Rickey W. Thompson v. Lee County Democratic Party Executive Committee, 227 So. 3d 1037

Background

Rickey Thompson, a sitting Lee County Justice Court judge, was removed from office by the Mississippi Supreme Court for judicial misconduct; the Court’s mandate issued August 13, 2015.
Nine days before the mandate issued, Thompson won the Democratic primary for reelection to the same justice court seat.
After the removal mandate, the Lee County Democratic Executive Committee (following Attorney General guidance) replaced Thompson on the general-election ballot with another nominee.
Thompson sued, arguing (1) removal under Miss. Const. art. 6, § 177A does not permanently bar return to office and therefore Miss. Code § 9-19-17 impermissibly adds a constitutional qualification, and (2) he was denied due process in ballot removal.
The Hinds County Circuit Court held Thompson ineligible for judicial office; the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “remove from office” under § 177A is permanent and thus Thompson cannot return to the office.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does “remove from office” in Art. 6 § 177A permanently bar a judge from holding that judicial office in the future?	Thompson: “Remove from office” only vacates the current term; the Constitution’s eligibility rules (Art. 6 § 171) do not list prior removal as a disqualification.	AG/Respondents: “Remove from office” implies permanent separation; removal is more severe than suspension and forbids future judicial service.	Held: “Remove from office” is permanent; a removed judge remains ineligible to return.
Does Miss. Code § 9-19-17 impermissibly add a constitutional qualification for judicial office?	Thompson: § 9-19-17 adds a qualification (no prior removal), violating Art. 6 § 171 and the rule that statutes cannot add constitutional qualifications.	AG/Respondents: § 9-19-17 implements § 177A and merely restates the constitutional effect of removal.	Held: Court did not reach the statutory-qualification question because it resolved the case on the constitutional meaning of “remove from office.”
Were Thompson’s due-process rights violated by the ballot removal procedures?	Thompson: Proper procedures were not followed; commissions/election officials lacked authority to disqualify him without statutory/process safeguards.	AG/Respondents: The Supreme Court’s removal effected ineligibility, so ballot actions were proper.	Held: Court declined to address procedural/due-process challenge because permanence of removal resolved eligibility.
What standard of review applies to constitutional/statutory interpretation?	Thompson: N/A (argues constitution governs eligibility).	Respondents: N/A.	Held: De novo review for constitutional and statutory interpretation; presumption of constitutionality for statutes when relevant.

Key Cases Cited

Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Thompson, 169 So.3d 857 (Miss. 2015) (opinion ordering removal for judicial misconduct)
Proctor v. Daniels, 392 S.W.3d 360 (Ark. 2010) (holding constitutional removal contemplates permanency)
Kentucky Judicial Conduct Comm’n v. Woods, 25 S.W.3d 470 (Ky. 2000) (distinguishing suspension from removal; removal bars holding office)
In re Maples, 611 So.2d 211 (Miss. 1992) (consent order contemplated prohibition on future judicial service)
In re Anderson, 451 So.2d 232 (Miss. 1984) (language indicating removal can disqualify from future judicial office)
In re Lloyd W. Anderson, 412 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1982) (discussing legislative implementation of § 177A and § 9-19 statutes)
Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Osborne, 876 So.2d 324 (Miss. 2004) (describing removal as the most severe discipline)
Gelch v. State Board of Elections, 482 A.2d 1204 (R.I. 1984) (distinguishing resignation/ouster issues; not dispositive on permanence of removal)
In re Johnson, 689 So.2d 1313 (La. 1997) (holding removal prevented assuming a subsequent term won while removal was pending)
Montgomery v. Lowndes County Democratic Exec. Comm., 969 So.2d 1 (Miss. 2007) (addressing interplay of constitutional qualifications and statutory residency requirements)