*1 opening of the settled award would have argument Fund’s that required he was appropriate. instance, been In such an reject do so. We also argument that provides KRS 342.125 that no fact con- Special Fund should not required tained in agreement constitutes an ad- begin paying its share of the award en- Davis, mission against interest. tered reopening at until expira- after the settlement at contemplated issue perma- tion of 25% of expectancy. claimant’s life nent, partial disability obviously which As effective on the exposure date of last could have increased had the worker expe- 342.120(8)(b)provided: KRS rienced worsening injury. Unlike In instances where employer case, the instant Davis did not involve a liability settled its for income benefits settlement which contemplated total dis- and thereafter a determination has been ability, disability in- could not made of the special liability, fund’s crease even if the physical worker’s condi- special portion fund of the benefit rate tion worsened. paid shall be over the maximum
Claimant and employer, the parties provided statute for that disabili- to the agreement which presently at ty, agreed by unless otherwise par- all issue, dispute have no regard with to its ties. meaning. When claimant employ and the case, In the instant employer’s liability claim, er agreed to settle the evidence had extinguished upon payment of the been introduced from three physicians lump sum. persuaded We are that if any which indicated that he suffered from cate additional benefits are awarded at reopen- disease, gory 2 and there was no evidence ing, Special begin paying Fund must of less than category disease. The appli ¾ its share of the award as of the date the cable version of KRS 342.732 would have motion reopen was filed. authorized an award of disability total due The decision of the Appeals Court of pneumoconiosis based the evidence affirmed, and the matter is remanded to of category 2 disease. Claimant and the the ALJ to enter an granting employer both agreement assert that the reopen. motion to contemplated the compromise of a total disability which could not be reopened and All concur. increased even upon evidence of a worsen ing of claimant’s condition. Stated other
wise, claimant and the employer both un agreement
derstood their provide sum,
upon payment
lump
of the
any liabili
ty
employer might
which the
have had for
KENTUCKY JUDICIAL CONDUCT
income
pneumoconi-
benefits for claimant’s
COMMISSION, Petitioner,
entirely extinguished.
osis was
See New
berg
Chumley, Ky.,
v.
facts, and we are aware none. Under circumstances, reject
those the Special *2 KY, McKenzie, Grayson, D.
Philip respondent. AND ORDER
OPINION
the Court
before
cause comes
This
Conduct Commis-
the Judicial
motion of
R.
declaring William
an order
sion1
reason of his
ineligible,
Woods
Judge, to
District Court
Novem-
in the
to that office
seek election
unex-
to fill the
special election
ber 2000
facts, two issues
From the
pired term.
First, we
address.
we must
emerge that
may con-
whether this Court
must decide
action un-
original
an
the motion as
sider
Ky.
110(2)(a),
der
Const.
answered affirma-
question
is
event
minimum
determine the
tively, we must
Ky.
§ 121 of
duration
Const.
judicial office.
the removal from
Conduct
Judicial
On June
Ky.
Commission,
acting pursuant to
Const.
seq.,
et
4.000,
entered
121 and SCR
removing William
final order
unanimous
of District Court
from the Office
Woods
Dis-
Thirty-seventh Judicial
Judge of the
that,
determined
trict. The Commission
verbally
had
things, Woods
among other
him as
who came before
abused citizens
mistreated court
similarly
had
judge and
he
with whom
and other officials
personnel
also determined
The Commission
worked.
handgun
displayed
openly
that he had
District
Morgan
during a session of
Court,
during a two-
concluded that
and it
election,
after he had lost
week
that could
in conduct
engaged
“judicial tyranny.”
as
be described
most severe
believed “the
the Commission
warranted.
discipline” was
thoroughly
unnecessary to more
It
ap-
did not
as Woods
review the evidence
removing him from
the order
peal from
KY,
Rabe, Lexington,
James
George F.
final.
of Removal is now
office. The Order
Lawson,
Secretary,
Executive
D.
were
KY,
July
public statements
Lexington,
Conduct
that he
to the effect
to Woods
attributed
petitioner.
pline judges for official misconduct.
is a creature of
1. The Commission
authority to disci-
vested with
intended to seek
brought
November
when
specific
forum was
special
election to the
In response
identified.
to the contention
just
from which he had
been removed. On that
we could exercise original
14, 2000,
July
an original action was filed
110(2)(a),
under
we acknowledged:
this Court
the Judicial Conduct Com-
possesses
this Court
the raw
*3
mission seeking enforcement of its order of
general-
entertain
case which fits
thereby
prohibiting Woods from
ly within the rubric of its constitutional
pursuing
unexpired
election to the
term.
