | 1,479 | 69 | 1,401 | 73 |
| School health (educational agencies) | (X) | 178 | (X) | 190 | (X) | 204 |
| Other public health activities 9 | 373 | 667 | 427 | 434 | 551 | 827 |
| Medical facilities construction | 284 | 389 | 332 | 461 | 386 | 500 |
| Defense Department | 50 | (X) | 20 | (X) | 59 | (X) |
| Other | 234 | 389 | 305 | 461 | 327 | 500 |
| Veterans programs | 6,857 | 23 | 7,329 | 33 | 7,996 | 40 |
| Pensions and compensation 10 | 4,487 | (X) | 4,716 | (X) | 5,041 | (X) |
| Health and medical programs | 1,346 | (X) | 1,465 | (X) | 1,585 | (X) |
| Hospital and medical care | 1,250 | (X) | 1,372 | (X) | 1,478 | (X) |
| Hospital construction | 49 | (X) | 46 | (X) | 54 | (X) |
| Medical and prosthetic research | 47 | (X) | 46 | (X) | 53 | (X) |
| Education | 297 | (X) | 466 | (X) | 671 | (X) |
| Life insurance 11 | 548 | (X) | 504 | (X) | 503 | (X) |
| Welfare and other | 179 | 23 | 179 | 33 | 197 | 40 |
| Education 12 | 5,279 | 30,889 | 5,108 | 33,648 | 5,079 | 37,954 |
| Elementary and secondary | 2,437 | 25,247 | 2,638 | 28,065 | 2,472 | 31,963 |
| Construction 13 | 33 | 3,937 | 35 | 4,184 | 34 | 4,620 |
| Higher | 2,089 | 4,400 | 1,807 | 4,800 | 1,943 | 5,100 |
| Construction | 710 | 900 | 474 | 1,000 | 431 | 1,100 |
| Vocational and adult 13 | 552 | 742 | 519 | 783 | 514 | 891 |
| Housing | 283 | 95 | 325 | 103 | 446 | 110 |
| Other social welfare | 1,356 | 1,524 | 1,706 | 1,786 | 1,903 | 2,293 |
| Vocational rehabilitation, total | 319 | 91 | 363 | 106 | 431 | 127 |
| Medical services and research | 78 | 17 | 98 | 26 | 116 | 31 |
| Institutional care 14 | 15 | 880 | 23 | 1,015 | 26 | 1,435 |
| School meals 15 | 442 | 147 | 544 | 162 | 624 | 171 |
| Child welfare 16 | 47 | 406 | 50 | 453 | 50 | 500 |
| Special OEO programs 16 | 452 | (X) | 608 | (X) | 647 | (X) |
| Social welfare, not elsewhere classified 17 | 81 | (X) | 118 | (X) | 124 | (X) |
— Represents zero. X Not applicable.
1 Excludes refunds to those leaving service. Federal data include military retirement.
2 Includes compensation for Federal employees and ex-servicemen, and trade adjustment and cash training allowances.
3 Programs operate in 4 States only: Calif., N.J., N.Y., and R.I. Benefits by private insurance carriers, State funds, and self-insurers.
4 Work relief, other emergency aid, surplus food for the needy, food stamps, and Job Corps, Neighborhood Youth Corps, and Work-Experience programs under the
5 Excludes domiciliary care in institutions other than mental or tuberculosis, and services included with other programs in social welfare series.
7 Includes cost of medical care for military dependent families.
8 Includes services for crippled children.
9 Excludes water supply and sanitation services.
10 Includes burial awards.
11 Excludes servicemen‘s group life insurance.
12 Federal expenditures for administrative costs (Office of Education) and research not shown separately but included in total.
13 Construction costs of vocational and adult education programs included under elementary-secondary expenditures.
14 Represents primarily surplus food for nonprofit institutions.
15 Represents primarily child welfare services under title V of the
16 Includes community action, migrant workers, and VISTA programs and all administrative expenses of the Office of Economic Opportunity.
17 Includes administrative expenses of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; Indian welfare; aging activities; certain manpower activities; and other items.
Source: Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administration; Social Security Bulletin, December 1969.
Hearings on H. R. 17923 before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, p. 1979.
