Ries v. City of Chicago
950 N.E.2d 631
Ill.2011Background
- Plaintiffs Ries and Martinez were injured when a stolen police car driven by Lowe, an escaping prisoner, crashed into them.
- Officer Oliva placed Lowe in his squad car with keys in ignition and engine running, leaving Lowe in custody in a car without a cage.
- Pursuing officers subsequently chased Lowe; Lowe drove through a red light, causing the collision with plaintiffs.
- Plaintiffs sued the City and Oliva for willful and wanton misconduct; the City moved to dismiss arguing Tort Immunity Act immunities.
- Trial and appellate proceedings focused on whether 4-106(b) immunity for escaping prisoners applied to the City and whether 2-202’s willful/wanton exception could override that immunity.
- The appellate court granted JNOV for the City on immunity grounds; the Supreme Court affirmed, holding City immune under 4-106(b).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does DeSmet require police control of the scene for 2-202 to apply? | Lowe’s injuries fall under 2-202 despite 4-106(b) immunity. | DeSmet requires scene control for 2-202 to apply; 4-106(b) immunity governs. | No; 4-106(b) immunity controls. |
| Must a plaintiff sue the officer personally for 2-202 to apply? | Doe-based reasoning allows 2-202 to apply against officers. | Section 2-202 applies to public employees; when only the entity remains, it cannot. | 2-202 cannot override 4-106(b) via a lone public-entity claim. |
| Does 4-106(b) immunize the City for injuries caused by an escaping prisoner here? | The City should be liable for negligent/policymaker conduct. | Lowe was an escaping prisoner; injuries were inflicted by him; City immune. | Yes; City immune under 4-106(b). |
| Was the initial directed verdict for Oliva binding, precluding later jury consideration of Oliva’s willful conduct? | Oliva’s conduct could be considered in the City's liability. | Directed verdict removed Oliva from the case; cannot re-include his conduct. | Directed verdict upheld; the City not liable for Oliva’s willful/wanton conduct. |
Key Cases Cited
- Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 374 (1994) (Doe holds 2-202 can provide a willful/wanton exception)
- DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497 (2006) (limits 2-202 application relative to 4-102 immunity)
- In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179 (1997) (overrules broad reading of willful/wanton in 2-202 when no exception exists)
- Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, 196 Ill. 2d 484 (2001) (limits application of willful/wanton exceptions under immunities)
- Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335 (1998) (willful/wanton exceptions and immunity scope examined)
- Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213 (2007) (priority of specific immunity provisions over general ones)
- Aikens v. Morris, 145 Ill. 2d 273 (1991) (section 2-202 narrowed to 'executing or enforcing' law at time of incident)
- Barnett v. Board of Education, 171 Ill. 2d 391 (1997) (illustrates scope of immunities when not explicit exceptions exist)
- Chicago Flood Litigation (see above), 176 Ill. 2d 179 (1997) (restated limiting interpretation of 2-202 in immunity schema)