110(2)(a)
grant
authority.
As Section
responded
Woods
pe-
to the Commission’s
provision
the Constitution contains a
July
tition on
August
2000. On
grants
the Supreme
super-
Woods filed as a candidate for the office of
Justice,
visory control of the Court of
District Judge
Thirty-seventh
for the
Dis-
virtually any matter within that context
16, 2000,
August
trict.2 On
this Court
subject
jurisdiction.4
would be
to its
oral argument
heard
on the Commission’s
However,
110(2)(a)
§
due to
motion.
the breadth of
The Commission
represented
was
counsel,
tone,
Rabe,
discretionary
and its
George
F.
we held the
and Woods
counsel,
represented by
deciding
was
factor in
taking
original
D.
action
Philip
110(2)(a)
§
McKenzie.
under
is not whether
this
jurisdiction,
Court could exercise
but
Woods asserts
that
the Judicial
whether
it should.5 In the exercise of
Conduct Commission lacks standing or au
restraint,
Abernathy
concluded
that
thority to seek enforcement of the order of
110(2)(a)
original actions should be en-
removal. The Commission responds that
tertained
“only
this Court
in well de-
power
its constitutional
to remove a judge
fined or compelling circumstances” and
necessarily
includes the author
“generally only in
cases where
other
ity
to seek
enforcement of its or
court has
proceed.”6
just
This is
ders, and that
may
this Court
entertain
such a case.
Ky.
such
actions
Const.
110(2)(a).
is
affirm,
court with
authority
This Court
original jurisdiction
pur-
Ky.
aside,
modify,
110(2)(a)
set
or remand orders of the
suant to
may
“as
Const.
Commission.7
it
that
follows
this
required to exercise control of the Court of
empowered
Court is
interpret
and en
Justice.” While in most cases this Court’s
Moreover,
force those orders.
is
this is a
appellate only, the Constitu-
classic situation where we should exercise
recognizes
highest
tion
court of
original jurisdiction
superviso
our
to maintain
system
unified
must be able to
ry
exercise
control of the
necessary supervisory
Court of Justice. The
authority.
proposition
This
Commission voted to
was considered most re-
remove Woods from
Nicholson,3
cently in
Abernathy
egregious
misconduct. Yet
110(2)(a)
compared
which we
regain
Sections
and Woods now seeks to
that same of
112(5) of the
Constitution of
in fice
having sought
review
deciding
original
where an
action should of the Commission’s order of removal.
argument,
objected
2. At oral
to the
5.
Id. at 89.
supplement
Commission's motion to
the rec-
copy
filing papers. Upon
ord with a
of his
p.
Stephens,
6.
Id. at
89. Former Chief Justice
filing papers
the belief that such
are relevant
Stumbo,
joined by
thought
Justice
we went
defenses,
in view of the claims and
we have
They
too far.
believed that because
issue
day by separate
granted
this
the Com-
nature,
was administrative in
this Court had
supplement
mission’s motion to so
the record.
supervision.
the inherent
to exercise
Ky.,
3.
