Richard M. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18074
| 11th Cir. | 2016Background
- Villarreal, a 49-year-old, applied for a territory manager job at R.J. Reynolds in 2007; his application was screened out under criteria favoring recent college graduates and shorter sales experience. He received no notice and did not follow up.
- He learned of potential age-based screening only in 2010, filed an EEOC charge in May 2010, later amended it to add repeat rejections and Pinstripe (the contractor). EEOC issued right-to-sue notices in 2012.
- Villarreal brought class claims alleging (1) disparate treatment under 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) and (2) disparate impact under 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2); the district court dismissed the disparate-impact count and untimely portions of the claims and denied leave to amend.
- The Eleventh Circuit majority holds § 4(a)(2) (29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2)) covers employees (those with a present "status as an employee") and therefore does not provide a disparate-impact cause of action for nonemployee applicants.
- The court also holds Villarreal cannot obtain equitable tolling for his disparate-treatment claim because his pleadings admit he did nothing for over two years and therefore did not pursue his rights diligently; the continuing-violation argument was remanded to the panel for decision.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ADEA § 4(a)(2) authorizes disparate-impact suits by job applicants | Villarreal/EEOC: § 4(a)(2)'s phrase "any individual" and the statute's purpose allow applicants to sue for disparate impact | R.J. Reynolds: § 4(a)(2) protects only those with a "status as an employee" (current employees), not applicants | Held: § 4(a)(2) covers employees only; applicants cannot bring disparate-impact claims under that provision |
| Whether to defer to EEOC/agency interpretation that § 4(a)(2) covers applicants | Villarreal/EEOC: longstanding agency interpretation supports applicants' claims | R.J. Reynolds: statutory text is clear; where text is unambiguous courts need not defer | Held: No deference; plain text controls and is unambiguous |
| Whether equitable tolling preserves claims based on 2007 rejection | Villarreal: he lacked notice and exercised diligence once he learned facts in 2010; tolling applies | R.J. Reynolds: Villarreal failed to act for two years and thus lacked diligence required for tolling | Held: Equitable tolling denied—pleaded facts foreclose diligence; dismissal affirmed in part |
| Whether continuing-violation doctrine makes disparate-treatment claim timely | Villarreal: repeated rejections and later applications constitute a continuing violation | R.J. Reynolds: (not addressed below in full) | Held: Court did not decide; remanded to panel to address continuing-violation issue |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (plurality and concurring opinions recognizing disparate-impact theory under ADEA § 4(a)(2))
- Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (establishing disparate-impact liability for facially neutral employment practices)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation)
- Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (statutory context can inform whether "employee" covers nonemployees or former employees)
- Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975) (equitable tolling where employer deception or concealed discriminatory practices made a claim not reasonably discoverable)