Ricky D. Parker and James Myers v. Schlumberger Technology Corporation
01-14-01018-CV
| Tex. App. | Jun 23, 2015Background
- Schlumberger bought Parker Energy Services; Parker and Myers signed Intellectual Property, Confidential Information, and Non-Compete (ICN) agreements and (for Myers) a Retention Bonus Contract with one-year post‑employment noncompete and non‑solicit provisions.
- Parker resigned Oct. 2, 2013; Schlumberger contends Parker and Myers began preparing and then soliciting competing business (Professional Wireline / PWL) in 2014, including ordering trucks, tools, recruiting former Schlumberger employees, and obtaining MSAs with customers.
- Schlumberger obtained a temporary restraining order (Oct. 9, 2014) and a temporary injunction (Dec. 18, 2014) enjoining Parker and Myers broadly from working for or assisting competing wireline businesses, soliciting established customers, and using/confidentially handling proprietary materials; bond ultimately set at $50,000.
- Parker and Myers appealed interlocutorily, challenging denial of arbitration and the injunction; the First Court of Appeals stayed trial-court proceedings but allowed the trial court to hear and modify injunction issues.
- On June 4, 2015 the trial court entered an amended temporary injunction that largely preserved the substantive work restrictions but added a September 18, 2015 expiration for Parker alone; appellants move the court of appeals to review and dissolve the injunction, arguing the noncompete expired Oct. 2, 2014 and equipment purchases/preparation do not toll it.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Schlumberger) | Defendant's Argument (Parker/Myers) | Held / Trial Court Ruling |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforceability of ICN restraints and propriety of temporary injunction | ICN and retention‑bonus provisions are valid; defendants breached them (solicitation, employee recruitment, use/retention of confidential info), causing irreparable harm warranting injunction | Defendants contend restraints are overbroad or unenforceable and that any competitive activity was preparatory; injunction improperly restrains constitutional right to work | Trial court found probable right to relief on breach and other claims and entered (then amended) a temporary injunction prohibiting competitive work and solicitations; court concluded irreparable harm would result absent injunction |
| Whether Parker’s non‑compete expired Oct. 2, 2014 or was tolled/extended | Schlumberger argues Parker’s pre‑expiration acts (ordering trucks, recruiting, soliciting) tolled/extended the one‑year restriction | Parker argues the ICN forbids actual present competition (not preparatory acts), the one‑year term expired Oct. 2, 2014, and purchasing equipment/preparations are permissible and do not toll | Trial court concluded Parker engaged in breaches that justified tolling/extension; appellants argue on appeal that tolling by mere preparations is improper and injunction therefore abuses discretion |
| Scope (time, geography, activity) — reasonableness under Texas law | Schlumberger says restraints are appropriately limited to customers/territories tied to defendants’ duties and confidential info | Defendants argue restraints (especially indefinite injunction originally entered) are broader than necessary, lacking sufficient temporal/geographic limitation | Trial court imposed broad county/customer/state restrictions tied to Plaintiffs’ exhibits; amended order limited Parker’s restrictions to expire Sept. 18, 2015, but otherwise kept substantive scope intact |
| Relief sought on interlocutory review (compel arbitration / dissolve injunction) | Schlumberger opposes arbitration/early dissolution; urges enforcement to protect customers, goodwill, and confidential information | Parker/Myers separately seek reversal of denial to compel arbitration and dissolution/modification of injunction to allow immediate work | On interlocutory record, appellants seek appellate review under Tex. R. App. P. 29.6; the court of appeals stayed trial except for injunction matters and permitted review — appellants assert the amended injunction does not cure the core legal defects and should be reversed |
Key Cases Cited
- Abetter Trucking Co. v. Arizpe, 113 S.W.3d 503 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003) (employees may prepare to compete absent an express covenant forbidding preparation)
- Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. 2011) (noncompetes must be narrowly tailored and employers must show special facts to justify restraint)
- Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. 1990) (covenants not to compete are restraints on trade and disfavored; reasonableness required)
- Martin v. Linen Sys. for Hospitals, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984) (burden on employer to prove necessity and reasonableness of covenant)
- Gallagher Healthcare Ins. Servs. v. Vogelsang, 312 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009) (restraints broader than necessary are unnecessary and unenforceable)
- Borders v. KRLB, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1987) (courts cannot rewrite contracts to add terms not agreed by parties)