70 Cal.App.5th 1059
Cal. Ct. App.2021Background
- Plaintiffs: Rincon Band and Santa Ynez (Chumash) Band (federally recognized tribes), ten tribal-affiliated business entities, and 12 individual tribe members sued 24 cardroom and third-party proposition‑player defendants alleging those non‑tribal cardrooms run unlawful “banked” card games on non‑tribal land that usurp tribes’ exclusive right to offer class III banked games in California.
- Legal context: California Constitution (art. IV, §19(f)) and federal law (IGRA) recognize tribes’ exclusive ability to offer casino‑style banked games on tribal lands; Penal Code §330.11 permits certain controlled player‑dealer games if rules require systematic rotation; plaintiffs allege cardrooms circumvent rotation and/or use TPPs to effectively bank games.
- Procedural posture: plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint (SAC); defendants demurred. Trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment of dismissal. Plaintiffs appealed.
- Trial court holdings (key): tribes are not “persons” under the UCL and not “private persons” for public nuisance statutes; many tribe entities are arms of tribes and likewise lack UCL standing; tribe entities and tribe members failed to allege the required economic injury (UCL) or special injury (public nuisance).
- Relief claims rejected: UCL and public nuisance claims dismissed for lack of standing; injunctive/declaratory claims based on art. IV §19(e) and Penal Code enforcement failed because §19(e) is not self‑executing and equity will not ordinarily enforce penal laws; tortious‑interference claims by Chumash failed for lack of breach/disruption allegations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether tribes are “persons” with standing under the UCL | Tribes may sue as "persons" or as "organizations of persons" under Bus. & Prof. Code §17201 | UCL’s definition lists private entities; governmental sovereign tribes are not "persons" for UCL purposes | Tribes are governmental sovereigns and not "persons" under the UCL; no standing to sue under §17204 |
| Whether tribal business entities or tribe members have UCL standing (economic injury) | Tribe Entities and Members alleged lost gaming revenue/distributions under Revenue Allocation Plans and personal harm | Defendants: revenue/net gaming belongs to tribes; SAC fails to plead Tribe Entities or Members personally lost money or property caused by defendants | SAC fails to plead concrete, particularized economic injury for Tribe Entities or Members; UCL standing insufficient |
| Whether tribes/tribe entities are “private persons” with standing for public nuisance | Plaintiffs: civil nuisance statutes allow private‑person suits if specially injured; tribes/entities qualify | Defendants: governmental tribes/entities are not “private persons”; public prosecutors, not tribes, are proper public‑nuisance plaintiffs for community harms | Tribes and tribe entities are not “private persons” under Civ. Code §3493/Code Civ. Proc. §731; lack standing |
| Whether plaintiffs alleged the required special injury for public nuisance | Plaintiffs: diversion of gaming revenue is a special injury distinct from public harm | Defendants: alleged harm is economic/competitive, not the sort of property/personal enjoyment injury public‑nuisance law protects; SAC lacks allegations tying revenue loss to individual plaintiffs | Plaintiffs failed to allege a special injury of the type public nuisance law protects or individualized harm traceable to plaintiffs; nuisance claims fail |
| Whether art. IV §19(e) or Penal Code violations support equitable declaratory/injunctive relief by private parties | Plaintiffs: §19(e) and Penal Code violations authorize injunctive/declaratory relief against illegal gaming | Defendants: §19(e) is not self‑executing; equity typically will not enforce penal statutes absent authorization | §19(e) is not self‑executing; private equitable enforcement of Penal Code is generally unavailable; equitable claims fail |
| Whether Chumash stated tortious‑interference claims against defendants | Chumash: defendants’ illegal cardrooms disrupted economic relationship under the gaming compact and increased costs | Defendants: SAC does not allege an actual breach or disruption of the compact or that defendants made compact performance more burdensome | SAC fails to allege breach/disruption of the compact or sufficiently pleaded disruption of a prospective economic relationship; tortious‑interference claims fail |
Key Cases Cited
- Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Int’l Union v. Davis, 21 Cal.4th 585 (Cal. 1999) (describes banked games, IGRA/Prop 1A history and limits on state power over tribal gaming)
- United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Newsom, 10 Cal.5th 538 (Cal. 2020) (discusses tribal gaming, Public Law 280, and state regulatory limits)
- California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (U.S. 1987) (tribal gaming on Indian lands not subject to state criminal law that is regulatory rather than prohibitory)
- Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (U.S. 1998) (federal law: tribes enjoy sovereign immunity from suit absent waiver or congressional authorization)
- Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 310 (Cal. 2011) (modern UCL standing requires economic injury in fact causally linked to defendant’s conduct)
- PETA v. California Milk Producers Advisory Bd., 125 Cal.App.4th 871 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (governmental entities are not “persons” under the UCL)
- California Gasoline Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp., 50 Cal.2d 844 (Cal. 1958) (constitutional provisions may be non‑self‑executing and require legislative implementation)
- Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 310 (Cal. 2011) (UCL standing and incorporation of federal "injury in fact" concept)
- Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal.3d 311 (Cal. 1985) (pleading and demurrer standards: treat demurrer as admitting properly pleaded facts, not conclusions)
- Moore v. Regents of University of California, 51 Cal.3d 120 (Cal. 1990) (courts do not assume truth of legal conclusions or contentions)
- Miami Nation Enterprises v. State (People v. Miami Nation Enterprises), 2 Cal.5th 222 (Cal. 2016) (factors for determining when an entity is an "arm of the tribe" entitled to immunity)
- Gold Country Casino v. Kemper (Allen v. Gold Country Casino), 464 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2006) (tribal casino functions as an arm of the tribe for immunity analysis)
- Leider v. Lewis, 2 Cal.5th 1121 (Cal. 2017) (equity will not ordinarily restrain violations of penal statutes absent statutory authorization)