record of removed ac Louisiana, Johnson,9 sup- of In re cording argument, judge to his a removed judicial ports the idea that removal from precluded immediately regain term, of at a officeis for the remainder the removed, ing the office he was from which Johnson, In the removal minimum. while either for the a succeeding same term or case was the re-elected pending, was response, term. ar Commission a commencing for term after the removal means, minimum, gues that at a removal judgment The court was to become final. disqualification for the remainder held that to the applied the removal current term office. serving term of that the office was Section Ken- Constitution of at the and to the time he gives the tucky Judicial Conduct Commis- subsequent term to he was elected the authority sion to take three different pending. while the removal case was types regard of actions with to dis- Returning misconduct or A unfitness for office. to the judge may guidance proper interpreta- for cover as disability, retired sus- in pended pay, good or removed for tion of removal the structure of Although Undoubtedly, a provision. cause. not removal Constitution does removal, a concept define is not arcane more than suspension severe sanction and is pay. addressed Sixth Edition definite have char- term without We Therein, Dictionary. Black’s Law pen- “Re- acterized removal as “more extreme moval from as office” is defined follows: alty” than suspension10 the Commis- sion, removal, in order of concluded
Deprivation of
act of
competent
office
discipline
that “the
severe
is warrant-
most
superior
acting
scope
officer
within
It would
ed
this case.”
be absurd
authority.
“Suspension”
tempo-
suspend
rary forced
of hold that
the Commission could
removal
exercise
office;
significant period
some
pay
“removal” is the dismissal from without
time,
more
office.
but that the
severe measure
10. Long
8. Nicholson v.
Retirement and Remov-
v. Judicial Retirement and Removal
Commission,
(1978).
Ky.,
Ky.,
al
562 S.W.2d
610 S.W.2d
(La. 1997).
9.
Upon the authorities discussed herein- CHIEF JUSTICE above, analysis language and our KELLER, Justice, dissenting. and structure of 121 of the Constitution I respectfully dissent because the ma- of Kentucky, we have no doubt that jority opinion incorrectly holds that remedy of disqualifies a former to remove a at least the encompasses separate au- distinct remainder of the current term. To hold thority disqualify holding otherwise would render removal less se- future While vere than suspension and possibly convert 121 grants Woods’ removal into a suspension only (hereinafter, Judicial Conduct Commission question few months. The of whether Commission”) “the to divest a Woods’ ineligibility for office should last judge of her his or the electorate of longer than the remainder of the current this Commonwealth has reserved district court judge’s term is not now be- the General Assembly pro- sought by fore Court. The relief hibit former Commission was Woods’ disqualification judicial office. The Commission removed serving the office from which he *5 Woods from in office its order of June during the remainder of the 2000, but neither the Commission nor this term and that granted. relief will be empowered Court is under the Constitu- IT Accordingly, IS ORDERED that prohibit tion entering Woods from William R. Woods shall be hereby and is November special election and seek- ineligible declared for election to the office ing the office formerly he held. Judge District Court for the Thirty- majority’s statement that this case seventh in Judicial District the November requires the Court to mini- “determine the 7, 2000, election, and his name shall not be mum duration ... of the removal of a certified as a candidate for that office. betrays official” its failure to com- Furthermore, William R. is hereby Woods prehend the nature Although of removal. prohibited seeking from the office of Dis- majority upon dictionary relies defini- trict Judge Thirty-seventh correctly tions which describe the act of by any during Judicial District means in- “terminating] wholly removal as remainder of the current term of district cumbency employment,”1 office or judges, court prohibited he is likewise the majority’s conclusion that such lan- from seeking holding any other guage clearly implies disqualification from office of the Kentucky Court of Justice conceptualizes future office removal as a during said term.11 state of being rather than act which divests a from office. Such COOPER, JOHNSTONE and incoherent, a conceptualization is and the STUMBO, JJ., concur. by majority conclusions drawn from J., KELLER, separate files a dissenting similarly this initial are flawed. premise opinion in which GRAVES and of majority’s reasoning Much flawed JJ., WINTERSHEIMER, join. that, from stems its conclusion because GRAVES, J., separate dissenting disciplin- files a ultimate removal constitutes the J., sanction, opinion WINTERSHEIMER, in ary which a removed from office joins. prohibited holding must be the office Dictionary). Revised Black's Law Majority opinion (citing 1. See at 473 Fourth is, be, hereby R. Woods Judge is more William to ensure that removal Although the Com- suspension preserve than and to office.”