U. S. Department of Agriculture
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service
ASCS Payments to Producers, All Programs,1 Calendar Year 1969
| Amount | Percent of total | |
|---|---|---|
| Total payments. | $3,794,996,353 | 100 |
| Payments below $5,000. | 2,078,439,326 | 55 |
| Payments $5,000 or above. | 1,457,635,442 | 38 |
| Undistributed 2 | 258,921,585 | 7 |
1 Includes acreage diversion payments on cotton, feed grain, and wheat; price support payments on cotton and feed grain; wheat marketing certificates; cost-share payments under the Agricultural Conservation Program, emergency conservation and Appalachia programs; land retirement and conservation assistance payments under the cropland conversion, cropland adjustment, and conservation reserve programs; and the milk indemnity payment program. Does not include any price support loans or purchases, and payments under the
2 Includes payments to producers under the
ASCS Payments by Size Groupings $5,000 and over
(Excludes sugar and wool payments)
| Range | Number | Amount |
|---|---|---|
| $5,000 to $7,499. | 61,330 | $ 370,839,000 |
| $7,500 to $9,999. | 25,859 | 222,488,754 |
| $10,000 to $14,999. | 21,147 | 254,979,861 |
| $15,000 to $24,999. | 12,856 | 242,547,832 |
| $25,000 to $49,999. | 6,029 | 200,524,421 |
| $50,000 to $99,999. | 1,404 | 91,191,225 |
| $100,000 to $499,999. | 346 | 55,113,824 |
| $500,000 to $999,999. | 11 | 7,668,176 |
| $1,000,000 and over. | 5 | 12,282,349 |
| Total | 128,987 | $1,457,635,442 |
Although I substantially agree with its initial statement of the issue in this case, the Court‘s opinion goes on to imply that the appellee has refused to provide information germane to a determination of her eligibility for AFDC benefits. The record plainly shows, however, that Mrs. James offered to furnish any information that the appellants desired and to be interviewed at any place other than her home. Appellants rejected her offers and terminated her benefits solely on the ground that she refused to permit a home visit. In addition, appellants make no contention that any sort of probable cause exists to suspect appellee of welfare fraud or child abuse.
Simply stated, the issue in this case is whether a state welfare agency can require all recipients of AFDC benefits to submit to warrantless “visitations” of their homes. In answering that question, the majority dodges between constitutional issues to reach a result clearly inconsistent with the decisions of this Court. We are told that there is no search involved in this case; that even if there were a search, it would not be unreasonable; and that even if this were an unreasonable search, a welfare recipient waives her right to object by accepting benefits. I emphatically disagree with all three conclusions. Furthermore, I believe that binding regulations of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare prohibit appellants from requiring the home visit.
I
The Court‘s assertion that this case concerns no search “in the
“[T]he Constitution protects the privacy of the home against all unreasonable intrusion of whatever character. . . . ‘[It applies] to all invasions on the part of the government and its employés of the sanctity of a man‘s home,’ ” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 550-551 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
This Court has rejected as “anomalous” the contention that only suspected criminals are protected by the
Even if the
Actually, the home visit is precisely the type of inspection proscribed by Camara and its companion case, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967), except that the welfare visit is a more severe intrusion upon privacy and family dignity. Both the home visit and the searches in those cases may convey benefits to the householder. Fire inspectors give frequent advice concerning fire prevention, wiring capacity, and other matters, and obvious self-interest causes many to welcome the fire or safety inspection. Similarly, the welfare caseworker may provide welcome advice on home management and child care. Nonetheless, both searches may result in the imposition of civil penalties—loss or reduction of welfare benefits or an order to upgrade a housing defect. The fact that one purpose of the visit is to provide evidence that may lead to an elimination of benefits is sufficient to grant appellee protection since Camara stated that the
The Court attempts to distinguish See and Camara by telling us that those cases involved “true” and “genuine” searches. The only concrete distinction offered is that See and Camara concerned criminal prosecutions for refusal to permit the search. The Camara opinion did observe that one could be prosecuted for a refusal to allow that search; but, apart from the issue of consent, there is neither logic in, nor precedent for, the view that the
Conceding for the sake of argument that someone might view the “visitation” as a search, the majority nonetheless concludes that such a search is not unreasonable. However, its mode of reaching that conclusion departs from the entire history of
First, it is argued that the home visit is justified to protect dependent children from “abuse” and “exploita-
