Richard Moreno v. City of Clarksville
479 S.W.3d 795
| Tenn. | 2015Background
- On December 24, 2009, a tree on State property fell onto Moreno's car on the Neal Tarpley Bridge, causing serious injuries and property damage.
- Moreno timely filed a written notice of claim against the State with the Division of Claims Administration on December 17, 2010, under the Claims Commission Act.
- The Division failed to honor/deny the claim within 90 days, and the claim was transferred to the Claims Commission on March 17, 2011.
- Moreno filed a formal complaint against the State with the Claims Commission on April 14, 2011; the State answered on May 18, 2011.
- In September 2012 the State amended its answer to include the City of Clarksville as comparatively at fault, and Moreno sought to amend accordingly; subsequently, the City moved to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds.
- Moreno filed a Circuit Court complaint against the City on November 26, 2012; the circuit court dismissed in May 2013; the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the written notice constitutes an 'original complaint' under 20-1-119 | Moreno argues notice within one year triggers 90-day window against City. | Clarksville argues only an 'original complaint' qualifies, and notice is not a complaint. | No; notice is not an 'original complaint' triggering 20-1-119. |
| Whether 9-8-402(b) tolls GTLA limitations for the City | Claims Commission tolling applies to GTLA claims against City. | GTLA limitations are not tolled by 9-8-402(b) absent express legislative intent. | 9-8-402(b) does not toll GTLA limitations against the City. |
| Application of Mills/Grindstaff/Shaffer framework to 20-1-119 | Notice approach aligns with remedial purpose to include non-parties. | Plain statutory language requires an 'original complaint' in filing; letters/discovery do not suffice. | Statutory text controls; the remedial purpose does not override plain language. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mills v. Fulmarque, 360 S.W.3d 362 (Tenn. 2012) (90-day window is not the statute of limitations; applies to adding nonparties)
- Becker v. Ford Motor Co., 431 S.W.3d 588 (Tenn. 2014) (interprets 20-1-119 purpose to fairly include potential contributors)
- Cunningham v. Williamson County Hospital Dist., 405 S.W.3d 41 (Tenn. 2013) (GTLA limitations; conflicts with general extensions must be express)
- Lynn v. City of Jackson, 63 S.W.3d 332 (Tenn. 2001) (general savings statutes not extending GTLA limitations absent express language)
- Auto. Sales Co. v. Johnson, 122 S.W.2d 453 (Tenn. 1938) (strict construction; independent of broad savings statutes)
- Doyle v. Frost, 49 S.W.3d 853 (Tenn. 2001) (GTLA strict compliance; governs sovereign immunity claims)