serious removed from heirarehy potential disciplinary interpret asks this Court to so mission now not, majority’s view character- order, sanctions. the Commission did a “meta-suspension” as izes removal not, a term remove Woods could a more the fact that removal is overlooks in the were elected If Woods office. because, suspension than serious sanction election, he would special November an individual after removal Thirty-seventh district become ceases to be The distinction regard- future office Judicial District —a dura- type of sanction rather than its formerly that he held less of the fact tion: and removal Suspension, retirement note, ma- additionally, that the I would separation person all of a involve ineligi- merely order jority does not Woods judicial authority whatever or of the office of district ble for has.[7] he character fice One District, but also Thirty-seventh Judicial who is person ize an order which bars a prohibited seek- him “likewise orders longer holding judicial any judicial ing or “suspension” in the as a during said Kentucky Court of Justice matter, (or, for that a “retirement” or as vacancy term.” event of “removal”), but such characterization Court, Appeals, the Circuit meaning words. a strained those for which Supreme Court m. Removal is the means eligible run virtue of would be are
judges guilty serious misconduct him residency, majority prohibits his Suspension divested of office.... seeking any of future offices. these office; merely a divestiture it is separation undisputed Constitu- It is *6 from and duties.2 powers pow- the grants § 121 Commission tion to remove a from office: er The removal of the office of Woods from of the Thirty-Seventh district Judi- Subject procedure to rules of com- accomplished cial District was and Court, by the Supreme established when the him pleted Commission ordered any justice and hearing, after notice can- removed from office. This much or the Court Supreme Court disputed given style not be of this case: Circuit or District Appeals, Court Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission disability be or Court retired for Woods, formerly William a district without suspended pay or for 3 Thirty-seventh judge of the Judicial Dis- by a good cause commission.... majority opin- question, trict. Without Kentucky with the In accordance Constitu- judicial holding prohibits ion tion, has adopted this Court future, if narrow even 4.020, Rule which authorizes him opinion holding only prohibits Commission: judicial seeking approx- office for the separately or impose To sanctions imately years on his former remaining two (1) admonition, collectively private term. It matters not that Woods censure; reprimand or reprimand, public year the time of his serving a four term at (2) or removal suspension pay exercised removal. Commission judicial office, of its the Ken- or retirement full extent under “that the Court Justice any it ordered tucky Constitution when Probert, (emphasis Kentucky § 121 411 N.W.2d Constitution In Re Mich. 308 (Levin, (brack- (1981) dissenting) added). 784 J. original). 7 from eted footnote 476
lawyer while a candidate for of- to a disqualify seeking future fice. .4 majority office. The con- opinion tains not one citation to case decided in contrast, however, Kentucky Consti- any jurisdiction which reached this con- 66, 67, §§ tution grant impeach- 68 clusion, Kentucky and neither ment Representa- the House of 121 nor Kentucky Constitution tives,5 designate the Senate to conduct eligibility which outlines the requirements trials following impeachment,6 and em- justices judges, any pro- contains power only Assembly the General to both disqualifying vision remove civil removed from officers from office and dis- qualify holding them office from future future office: 4.020, I significant also find it that SCR The Governor all civil officers adopted the rule this Court to define
shall be liable to impeachment any office; misdemeanors in of the judgment but contains in such cases shall not extend no language authorizing the Commission further than and disquali- to disqualify judge it has removed from honor, to hold seeking office. SCR 4.020 fications profit trust or under this Common- gives the the authority Commission wealth; shall, party but the convicted “admonition, judge by sanction a private nevertheless, subject and hable to reprimand, public reprimand or cen- indictment, trial and punishment by sure,” although those sanctions are not law.7 specifically Kentucky mentioned in Consti- Assembly’s power General impeach tution 121 because this Court deter- civil judges,8 officers includes and the Judi- express grant authority mined that “the Constitution, cial Article of the retire, suspend judges remove electorate, adopted by the expressly pro- good cause contained Section impeachment vides powers “[t]he of Kentucky Constitution by impli- includes general assembly shall remain invio- cation the to include the lesser late.” sanctions set forth in Al- [SCR 4.020].” though majority today Although this Court reaches simi- previously lar quired disqualification determination that Commission to act within removal, implied by this obviously enumerated within 121,10 today’s never believed majority be the case before *7 that judge today, simply holds the to remove a or we would have written it necessarily from office includes the power into the rule. 4.020(l)(b) added). (emphasis Kentucky
4. SCR
(emphasis
§
9.
