Richardson v. Belleque, S064185

Background

Richardson was convicted of first‑degree manslaughter and second‑degree assault; at a presentence jury hearing the state sought an enhanced “dangerous‑offender” sentence under ORS 161.725 based on a finding that he suffered from a "severe personality disorder."
The court‑appointed psychiatrist (Dr. Suckow) diagnosed Richardson with antisocial personality disorder based in part on juvenile history; defense counsel cross‑examined but did not obtain juvenile records or consult/retain a defense psychologist to rebut the diagnosis.
The jury found Richardson a dangerous offender; the court imposed a substantially enhanced determinate and the maximum 30‑year indeterminate term.
In post‑conviction proceedings Richardson alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate juvenile records and for failing to consult or call a defense expert to rebut Suckow; he produced a defense psychologist (Dr. Cooley) who, after reviewing St. Mary’s juvenile records, opined Richardson had an adjustment reaction in adolescence (not conduct disorder) and could not be validly diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder.
The post‑conviction court granted relief, vacating the dangerous‑offender sentence and ordering resentencing; the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the judgments.

Issues

Issue	Richardson's Argument	Belleque's (State's) Argument	Held
Whether defense counsel’s decision not to investigate juvenile records or consult a defense psychologist was reasonable	Counsel failed to investigate records (St. Mary’s) and failed to consult/retain an expert; that failure was not a reasonable exercise of professional judgment	Counsel made a reasonable tactical choice to rely on vigorous cross‑examination rather than an expert, as he sometimes did	Counsel’s failure to investigate and to consult an expert was unreasonable under the circumstances; decision was not an informed tactical choice
Whether the deficient performance prejudiced Richardson	A defense expert (or use of juvenile records) would have rebutted antisocial personality diagnosis and thus tended to affect the dangerous‑offender jury finding	Presenting the St. Mary’s material via a defense expert would have aided the state by filling gaps and might have reinforced Suckow’s conclusions; petitioner must show a reasonable probability of a different result	Under Oregon law petitioner need not show a >50% probability; there was more than a mere possibility that proper investigation/ expert use would have tended to affect the jury’s dangerous‑offender verdict; prejudice established
Proper standard for prejudice in failure‑to‑investigate post‑conviction claims	Oregon uses a “tendency to affect the result” standard for jury determinations—more than possibility but less than probability	The state urges the federal Strickland reasonable‑probability test (outcome would likely have been different)	Oregon standard applies (‘‘tendency to affect the result’’); Strickland probability test not required here
Scope of competent counsel’s obligations when expert testimony will be used against the defendant	Where an adverse expert diagnosis depends on juvenile history, counsel must reasonably investigate and consult experts to test that diagnosis	Tactical limits on investigation can be reasonable; counsel’s prior experience and cross‑examination may suffice	When counsel knows an adverse expert will rely on historical juvenile data and that information is incomplete, reasonable counsel must investigate and consult an expert before deciding not to present rebuttal evidence

Key Cases Cited

Johnson v. Premo, 361 Or 688 (2017) (failure to investigate expert‑related evidence can be ineffective assistance)
Green v. Franke, 357 Or 301 (2015) (for jury determinations, prejudice standard is ‘‘tendency to affect the result’’—more than possibility, less than probability)
Krummacher v. Gierloff, 290 Or 867 (1981) (standards for assessing counsel performance and tactical choices)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (federal ineffective‑assistance framework and when investigation is required for tactical choices)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (counsel’s investigation into background must be adequate to support strategic choices)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (failure to discover mitigating background evidence can be constitutionally deficient)
Lichau v. Baldwin, 333 Or 350 (2002) (counsel’s withdrawal of a defense must be supported by reasonable investigation)
State v. Huntley, 302 Or 418 (1986) (role of expert testimony in dangerous‑offender proceedings; jury must make ultimate legal determination)
Pereida‑Alba v. Coursey, 356 Or 654 (2015) (elements for establishing ineffective assistance under Oregon constitution)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any fact increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)