Second, the Court contends that caseworkers must enter the homes of AFDC beneficiaries to determine eligibility. Interestingly, federal regulations do not require the home visit. In fact, the regulations specify the recipient himself as the primary source of eligibility information thereby rendering an inspection of the home only one of several alternative secondary sources.2 The majority‘s implication that a biannual home visit somehow assures the verification of actual residence or actual physical presence in the home strains credulity in the context of urban poverty. Despite the caseworker‘s responsibility for dependent children, he is not even required to see the children as a part of the home visit.3 Appellants offer scant explanation for their refusal even to attempt to utilize public records, expenditure receipts, documents such as leases, non-home interviews, personal financial records, sworn declarations, etc.—all sources that governmental agencies regularly accept as ade-
We are told that the plight of Mrs. James is no different from that of a taxpayer who is required to document his right to a tax deduction, but this analogy is seriously flawed. The record shows that Mrs. James has offered to be interviewed anywhere other than her home, to answer any questions, and to provide any documentation that the welfare agency desires. The agency curtly refused all these offers and insisted on its “right” to pry into appellee‘s home. Tax exemptions are also governmental “bounty.” A true analogy would be an Internal Revenue Service requirement that in order to claim a dependency exemption, a taxpayer must allow a specially trained IRS agent to invade the home for the purpose of questioning the occupants and looking for evidence that the exemption is being properly utilized for the benefit of the dependent. If such a system were even proposed, the cries of constitutional outrage would be unanimous.
Appellants offer a third state interest that the Court seems to accept as partial justification for this search. We are told that the visit is designed to rehabilitate, to provide aid. This is strange doctrine indeed. A paternalistic notion that a complaining citizen‘s constitutional rights can be violated so long as the State is somehow helping him is alien to our Nation‘s philosophy. More than 40 years ago, Mr. Justice Brandeis warned:
“Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government‘s purposes are beneficent.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 479 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
Although the Court does not agree with my conclusion that the home visit is an unreasonable search, its opinion suggests that even if the visit were unreasonable, appellee has somehow waived her right to object. Surely the majority cannot believe that valid
“Relevant constitutional restraints apply as much to the withdrawal of public assistance benefits as to disqualification for unemployment compensation . . . denial of a tax exemption . . . or . . . discharge from public employment.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 262 (1970).
II
The Court‘s examination of the constitutional issues presented by this case has constrained me to respond. It would not have been necessary to reach these questions for I believe that HEW regulations, binding on the States, prohibit the unconsented home visit.7
The federal Handbook of Public Assistance Administration provides:
“The [state welfare] agency especially guards against violations of legal rights and common decencies in such areas as entering a home by force, or without permission, or under false pretenses; making home visits outside of working hours, and particularly making such visits during sleeping hours . . . .” Part IV, § 2300 (a) (emphasis supplied).
Although the tone of this language is descriptive, HEW requirements are stated in terms of principles and objectives, Handbook, pt. I, § 4210 (3); and appellants do not contend that this regulation is merely advisory. Instead, appellants respond with the tired assertion that consent obtained by threatening termination of benefits constitutes valid permission under this regulation. There is no reason to suspect that HEW shares this crabbed view of consent. The Handbook, itself, insists on careful scrutiny of purported consent, pt. IV, § 2400. Section 2200 (a) is designed to protect the privacy of welfare recipients, and it would be somewhat ironic to adopt a construction of the regulation that provided that any person who invokes his privacy rights ceases to be a recipient.
Appellants next object that the home visit has long been a part of welfare administration and has never been disapproved by HEW. The short answer to this is that we deal with only the unconsented home visit. The general utility and acceptance of the home visit casts little light on whether HEW might prefer not to impose the visit on unwilling recipients. Appellants also remind us that the Federal Government itself requires a limited number of home visits for sampling purposes.
III
In deciding that the homes of AFDC recipients are not entitled to protection from warrantless searches by welfare caseworkers, the Court declines to follow prior case law and employs a rationale that, if applied to the claims of all citizens, would threaten the vitality of the