Constitution
109
added).
(“The
§
Kentucky
5.
Constitution
66
House of
Representatives
have
shall
the sole
Kentucky
Hardesty,
10. See
Bar Association v.
Id.).
impeachment.”
(1989) (Holding
Supreme
A of other states’ number disqualifi- includes a necessarily rules15 and court statutory provisions,14 provisions cation, the constitutional all of office judge removed from that a provide defining the effect jurisdictions fu- in other may not seek reasons disciplinary for surplusage are judicial office the ma- removal accept If we judicial ture office. (emphasis V, ("A 18(1) future.” Id. See, judicial office in the § e.g., Const. Art. Penn. 13. N.D.Cent.Code, 27-23-03(4) added)); § peace ... re justice of the justice, judge or judge (North providing "A re- shall this section 18 Dakota statute office under moved from ineligible for automatically judicial by supreme office and court is moved forfeit Id.), office, eligible judicial pending office.” further order judicial be for thereafter IV, 18(d) ("A court, suspended prac- § re Art. Cal. Const. is Id.); ineligible by Supreme ORS Court is ticing moved law in this state.” pending 1.430(3) order is judicial defining further effect (Oregon § office statute removal, suspended practicing law in this state.” "Upon an order for of removal: ("Under l-a(6)(C) Id.); §V Tex. Const. Art. and the from office judge shall be removed active relating to the of an the law and the office salary shall cease Judge, the Commission and Justice or date such vacant on the of the may prohibit for a retired or Id.). review tribunal order.” Judge holding judicial office in the mer sitting a court of this State future or from 15.See, 26: e.g., XXIII Sect. LASTSCTR. Id.); V by assignment.” Tex. Const. Art. judge who has been removed Any former removal, l-a(9) ("Upon § ... an order for Supreme pursuant by the question vacant. The office in shall become V., 25(c) eligible § Art. to La. Const. removal, tribunal, in ... an order for review judicial office a candidate for to become person holding judi may prohibit such years five by this court. After until certified Id.); Wash. Const. cial office in the future.” removal, a former the date of IV, 31(5) ("The or Art. eligi- petition for reinstatement of may file a justice by supreme court removed judicia- bility judicial office with the to seek vacant, ineligible person becomes and that ry The commission shall commission. judicial eligibility office until is reinstated petition promptly hold review Id.); supreme court.” NYCLS Const necessary. hearing take evidence if VI, 22(h) ("A judge justice Art or peti- days filing thirty of the Within appeals ineligible the court shall tion, file a written shall commission Id.). hold other office.” as to with this court recommendation See, 16-10-410(d) (Ar- eligibility judge’s e.g., whether the former Ark.Stat.Ann. be reinstated. providing "[a]ny judge office should seek kansas statute subchap- review the recommendation The court shall moved from office to this grant- commission and issue an appointed to serve as ter cannot be thereafter Id.); 15-l-13(a) denying judge certifica- (Georgia ing the former judge.” O.C.G.A. judicial eligibility to seek providing other tion of "[i]n statute addition Johnson, (La.1997), person re 689 So.2d qualification if a Id. In opinion, with a majority ends any judicial cited in the been removed from review, eligibility "Judge footnote: Johnson’s after order of the will be eligible candidate for person not be to be elected shall adopted day.” Id. governed by rule any judicial state court appointed to office in this the rule rule cited above is years elapsed time at 1314 n. The until have seven Id.); opinion, and it casts doubt to in the Nev.Rev.Stat .Ann. referred of such removal.” *8 (Nevada 3.060(l)(d), 4.010(1) interpretation that au- 2.020(l)(d), majority's on the §§ Supreme Court held thority. The Louisiana person not providing that shall "[a] statutes merely Judge Johnson could be removed eligible or be to the office be a candidate for Justice, regardless of terms Judge, of the number from office Supreme Court District of” serve, Peace, authorized to which he was then respectively, he has "[i]f Justice of the rule, adopted to its by any judicial the Court removed from ever been Constitution, to any authority under the Louisiana legislature or removed or retired judges remove supplement its to judicial office the commission Supreme Court not the Louisiana § 1.4677 office. Had discipline.”); Nev.Rev.Stat.Ann. rule, have (Nevada Johnson could adopted such providing that addition "[i]n statute office, just as former sought election to his commission in lieu removal ... to or having doing such au- here. Not discipline in- Woods is may impose ... other forms of Constitution, to, thority jus- under the cluding, requiring the but not limited adopted a rule. not similar Agree not to seek have judge to: ... 