Riser v. QEP Energy
776 F.3d 1191
10th Cir.2015Background
- Kathy Riser, a 50‑year‑old former QEP employee, performed fleet administration and facilities/construction management duties at Questar and then QEP from 2003 until her termination in September 2011.
- After a QEP spin‑off, QEP placed Riser in a Grade 5 pay classification based on typical administrative assistant duties (not her actual duties); she was paid ~$47,382/year.
- QEP created a Fleet Administrator (Grade 7, $62,000) in May–June 2011 and hired Matthew Chinn (male, 39); Chinn assumed fleet duties that Riser had been performing and Riser trained him.
- QEP created a Facilities Manager (Grade 7, $66,000) and hired Jason Bryant (male, 30) shortly after Riser’s September 2011 termination; QEP claimed Riser was fired for poor performance on a North Dakota project.
- Riser sued under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), Title VII (sex discrimination), and the ADEA (age discrimination) for pay discrimination, failure to promote, and discriminatory discharge; the district court granted summary judgment to QEP.
- The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded: it reversed summary judgment as to Riser’s EPA, Title VII, and ADEA pay claims but affirmed dismissal of discriminatory discharge claims (Riser waived argument on prima facie case for discharge).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| EPA pay discrimination — are Riser’s duties "substantially equal" to male comparators? | Riser performed the core fleet and facilities duties that were later split into two male positions; jobs are substantially equal. | QEP: duties differed in scope/time (Riser split duties, males full‑time), so not substantially equal. | Reversed district court: genuine disputes of material fact exist as to substantial equality versus Chinn and Bryant; jury issue. |
| EPA — is pay gap justified by a bona fide, gender‑neutral pay classification? | QEP’s grade system didn’t reflect Riser’s actual duties; she asked for reclassification and was ignored, so system may be pretextual. | QEP: its industry‑based classification and prior/salary negotiations for hires explain pay differentials. | Reversed district court: QEP failed to prove an affirmative defense so clearly that no rational jury could find otherwise. |
| Title VII/ADEA pay discrimination — prima facie similarity and pretext? | Jobs are substantially similar under the less stringent Title VII/ADEA standard; QEP’s pay system is inconsistent and thus pretextual. | QEP: classification system is legitimate and explains higher pay for younger/male hires. | Reversed district court: Riser established prima facie cases; evidence could permit a jury to find QEP’s pay justification pretextual. |
| Title VII/ADEA discriminatory discharge — did Riser show pretext? | Riser argued QEP’s stated performance reasons were pretextual (but did not properly brief prima facie). | QEP: termination for unsatisfactory performance on North Dakota project. | Affirmed: Riser waived challenge to prima facie case by not raising it in opening brief; summary judgment on discharge claims stands. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355 (10th Cir.) (EPA equal‑work standard and prima facie elements)
- EEOC v. Central Kansas Medical Center, 705 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir.) (job‑content—not title—controls EPA equality inquiry)
- County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (bona fide job‑rating systems can be EPA defenses)
- Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (classification systems as potential EPA defenses)
- Mickelson v. New York Life Insurance Co., 460 F.3d 1304 (employer must prove affirmative EPA defense clearly at summary judgment)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (plaintiff may show discrimination by proving employer’s explanation false)