9. tice or which do no more than state ity the obvious. opinion appears to overlook the fact Such a conclusion defies common sense. the November 2000 special election the office of district of the Thir- When the Michigan Judicial Tenure ty-seventh Judicial District is a contested Commission asked candidate, race with an incumbent Michigan enjoin former guarantee Woods has no of victory. As holding judicial office in the future under a tempting as it must be this Court to Michigan Constitutional provision tanta- embrace ignore activism and mount of Kentucky limitations 110(2)(b), the Court declined to do so Carter, we must allow the electorate in it expressly because was “not empowered Elliott, and Morgan Counties to decide for injunction to enter an sought nature themselves this November whether Woods dissenter, here.”16 A who concurred with again should be invested with public respect to the majority’s deny decision to trust in involved the office of district court injunctive relief, aptly characterized facing situation this Court: Under this Court was granted power, previously expressly GRAVES, WINTERSHEIMER, JJ„
served, judges to remove join from of- this dissent. fice .... GRAVES, Justice, dissenting. jurisdictions Several provide by con- stitution or statute that a who has join I the dissent of Justice Keller. been removed from office thereafter I separately write because the Judicial disqualified holding judicial Conduct Commission standing lacks Michigan provision. has no such bring original in action this Court. jurisdictions, those the electorate has expressed judgment that one who has may proven William Woods be been removed should never ineligible to assume the office of district again be public invested with the trust however, judge; the law has not been fol- has, effect, given up its own in challenging lowed eligibility to be a power to re-elect person such a after candidate for election to that office. A removal. Michigan electorate has qualified voter the 37th Judicial District expressed no similar sentiment.... proper person is the bring legal chal- In Kentucky, the spoken— electorate has lenge. has conferred the disqual- There a specific statute for review of official, ify a including civil a judge, from the qualifications of a candidate. KRS solely upon future office the Gen- provides 118.176 for the bona fide chal- Assembly. eral lenge aof candidate: Commission exercised the (2) granted it the Constitution it when The bona fides of candidate required Woods to surrender his robe and seeking general election in a ... gavel by ordering him him questioned by any quali- office. The majority’s zeal to ensure that fied voter entitled to vote for such candi- does not again by summary serve as date ... proceedings con- ignores simple Court of Justice sisting of a motion before the Circuit fact that the electorate of the Common- Court of the circuit in which the *9 wealth given has not the Commission or candidate whose bona fides is questioned major- this Court the to do so. The resides.... Probert, (Levin, (foot- supra dissenting) In Re note 2 at 774. 17. Id. at 790-792 J. added). emphasis notes deleted and campaign of his about the ethics plaints of Removal
The Order the Judicial conduct. may well inter- Conduct Commission
preted by the Circuit Woods has been being a impediment preventing Woods’ Kentucky Constitution Court of Justice. prior candidate 110(2)(a) give not does term for expiration of the which he conduct govern Woods’ elected, namely 2002. he is not a member of at this time because the Court of Justice. § 121 grants specific Judicial Conduct Commission authority under This Court would have to retire a powers limited for disabil- 110(2)(a) ex- ity, suspend pay, only if he qualifications amine Woods’ good cause. move a The Com- assume the office of elected seeks to go removing can no further than mission Judge. District office. The Judicial Conduct standing lacks Commission WINTERSHEIMER, J., joins in this eligibility. to contest electoral dissent. longer been removed from office The Judicial Conduct Commis- sion over his has no conduct participation current election. is a
While William Woods candidate the Judicial Conduct Com- jurisdiction only
mission has over com-